path: root/16/0475d9578af188c9f7747c5195b5360a428db3

Return-Path: <zachgrw@gmail.com>
Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org (smtp4.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::137])
 by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A42EC000E
 for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
 Sun,  1 Aug 2021 08:09:39 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F3E6C4022B
 for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
 Sun,  1 Aug 2021 08:09:38 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.098
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5
 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1,
 DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001,
 HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001,
 SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: smtp4.osuosl.org (amavisd-new);
 dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from smtp4.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1])
 by localhost (smtp4.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
 with ESMTP id AyP2Un7cUv2N
 for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
 Sun,  1 Aug 2021 08:09:38 +0000 (UTC)
X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0
Received: from mail-il1-x12f.google.com (mail-il1-x12f.google.com
 [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::12f])
 by smtp4.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E22764021C
 for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
 Sun,  1 Aug 2021 08:09:37 +0000 (UTC)
Received: by mail-il1-x12f.google.com with SMTP id a14so13784665ila.1
 for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>;
 Sun, 01 Aug 2021 01:09:37 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025;
 h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to;
 bh=hjn/88igarBHPfWU1A2S+6MJRSvZzWGNuo3XIsDMoEU=;
 b=OQ/FxQvt5z9ljld7nlIlOdSo45UC1rgaBa9VPWf42c1Ov9uXqH3csfCEc2oSao59em
 rQ5W3YRbXNviNlJhFXGIsFedjsa81DwNDkNYmehXv5FM8LcfZleJeBYqWqiFaJLju5Ru
 RTRNJVsdMAx8NC2S49FEqx+dpKP4944JnsvvMGDomwuCKD45L4QRPXstURcHWjHjiaBi
 Y8OiP79FjiWW3ITefs5UjPcb1KcUu2w7t40r0edYQc83iPUnE3K/gBbhwGc/w+yJaSVL
 igfQ+pWjHfIHAiZfxngF+fceR8SEO67kPZnhuh78SBMe9w5w5cOzaTwt/+liruT0k26r
 uorg==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
 d=1e100.net; s=20161025;
 h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to;
 bh=hjn/88igarBHPfWU1A2S+6MJRSvZzWGNuo3XIsDMoEU=;
 b=he47DSgaqi6Yj4u8bLPenl+HdPe96q1C/T2PTklAo/RMWPpS3zQOlPGAm1WSzz5R5y
 FROiLXJHDh4vazaHfDIbdHHhhrlxBfDib6EmrKiI3JbZ/9zmwTTDr2eLT9m+jB1H8XsN
 9EnNQ7aa45XLn48GmFpLjHsUV6siEHuu4MhzseCCUrXLd80JD3xN4lxOvMbnQri9fnUJ
 xdiFjR5eVet14p8m6KzZfWx7NvOPZUYwg4UOM5qpdS7jUX+ZIasMnjxN58/os9GpFshD
 r1VZnKErFXs3wkbbn1ogkNhXc1dMdFhyB0yUFji6BTtFarzCN+KsjCkDGcTUCCC3jVPk
 0AcQ==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530+GHZpuZqtB/m9KYyLG6DeVTheHV5HOKWkL4HhTsOlTaPSDGMz
 PF/bR964/sdNnDosBsIJ00cb0gZ7wlspSBGocLymGYV+GK4=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzZiojDp9WvGAXJIObXTIJk8Dp/6Y0vbRK+VTSFx07nu1i4bunXFPcZlNj/O6OxzjmInbpUKeWhYOx4sVTYAcU=
X-Received: by 2002:a92:7d08:: with SMTP id y8mr5319588ilc.111.1627805376903; 
 Sun, 01 Aug 2021 01:09:36 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
From: Zac Greenwood <zachgrw@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 2021 10:09:26 +0200
Message-ID: <CAJ4-pEAETy7_vOez5H32mZLg9gRpRajvoBjZyBT_v=DEqdQJvQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000041002705c87af934"
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sun, 01 Aug 2021 16:32:05 +0000
Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Exploring: limiting transaction output amount as a
 function of total input value
X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, 
 <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/>
List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, 
 <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 01 Aug 2021 08:09:39 -0000

--00000000000041002705c87af934
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

[Resubmitting to list with minor edits. My previous submission ended up
inside an existing thread, apologies.]

Hi list,

I'd like to explore whether it is feasible to implement new scripting
capabilities in Bitcoin that enable limiting the output amount of a
transaction based on the total value of its inputs. In other words, to
implement the ability to limit the maximum amount that can be sent from an
address.

