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author | Steven Hatzakis <shatzakis@gmail.com> | 2018-12-04 14:42:42 +0200 |
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committer | bitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org> | 2018-12-04 12:42:56 +0000 |
commit | ac601b7816cb81cb2a5ef0c23d082e171807e59b (patch) | |
tree | 4807183117a9d48655dbfac937eb1d448107be33 /ec | |
parent | 74a68853751b20170197971abf0bb4f930d25fea (diff) | |
download | pi-bitcoindev-ac601b7816cb81cb2a5ef0c23d082e171807e59b.tar.gz pi-bitcoindev-ac601b7816cb81cb2a5ef0c23d082e171807e59b.zip |
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal for Palindromic (Reversible) Mnemonics
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diff --git a/ec/15f744a34cdef926b969574aa8b928b06c154b b/ec/15f744a34cdef926b969574aa8b928b06c154b new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5ace2ea55 --- /dev/null +++ b/ec/15f744a34cdef926b969574aa8b928b06c154b @@ -0,0 +1,405 @@ +Return-Path: <shatzakis@gmail.com> +Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org + [172.17.192.35]) + by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 386EA892 + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Tue, 4 Dec 2018 12:42:56 +0000 (UTC) +X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 +Received: from mail-qt1-f176.google.com (mail-qt1-f176.google.com + [209.85.160.176]) + by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1BB7A14D + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Tue, 4 Dec 2018 12:42:55 +0000 (UTC) +Received: by mail-qt1-f176.google.com with SMTP id t13so17805002qtn.3 + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Tue, 04 Dec 2018 04:42:54 -0800 (PST) +DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; + h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to + :cc; bh=CuEVbVDr5An4IpiwbznpOb/03kirODOMTeuSiy9RfQM=; + b=W3p/GC30bEGLHiHz7gg36bV1ZRiJL3g6DYDJIrb0kviHIdMsZ6pTXfmRsPT3e4UhcD + G4RiMdSLAaH9EeQEqbbpBqzv7PWbZcWQaCgzKlhgg+1lgW4vaftlmehluTLHuJedZiwt + 4anb0wHUkUE9pLn5NlAslUOlz0/jsxuz2jQ66Q3nQp/bPt//mhk3M0GPZcFtsK7BbwAr + PRu8IEnkH0jUpnbqzjQG9DTKjTQoxAkONiTVUCOddpZLpUr10Z4gguO4QXpf6ZIHV7UM + OQMWY9XVn0No9OR8B036eIA8e31lrLsHoOteXsMpeO7XETMRZNV6DbBNlwS1QxqQSvEH + VMOA== +X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; + d=1e100.net; s=20161025; + h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date + :message-id:subject:to:cc; + bh=CuEVbVDr5An4IpiwbznpOb/03kirODOMTeuSiy9RfQM=; + b=CP9z7LjOxzPwrairTbtWkqpbp8TcxNwjuStIENIcEohAU6U9Hm1OorOZMCQH5SQT2M + yrvrzpGgWyddEN1t8GCtNKREvHjqD7c8ujZCvcja/ZFbInsRORzoxGMfRB63A0lCEkDd + r3/iCBvfjxt998zX8TkUodgkkS1o0Rtljw+AvTWDDvIoiy7dqDCZffPmqAqM5n9fjDTM + 4oT3K6E0W7Fj5Zj0PoNuTU5T9E7trchR67XIvP7F8ZkECSdYaQA0dVz0cz4TGF+XozWi + 0Rish0YEw5xsYB0uhAlM2j7So8ZEwtfBq37IGQbRgL1uv+WoAdw9q/a38HC08RzEQaP7 + 6r/w== +X-Gm-Message-State: AA+aEWbrPt05eNH/8NwhEH3rXcfhaLbFcNv+JaRCEIjcsPiY1mv1HIF4 + WnyjfKO7hdexnuVMy9weaPuZcvnwi6kTn8BQyFI= +X-Google-Smtp-Source: AFSGD/UsepRzApZiOLYNL3W2V5Xg0dBvkoHtJ9cBOXUuJ/gdeZx4/4WhlssUPdIoq+tpTFv78L/bbD4fCTyiYGjJ3VA= +X-Received: by 2002:ad4:410c:: with SMTP id i12mr19413265qvp.219.1543927373988; + Tue, 04 Dec 2018 04:42:53 -0800 (PST) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +References: <CABsxsG234DhY8Lxn0UMgXG0YnPdyJ5__U9P-aweV9L=xw7hxyw@mail.gmail.com> + <CA+ASnrGEbksc-YeKR7bKpAv5=rcWcg8BeR6XDVUzvJ9C76bGpA@mail.gmail.com> + <CAH+Axy4=8SyRL5W9Av_6dDOp43Qd+Cdkf2XZnpf1i6zCT4Pemg@mail.gmail.com> +In-Reply-To: <CAH+Axy4=8SyRL5W9Av_6dDOp43Qd+Cdkf2XZnpf1i6zCT4Pemg@mail.gmail.com> +From: Steven Hatzakis <shatzakis@gmail.com> +Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 14:42:42 +0200 +Message-ID: <CABsxsG2qBVA-imReWJci4JA=S0MhVMq9+ezyMF7SEw7Hqqa-gQ@mail.gmail.com> +To: macwhyte@gmail.com +Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000af88c3057c319a4b" +X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, + DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, + RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 +X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on + smtp1.linux-foundation.org +X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 04 Dec 2018 13:09:02 +0000 +Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org +Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal for Palindromic (Reversible) Mnemonics +X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org +X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 +Precedence: list +List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> +List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> +List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> +List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> +X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Dec 2018 12:42:56 -0000 + +--000000000000af88c3057c319a4b +Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" +Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable + +Thanks, James and Joseph, for the feedback, +It has been a fun experiment! + +I just want to note that the plausible deniability was not the motive but +just an example use-case, there are perhaps other use-cases that would be +on the user to decide. I think having a mnemonic that is also reversible +could be useful for other reasons - convenience related perhaps. +*Re security:* I am still not convinced entirely that security is reduced +at all because one still has to search through all entropy in the range +of 2^128 to see whether any of those are reversible (unless there is a way +to only search the field of 2^124 that are reversible, which I don't think +is possible because the hash-derived checksum cannot be determined before +hashing, only afterward). Therefore, security should still be 2^128 for a +12-word mnemonic whether it is reversible or not (as one in every 16 people +that already have one (12-word) is reversible, they just might not realize +it, so we can't say those are less secure). + +Best regards, + +On Tue, Dec 4, 2018 at 2:16 PM James MacWhyte <macwhyte@gmail.com> wrote: + +> I agree with Joseph. If you want plausible deniability, it would be bette= +r +> to simply hide the funds somewhere in the HD chain. Same if you want a +> second vault tied to the same phrase. +> +> You are reducing security by eliminating all entropy that doesn't fit the +> reversible criteria, although in practice it doesn't make a difference +> because the numbers are so big. However, it doesn't seem like a very usef= +ul +> feature to have. +> +> Thanks for doing all that work though, it was fun to read about your idea +> and what you found out through experimenting! +> +> James +> +> +> On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 at 1:00 PM Joseph Gleason =E2=91=88 via bitcoin-dev < +> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: +> +>> I have a suggestion. If you are concerned about plausible deniability, +>> then it might make sense to just have the single mnemonic seed lead to a +>> single xprv key (as usual) and then do a private key derivation from tha= +t +>> based on a password string. The password can be simple, as it is based = +on +>> the security of the seed, just as long as the user feels they need for +>> deniability. +>> +>> A simple reverse scheme like you describe would just be another thing a +>> person would know to check if given some seed so I don't see it as +>> providing much value, but I could be missing something. +>> +>> On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 at 10:45 AM Steven Hatzakis via bitcoin-dev < +>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: +>> +>>> Hi All, +>>> +>>> I've developed a method to check if a mnemonic is also valid when the +>>> words are put into reverse order (not the entropy), where a given 12 or +>>> 24-word mnemonic could be valid both in little endian and big endian +>>> format. I've coined these "Palindromic Mnemonics", but perhaps more +>>> user-friendly is "reversible mnemonics." +>>> +>>> Purpose: +>>> A checksum-valid reversible mnemonic allows two separate vaults to be +>>> connected to the same mnemonic string of words, where all a users must = +do +>>> is enter the words in reverse order (the last word becomes first, secon= +d to +>>> last becomes second, and so on) to access the secondary (reversed words= +) +>>> vault. This utility could provide multiple use-cases, including related= + to +>>> combinations with passphrases and plausible deniability, as well as +>>> conveniences for those wishing to use a separate vault tied to the same +>>> string of words. +>>> +>>> Security: +>>> For any randomly generated 12-word mnemonic (128-bits of security) the +>>> chances of it also being reversible are 1/16 (I believe), as a total of= + 4 +>>> bit positions must be identical (4 bits from the normal mnemonic and +>>> another 4 bits from the reversed string must match). For a 24-word +>>> mnemonic, those values increase to 8 bits which need to match 8 bits fr= +om +>>> the reversed string, leading to about 1 in every 256 mnemonics also bei= +ng +>>> reversible. While the message space of valid reversible mnemonics shoul= +d be +>>> 2^124 for 12 words, that search must still be conducted over a field of +>>> 2^128, as the hash-derived checksum values otherwise prevent a way to +>>> deterministically find valid reversible mnemonics without first going +>>> through invalid reversible ones to check. I think others should chime i= +n on +>>> whether they believe there is any security loss, in terms of entropy bi= +ts +>>> (assuming the initial 128 bits were generated securely). I estimate at = +most +>>> it would be 4-bits of loss for a 12-word mnemonic, but only if an attac= +ker +>>> had a way to search only the space of valid reversible mnemonics (2**12= +4) +>>> which I don't think is feasible (could be wrong?). There could also be +>>> errors in my above assumptions, this is a work in progress and sharing = +it +>>> here to solicit initial feedback/interest. +>>> +>>> I've already written the code that can be used for testing (on GitHub +>>> user @hatgit), and when run from terminal/command prompt it is pretty f= +ast +>>> to find a valid reversible mnemonics, whereas on IDLE in Python on a 32= +-bit +>>> and 64-bit machine it could take a few seconds for 12 words and sometim= +es +>>> 10 minutes to find a valid 24-word reversible mnemonic. +>>> Example 12 words reversible (with valid checksum each way): +>>> +>>> limit exact seven clarify utility road image fresh leg cabbage hint can= +oe +>>> +>>> And Reversed: +>>> +>>> canoe hint cabbage leg fresh image road utility clarify seven exact lim= +it +>>> +>>> +>>> Example 24 reversible: +>>> +>>> favorite uncover sugar wealth army shift goose fury market toe message +>>> remain direct arrow duck afraid enroll salt knife school duck sunny gru= +nt +>>> argue +>>> +>>> And reversed: +>>> +>>> argue grunt sunny duck school knife salt enroll afraid duck arrow direc= +t +>>> remain message toe market fury goose shift army wealth sugar uncover +>>> favorite +>>> +>>> +>>> My two questions 1) are how useful could this be for +>>> you/users/devs/service providers etc.. and 2) is any security loss +>>> occurring and whether it is negligible or not? +>>> +>>> Best regards, +>>> +>>> Steven Hatzakis +>>> _______________________________________________ +>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list +>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org +>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev +>>> +>> _______________________________________________ +>> bitcoin-dev mailing list +>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org +>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev +>> +> + +--000000000000af88c3057c319a4b +Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" +Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable + +<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,he= +lvetica,sans-serif">Thanks, James and Joseph, for the feedback,</div><div c= +lass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">It = +has been a fun experiment!=C2=A0<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" styl= +e=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_= +default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">I just want to no= +te that the plausible deniability was not the motive but just an example us= +e-case, there are perhaps other use-cases that would be on the user to deci= +de. I think having a mnemonic that is also reversible could be useful for o= +ther reasons - convenience related perhaps.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_= +default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><b>Re security:</= +b> I am still not convinced entirely that security is reduced at all becaus= +e one still has to search through all entropy in the range of=C2=A02^128 to= + see whether any of those are reversible (unless there is a way to only sea= +rch the field of 2^124 that are reversible, which I don't think is poss= +ible because the hash-derived checksum=C2=A0cannot be determined before has= +hing, only afterward). Therefore, security should still be 2^128 for a 12-w= +ord mnemonic whether it is reversible or=C2=A0not (as one in every 16 peopl= +e that already have one (12-word) is reversible, they just might not realiz= +e it, so we can't say those are less secure).