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From: WMOURA <neo.m.revolutions@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2023 23:45:02 -0300
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To: Giuseppe B <beppeben2030@gmail.com>, 
 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
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Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Minimum fees
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Hello,

In my amateur opinion, I imagine that this would give excessive power
to the miner, introducing a bug in the system, because if the miner
put an absurdly high minimum rate intentionally or not, this would
cause a serious problem, or not.


Em qua., 1 de mar. de 2023 =C3=A0s 17:25, Giuseppe B via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> escreveu:

> Hello everyone,
>
> I'm relatively new here so what I'm proposing could have already been
> discussed, or may be flawed or inapplicable. I apologize for that.
>
> I was picturing a situation where block rewards are almost zero, and the
> base layer is mainly used as a settlement layer for relatively few large
> transactions, since the majority of smaller ones goes through LN.
>
> In such a case it may very well be that even if transaction amounts are
> very consistent, transaction fees end up being very small since there is
> enough space for everyone in a block. Users wouldn't mind paying higher
> fees as they know that that would increase the network security, however
> nobody wants to be the only one doing that. Miners would of course like
> being paid more. So everyone involved would prefer higher fees but they
> just stay low because that's the only rational individual choice.
>
> Therefore I was imagining the introduction of a new protocol rule,
> min_fees, that would work like this:
> - the miner that gets to mine a block appends a min_fee field to the
> block, specifying the minimum fees that need to be contained in the
> following block in order for it to be valid.
> - one can also mine an empty block and reset the min_fee, to avoid the
> chain getting stuck.
>
> min_fees could either represent the total fees of the following block, or
> the minimal fee for each single transaction, as a percentage of the value
> transacted. Both seem to have some merits and some potential drawbacks. O=
f
> course min_fees=3D0 would correspond to the current situation.
>
> It looks to me that this could have the potential to bring the equilibriu=
m
> closer to a socially optimal one (as opposed to individually optimal), an=
d
> to benefit the network security in the long term. Of course it's just a
> rough sketch and it would deserve a much deeper analysis. I was just
> interested in knowing if you think that the principle has some merit or i=
f
> it's not even worth discussing it for some reason that I'm not considerin=
g.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Giuseppe.
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:large"><pr=
e class=3D"gmail-tw-data-text gmail-tw-text-large gmail-tw-ta" id=3D"gmail-=
tw-target-text" style=3D"text-align:left" dir=3D"ltr"><span class=3D"gmail-=
Y2IQFc" lang=3D"en">Hello, <br><br>In my amateur opinion, I imagine that th=
is would give excessive power to the miner, introducing a bug in the system=
, because if the miner put an absurdly high minimum rate intentionally or n=
ot, this would cause a serious problem, or not.</span></pre></div></div><br=
><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">Em qua., =
1 de mar. de 2023 =C3=A0s 17:25, Giuseppe B via bitcoin-dev &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfounda=
tion.org</a>&gt; escreveu:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hello everyone,<div><br></div><div>I&#39;m rela=
tively new here so what I&#39;m proposing could have already been discussed=
, or may be flawed or inapplicable. I apologize for that.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>I was picturing a situation where block rewards are almost zero, an=
d the base layer is mainly used as a settlement layer for relatively few la=
rge transactions, since the majority of smaller ones goes through LN.</div>=
<div><br></div><div>In such a case it may very well be that even if transac=
tion amounts are very consistent, transaction fees end up being very small =
since there is enough space for everyone in a block. Users wouldn&#39;t min=
d paying higher fees as they know that that would increase the network secu=
rity, however nobody wants to be the only one doing that. Miners would of c=
ourse like being paid more. So everyone involved would prefer higher fees b=
ut they just stay low because that&#39;s the only rational individual choic=
e.</div><div><br></div><div>Therefore I was imagining the introduction of a=
 new protocol rule, min_fees, that would work like this:=C2=A0</div><div>- =
the miner that gets to mine a block appends a min_fee field to the block, s=
pecifying the minimum fees that need to be contained in the following block=
 in order for it to be valid.</div><div>- one can also mine an empty block =
and reset the min_fee, to avoid the chain getting stuck.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>min_fees could either represent the total fees of the following bloc=
k, or the minimal fee for each single transaction, as a percentage of the v=
alue transacted. Both seem to have some merits and some potential drawbacks=
. Of course min_fees=3D0 would correspond to the current situation.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>It looks to me that this could have the potential to brin=
g the equilibrium closer to a socially optimal one (as opposed to individua=
lly optimal), and to benefit the network security in the long=C2=A0term. Of=
 course it&#39;s just a rough sketch and it would deserve a much deeper ana=
lysis. I was just interested in knowing if you think that the principle has=
 some merit or if it&#39;s not even worth=C2=A0discussing it for some reaso=
n that=C2=A0I&#39;m=C2=A0not considering.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,<=
/div><div><br></div><div>Giuseppe.</div><div><br></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
bitcoin-dev mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">=
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail=
man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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