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Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2022 12:06:32 +0100
From: email@yancy.lol
To: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
 <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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> Whether that's terrible or not depends on how easy it is to retry (and 
> how
> likely the retry is to succeed) after a failure -- if a TCP packet 
> fails,
> it just gets automatically resent, and if that succeeds, there's a 
> little
> lag, but your connection is still usable

I'm not sure if that analogy fits here.  A TCP packet will be retried 
(as opposed to UDP), although usually the retry strategy is because of 
an underlying connection issue, not a protocol mismatch or in this case 
"policy" mismatch, right?

If network propagation and node discovery becomes an issue, and as 
Antoine mentions, there becomes a need for competing services as I 
understand it, could that give rise to indexes and trackers who spider 
the network to create world view?  Perhaps it's a bad idea since "third 
party" trackers are security holes, however, to my knowledge, we already 
have "trusted" nodes during the initial bootstrap process.  Even so, I 
don't think we could preclude such solutions from occurring organically 
if the need is arises.

Cheers,
-Yancy

On 2022-10-30 02:02, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev wrote:

> On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 09:45:09PM -1000, David A. Harding via
> bitcoin-dev wrote:
> 
>> I think this might be understating the problem.  A 95% chance of 
>> having
>> an outbound peer accept your tx conversely implies 1 in 20 payments 
>> will
>> fail to propagate on their initial broadcast.
> 
> Whether that's terrible or not depends on how easy it is to retry (and 
> how
> likely the retry is to succeed) after a failure -- if a TCP packet 
> fails,
> it just gets automatically resent, and if that succeeds, there's a 
> little
> lag, but your connection is still usable. I think it's *conceivable* 
> that
> a 5% failure rate could be detectable and automatically rectified. Not
> that I have a good idea how you'd actually do that, in a way that's
> efficient/private/decentralised...
> 
>> Some napkin math: there are about 250,000 transactions a day; if
>> we round that up to 100 million a year and assume we only want one
>> transaction per year to fail to initially propagate on a network where
>> 30% of nodes have adopted a more permissive policy, lightweight 
>> clients
>> will need to connect to over 50 randomly selected nodes.[1]
> 
> A target failure probability of 1-in-1e8 means:
> 
> * with 8 connections, you need 90% of the network to support your txs
> * with 12 connections, you need ~79%
> * with 24 connections (eg everyone running a long-lived node is
> listening, so long lived nodes make 12 outbound and receive about
> ~12 inbound; shortlived nodes just do 24 outbound), you need ~54%
> 
> So with that success target, and no preferential peering, you need
> a majority of listening nodes to support your tx's features in most
> reasonable scenarios, I think.
> 
>> For a more
>> permissive policy only adopted by 10% of nodes, the lightweight client
>> needs to connect to almost 150 nodes.
> 
> I get 175 connections needed for that scenario; or 153 with a target
> failure rate of 1-in-10-million.
> 
> Cheers,
> aj
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=
=3DUTF-8" /></head><body style=3D'font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana,Gen=
eva,sans-serif'>
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0">
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
Whether that's terrible or not depends on how easy it is to retry (and how<=
br />likely the retry is to succeed) after a failure -- if a TCP packet fai=
ls,<br />it just gets automatically resent, and if that succeeds, there's a=
 little<br />lag, but your connection is still usable</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
I'm not sure if that analogy fits here.&nbsp; A TCP packet will be retried =
(as opposed to UDP), although usually the retry strategy is because of an u=
nderlying connection issue, not a protocol mismatch or in this case "policy=
" mismatch, right?</div>
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
If network propagation and node discovery becomes an issue, and as <span st=
yle=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;"><span style=3D"font-fa=
mily: arial, sans-serif;">Antoine</span></span> mentions, there becomes a n=
eed for competing services as I understand it, could that give rise to inde=
xes and trackers who spider the network to create world view?&nbsp; Perhaps=
 it's a bad idea since "third party" trackers are security holes, however, =
to my knowledge, we already have "trusted" nodes during the initial bootstr=
ap process.&nbsp; Even so, I don't think we could preclude such solutions f=
rom occurring organically if the need is arises.</div>
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
Cheers,</div>
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
-Yancy</div>
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
On 2022-10-30 02:02, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev wrote:
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0">On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 09:45:09PM -1000, David A. Har=
ding via<br />bitcoin-dev wrote:
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0">I think this might be understating the problem. &nbsp;=
A 95% chance of having<br />an outbound peer accept your tx conversely impl=
ies 1 in 20 payments will<br />fail to propagate on their initial broadcast=
=2E</blockquote>
<br />Whether that's terrible or not depends on how easy it is to retry (an=
d how<br />likely the retry is to succeed) after a failure -- if a TCP pack=
et fails,<br />it just gets automatically resent, and if that succeeds, the=
re's a little<br />lag, but your connection is still usable. I think it's *=
conceivable* that<br />a 5% failure rate could be detectable and automatica=
lly rectified. Not<br />that I have a good idea how you'd actually do that,=
 in a way that's<br />efficient/private/decentralised...<br /><br />
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0">Some napkin math: there are about 250,000 transactions=
 a day; if<br />we round that up to 100 million a year and assume we only w=
ant one<br />transaction per year to fail to initially propagate on a netwo=
rk where<br />30% of nodes have adopted a more permissive policy, lightweig=
ht clients<br />will need to connect to over 50 randomly selected nodes.[1]=
</blockquote>
<br />A target failure probability of 1-in-1e8 means:<br /><br />&nbsp;* wi=
th 8 connections, you need 90% of the network to support your txs<br />&nbs=
p;* with 12 connections, you need ~79%<br />&nbsp;* with 24 connections (eg=
 everyone running a long-lived node is<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;listening, so=
 long lived nodes make 12 outbound and receive about<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;~12 inbound; shortlived nodes just do 24 outbound), you need ~54%<br /><br=
 />So with that success target, and no preferential peering, you need<br />=
a majority of listening nodes to support your tx's features in most<br />re=
asonable scenarios, I think.<br /><br />
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0">For a more<br />permissive policy only adopted by 10% =
of nodes, the lightweight client<br />needs to connect to almost 150 nodes.=
</blockquote>
<br />I get 175 connections needed for that scenario; or 153 with a target<=
br />failure rate of 1-in-10-million.<br /><br />Cheers,<br />aj<br />_____=
__________________________________________<br />bitcoin-dev mailing list<br=
 /><a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lis=
ts.linuxfoundation.org</a><br /><a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.or=
g/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener noreferre=
r">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a></bloc=
kquote>
</div>
</body></html>

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