Two use cases come to mind:

UC1: enable a user to add additional protection their funds by
rate-limiting the amount that they are allowed to send during a certain
period (measured in blocks). A typical use case might be a user that
intends to hodl their bitcoin, but still wishes to occasionally send small
amounts. Rate-limiting avoids an attacker from sweeping all the users'
funds in a single transaction, allowing the user to become aware of the
theft and intervene to prevent further thefts.

UC2: exchanges may wish to rate-limit addresses containing large amounts of
bitcoin, adding warm- or hot-wallet functionality to a cold-storage
address. This would enable an exchange to drastically reduce the number of
times a cold wallet must be accessed with private keys that give access to
the full amount.

In a typical setup, I'd envision using multisig such that the user has two
sets of private keys to their encumbered address (with a "set" of keys
meaning "one or more" keys). One set of private keys allows only for
sending with rate-limiting restrictions in place, and a second set of
private keys allowing for sending any amount without rate-limiting,
effectively overriding such restriction.

The parameters that define in what way an output is rate-limited might be
defined as follows:

Param 1: a block height "h0" indicating the first block height of an epoch;
Param 2: a block height "h1" indicating the last block height of an epoch;
Param 3: an amount "a" in satoshi indicating the maximum amount that is
allowed to be sent in any epoch;
Param 4: an amount "a_remaining" (in satoshi) indicating the maximum amount
that is allowed to be sent within the current epoch.

For example, consider an input containing 100m sats (1 BTC) which has been
rate-limited with parameters (h0, h1, a, a_remaining) of (800000, 800143,
500k, 500k). These parameters define that the address is rate-limited to
sending a maximum of 500k sats in the current epoch that starts at block
height 800000 and ends at height 800143 (or about one day ignoring block
time variance) and that the full amount of 500k is still sendable. These
rate-limiting parameters ensure that it takes at minimum 100m / 500k = 200
transactions and 200 x 144 blocks or about 200 days to spend the full 100m
sats. As noted earlier, in a typical setup a user should retain the option
to transact the entire amount using a second (set of) private key(s).

For rate-limiting to work, any change output created by a transaction from
a rate-limited address must itself be rate-limited as well. For instance,
expanding on the above example, assume that the user spends 200k sats from
a rate-limited address a1 containing 100m sats:

Start situation:
At block height 800000: rate-limited address a1 is created;
Value of a1: 100.0m sats;
Rate limiting params of a1: h0=800000, h1=800143, a=500k, a_remaining=500k;

Transaction t1:
Included at block height 800100;
Spend: 200k + fee;
Rate limiting params: h0=800000, h1=800143, a=500k, a_remaining=300k.

Result:
Value at destination address: 200k sats;
Rate limiting params at destination address: none;
Value at change address a2: 99.8m sats;
Rate limiting params at change address a2: h0=800000, h1=800143, a=500k,
a_remaining=300k.

In order to properly enforce rate limiting, the change address must be
rate-limited such that the original rate limit of 500k sats per 144 blocks
cannot be exceeded. In this example, the change address a2 were given the
same rate limiting parameters as the transaction that served as its input.
As a result, from block 800100 up until and including block 800143, a
maximum amount of 300k sats is allowed to be spent from the change address.

Example continued:
a2: 99.8 sats at height 800100;
Rate-limit params: h0=800000, h1=800143, a=500k, a_remaining=300k;

Transaction t2:
Included at block height 800200
Spend: 400k + fees.
Rate-limiting params: h0=800144, h1=800287, a=500k, a_remaining=100k.

Result:
Value at destination address: 400k sats;
Rate limiting params at destination address: none;
Value at change address a3: 99.4m sats;
Rate limiting params at change address a3: h0=800144, h1=800287, a=500k,
a_remaining=100k.

Transaction t2 is allowed because it falls within the next epoch (running
from 800144 to 800287) so a spend of 400k does not violate the constraint
of 500k per epoch.

As could be seen, the rate limiting parameters are part of the transaction
and chosen by the user (or their wallet). This means that the parameters
must be validated to ensure that they do not violate the intended
constraints.

For instance, this transaction should not be allowed:
a2: 99.8 sats at height 800100;
Rate-limit params of a2: h0=800000, h1=800143, a=500k, a_remaining=300k;

Transaction t2a:
Included at block height 800200;
Spend: 400k + fees;
Rate-limit params: h0=800124, h1=800267, a=500k, a_remaining=100k.