=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"= +gmail_default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><br></div><= +div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_sign= +ature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:12.8p= +x;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><span>Best regards,</span></div><= +/div></div></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr= +">On Tue, Dec 4, 2018 at 2:16 PM James MacWhyte <<a href=3D"mailto:macwh= +yte@gmail.com">macwhyte@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class= +=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd= +ing-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I agree with Joseph. If you want plausible d= +eniability, it would be better to simply hide the funds somewhere in the HD= + chain. Same if you want a second vault tied to the same phrase.<div><br></= +div><div>You are reducing security by eliminating all entropy that doesn= +9;t fit the reversible criteria, although in practice it doesn't make a= + difference because the numbers are so big. However, it doesn't seem li= +ke a very useful feature to have.<div><br></div><div>Thanks for doing all t= +hat work though, it was fun to read about your idea and what you found out = +through experimenting!</div><div><br clear=3D"all"><div><div dir=3D"ltr" cl= +ass=3D"m_6668330300381286486gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signat= +ure"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>James<br></div></div></div></div><br></div></div= +></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 = +at 1:00 PM Joseph Gleason =E2=91=88 via bitcoin-dev <<a href=3D"mailto:b= +itcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">bitcoin-dev@lists.l= +inuxfoundation.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote= +" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><= +div dir=3D"ltr">I have a suggestion.=C2=A0 If you are concerned about plaus= +ible deniability, then it might make sense to just have the single mnemonic= + seed lead to a single xprv key (as usual) and then do a private key deriva= +tion from that based on a password string.=C2=A0 The password can be simple= +, as it is based on the security of the seed, just as long as the user feel= +s they need for deniability.<div><br></div><div>A simple reverse scheme lik= +e you describe would just be another thing a person would know to check if = +given some seed so I don't see it as providing much value, but I could = +be missing something.</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D= +"ltr">On Mon, Dec 3, 2018 at 10:45 AM Steven Hatzakis via bitcoin-dev <<= +a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">b= +itcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote cl= +ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p= +adding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di= +r=3D"ltr"><div><p style=3D"font-family:-apple-system,system-ui,"Segoe = +UI",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif,"Apple Color Emoji","Seg= +oe UI Emoji","Segoe UI Symbol";box-sizing:border-box;margin-= +bottom:16px;color:rgb(36,41,46);font-size:14px;margin-top:0px">Hi All,=C2= +=A0</p><p style=3D"font-family:-apple-system,system-ui,"Segoe UI"= +,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif,"Apple Color Emoji","Segoe UI Em= +oji","Segoe UI Symbol";box-sizing:border-box;margin-bottom:1= +6px;color:rgb(36,41,46);font-size:14px;margin-top:0px">I've developed a= + method to check if a mnemonic is also valid when the words are put into re= +verse order (not the entropy), where a given 12 or 24-word mnemonic could b= +e valid both in little endian and big endian format. I've coined these = +"Palindromic Mnemonics", but perhaps more user-friendly is "= +reversible mnemonics."