This transaction t2a attempts to shift the epoch forward by 20 blocks such
that it starts at 800124 instead of 800144. Shifting the epoch forward like
this must not be allowed because it enables spending more that the rate
limit allows, which is 500k in any epoch of 144 blocks. It would enable
overspending:

t1: spend 200k at 800100 (epoch 1: total: 200k);
t2a: spend 400k at 800200 (epoch 2: total: 400k);
t3a: spend 100k at 800201 (epoch 2: total: 500k);
t4a: spend 500k at 800268 (epoch 2: total: 1000k, overspending for epoch 2).

Specifying the rate-limiting parameters explicitly at every transaction
allows the user to tighten the spending limit by setting tighter limits or
for instance by setting a_remainder to 0 if they wish to enforce not
spending more during an epoch. A second advantage of explicitly specifying
the four rate-limiting parameters with each transaction is that it allows
the system to fully validate the transaction without having to consider any
previous transactions within an epoch.

I will stop here because I would like to gauge interest in this idea first
before continuing work on other aspects. Two main pieces of work jump to
mind:

Define all validations;
Describe aggregate behaviour of multiple (rate-limited) inputs, proof that
two rate-limited addresses cannot spend more than the sum of their
individual limits.

Zac

--00000000000041002705c87af934
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>[Resubmitting to list with minor edits. My previous s=
ubmission ended up inside an existing thread, apologies.]</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>Hi list,</div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;d like to explore whether i=
t is feasible to implement new scripting capabilities in Bitcoin that enabl=
e limiting the output amount of a transaction based on the total value of i=
ts inputs. In other words, to implement the ability to limit the maximum am=
ount that can be sent from an address.</div><div><br></div><div>Two use cas=
es come to mind:</div><div><br></div><div>UC1: enable a user to add additio=
nal protection their funds by rate-limiting the amount that they are allowe=
d to send during a certain period (measured in blocks). A typical use case =
might be a user that intends to hodl their bitcoin, but still wishes to occ=
asionally send small amounts. Rate-limiting avoids an attacker from sweepin=
g all the users&#39; funds in a single transaction, allowing the user to be=
come aware of the theft and intervene to prevent further thefts.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>UC2: exchanges may wish to rate-limit addresses containing l=
arge amounts of bitcoin, adding warm- or hot-wallet functionality to a cold=
-storage address. This would enable an exchange to drastically reduce the n=
umber of times a cold wallet must be accessed with private keys that give a=
ccess to the full amount.</div><div><br></div><div>In a typical setup, I&#3=
9;d envision using multisig such that the user has two sets of private keys=
 to their encumbered address (with a &quot;set&quot; of keys meaning &quot;=
one or more&quot; keys). One set of private keys allows only for sending wi=
th rate-limiting restrictions in place, and a second set of private keys al=
lowing for sending any amount without rate-limiting, effectively overriding=
 such restriction.</div><div><br></div><div>The parameters that define in w=
hat way an output is rate-limited might be defined as follows:</div><div><b=
r></div><div>Param 1: a block height &quot;h0&quot; indicating the first bl=
ock height of an epoch;</div><div><div>Param 2: a block height &quot;h1&quo=
t; indicating the last block height of an epoch;</div><div>Param 3: an amou=
nt &quot;a&quot; in satoshi indicating the maximum amount that is allowed t=
o be sent in any epoch;<br></div><div>Param 4: an amount &quot;a_remaining&=
quot; (in satoshi) indicating the maximum amount that is allowed to be sent=
 within the current epoch.</div></div><div><br></div><div>For example, cons=
ider an input containing 100m sats (1 BTC) which has been rate-limited with=
 parameters (h0, h1, a, a_remaining) of (800000, 800143, 500k, 500k). These=
 parameters define that the address is rate-limited to sending a maximum of=
 500k sats in the current epoch that starts at block height 800000 and ends=
 at height 800143 (or about one day ignoring block time variance) and that =
the full amount of 500k is still sendable. These rate-limiting parameters e=
nsure that it takes at minimum 100m / 500k =3D 200 transactions and 200 x 1=
44 blocks or about 200 days to spend the full 100m sats. As noted earlier, =
in a typical setup a user should retain the option to transact the entire a=
mount using a second (set of) private key(s).</div><div><br></div><div>For =
rate-limiting to work, any change output created by a transaction from a ra=
te-limited address must itself be rate-limited as well. For instance, expan=
ding on the above example, assume that the user spends 200k sats from a rat=
e-limited address a1 containing 100m sats:</div><div><br></div><div>Start s=
ituation:</div><div>At block height 800000: rate-limited address a1 is crea=
ted;</div><div>Value of a1: 100.0m sats;</div><div>Rate limiting params of =
a1: h0=3D800000, h1=3D800143, a=3D500k, a_remaining=3D500k;</div><div><br><=
/div><div>Transaction t1:</div><div>Included at block height 800100;</div><=
div>Spend: 200k + fee;</div><div>Rate limiting params: h0=3D800000, h1=3D80=
0143, a=3D500k, a_remaining=3D300k.</div><div><br></div><div>Result:</div><=
div>Value at destination address: 200k sats;</div><div>Rate limiting params=
 at destination address: none;</div><div>Value at change address a2: 99.8m =
sats;</div><div>Rate limiting params at change address a2: h0=3D800000, h1=
=3D800143, a=3D500k, a_remaining=3D300k.</div><div><br></div><div>In order =
to properly enforce rate limiting, the change address must be rate-limited =
such that the original rate limit of 500k sats per 144 blocks cannot be exc=
eeded. In this example, the change address a2 were given the same rate limi=
ting parameters as the transaction that served as its input. As a result, f=
rom block 800100 up until and including block 800143, a maximum amount of 3=
00k sats is allowed to be spent from the change address.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>Example continued:</div><div>a2: 99.8 sats at height=C2=A0800100;</d=
iv><div>Rate-limit params: h0=3D800000, h1=3D800143, a=3D500k, a_remaining=
=3D300k;</div><div><br></div><div>Transaction t2:</div><div>Included at blo=
ck height 800200</div><div>Spend: 400k=C2=A0+ fees.</div><div>Rate-limiting=
 params: h0=3D800144, h1=3D800287, a=3D500k, a_remaining=3D100k.<br></div><=
div><br></div><div><div>Result:</div><div>Value at destination address: 400=
k sats;</div><div>Rate limiting params at destination address: none;</div><=
div>Value at change address a3: 99.4m sats;</div><div>Rate limiting params =
at change address a3: h0=3D800144, h1=3D800287, a=3D500k, a_remaining=3D100=
k.</div><div><br></div><div>Transaction t2 is allowed because it falls with=
in the next epoch (running from 800144 to 800287) so a spend of 400k does n=
ot violate the constraint of 500k per epoch.</div><div><br></div><div>As co=
uld be seen, the rate limiting parameters are part of the transaction and c=
hosen by the user (or their wallet). This means that the parameters must be=
 validated to ensure that they do not violate the intended constraints.</di=
v><div><br></div><div>For instance, this transaction should not be allowed:=
</div><div><div>a2: 99.8 sats at height=C2=A0800100;</div><div>Rate-limit p=
arams of a2: h0=3D800000, h1=3D800143, a=3D500k, a_remaining=3D300k;</div><=
div><br></div><div>Transaction t2a:</div><div>Included at block height 8002=
00;</div><div>Spend: 400k=C2=A0+ fees;</div><div><div>Rate-limit params: h0=
=3D800124, h1=3D800267, a=3D500k, a_remaining=3D100k.</div><div><br></div><=
/div><div>This transaction t2a attempts to shift the epoch forward by 20 bl=
ocks such that it starts at 800124 instead of 800144. Shifting the epoch fo=
rward like this must not be allowed because it enables spending more that t=
he rate limit allows, which is 500k in any epoch of 144 blocks. It would en=
able overspending:</div></div><div><br></div><div>t1: spend 200k at 800100 =
(epoch 1: total: 200k);</div><div>t2a: spend 400k at 800200 (epoch 2: total=
: 400k);</div><div>t3a: spend 100k at 800201 (epoch 2: total: 500k);</div><=
div>t4a: spend 500k at 800268 (epoch 2: total: 1000k, overspending for epoc=
h 2).</div><div><br></div><div>Specifying the rate-limiting parameters expl=
icitly at every transaction allows the user to tighten the spending limit b=
y setting tighter limits or for instance by setting a_remainder to 0 if the=
y wish to enforce not spending more during an epoch. A second advantage of =
explicitly specifying the four rate-limiting parameters with each transacti=
on is that it allows the system to fully validate the transaction without h=
aving to consider any previous transactions within an epoch.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>I will stop here because I would like to gauge interest in this =
idea first before continuing work on other aspects. Two main pieces of work=
 jump to mind:</div><div><br></div><div>Define all validations;</div><div>D=
escribe aggregate behaviour of multiple (rate-limited) inputs, proof that t=
wo rate-limited addresses cannot spend more than the sum of their individua=
l limits.</div><font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></div><div>Zac</div></font>=
</div></div>

--00000000000041002705c87af934--