</p><p style=3D"font-family:-apple-system,system= +-ui,"Segoe UI",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif,"Apple Color Emoji= +","Segoe UI Emoji","Segoe UI Symbol";box-sizing:bo= +rder-box;margin-bottom:16px;margin-top:0px;color:rgb(36,41,46);font-size:14= +px"><span style=3D"box-sizing:border-box;font-weight:600">Purpose:</span><b= +r style=3D"box-sizing:border-box">A checksum-valid reversible mnemonic allo= +ws two separate vaults to be connected to the same mnemonic string of words= +, where all a users must do is enter the words in reverse order (the last w= +ord becomes first, second to last becomes second, and so on) to access the = +secondary (reversed words) vault. This utility could provide multiple use-c= +ases, including related to combinations with passphrases and plausible deni= +ability, as well as conveniences for those wishing to use a separate vault = +tied to the same string of words.</p><p style=3D"font-family:-apple-system,= +system-ui,"Segoe UI",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif,"Apple Color= + Emoji","Segoe UI Emoji","Segoe UI Symbol";box-siz= +ing:border-box;margin-bottom:16px;margin-top:0px;color:rgb(36,41,46);font-s= +ize:14px"><span style=3D"box-sizing:border-box;font-weight:600">Security:</= +span><br style=3D"box-sizing:border-box">For any randomly generated 12-word= + mnemonic (128-bits of security) the chances of it also being reversible ar= +e 1/16 (I believe), as a total of 4 bit positions must be identical (4 bits= + from the normal mnemonic and another 4 bits from the reversed string must = +match). For a 24-word mnemonic,=C2=A0those values increase to 8 bits which = +need to match 8 bits from the reversed string, leading to about 1 in every = +256 mnemonics also being reversible. While the message space of valid rever= +sible mnemonics should be 2^<span style=3D"box-sizing:border-box">124 for 1= +2 words, that search must still be conducted over a field of 2</span><span = +style=3D"box-sizing:border-box;font-weight:600">^</span>128, as the hash-de= +rived checksum values otherwise prevent a way to deterministically find val= +id reversible mnemonics without first going through invalid reversible ones= + to check. I think others should chime in on whether they believe there is = +any security loss, in terms of entropy bits (assuming the initial 128 bits = +were generated securely). I estimate at most it would be 4-bits of loss for= + a 12-word mnemonic, but only if an attacker had a way to search only the s= +pace of valid reversible mnemonics (2**124) which I don't think is feas= +ible (could be wrong?). There could also be errors in my above assumptions,= + this is a work in progress and sharing it here to solicit initial feedback= +/interest.</p><p style=3D"font-family:-apple-system,system-ui,"Segoe U= +I",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif,"Apple Color Emoji","Sego= +e UI Emoji","Segoe UI Symbol";box-sizing:border-box;margin-b= +ottom:16px;margin-top:0px;color:rgb(36,41,46);font-size:14px">I've alre= +ady written the code that can be used for testing (on GitHub user @hatgit),= + and when run from terminal/command prompt it is pretty fast to find a vali= +d reversible mnemonics, whereas on IDLE in Python on a 32-bit and 64-bit ma= +chine it could take a few seconds for 12 words and sometimes 10 minutes to = +find a valid 24-word reversible mnemonic.=C2=A0</p>Example 12 words reversi= +ble (with valid checksum each way): <br><br>limit exact seven clarify utili= +ty road image fresh leg cabbage hint canoe<br><br>And Reversed:<br><br>cano= +e hint cabbage leg fresh image road utility clarify seven exact limit<br><b= +r><br>Example 24 reversible:<br><br>favorite uncover sugar wealth army shif= +t goose fury market toe message remain direct arrow duck afraid enroll salt= + knife school duck sunny grunt argue</div><div><br>And reversed:</div><div>= +<br>argue grunt sunny duck school knife salt enroll afraid duck arrow direc= +t remain message toe market fury goose shift army wealth sugar uncover favo= +rite<p class=3D"m_6668330300381286486m_-575678971359378551m_671132201258651= +6752gmail-p1" style=3D"margin:0px;font-variant-numeric:normal;font-variant-= +east-asian:normal;font-stretch:normal;font-size:11px;line-height:normal;fon= +t-family:Menlo;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span class=3D"m_6668330300381286486m_-575= +678971359378551m_6711322012586516752gmail-s1" style=3D"font-variant-ligatur= +es:no-common-ligatures"><br></span></p><p style=3D"box-sizing:border-box;ma= +rgin-bottom:16px;margin-top:0px"><span style=3D"color:rgb(36,41,46);font-fa= +mily:-apple-system,system-ui,"Segoe UI",Helvetica,Arial,sans-seri= +f,"Apple Color Emoji","Segoe UI Emoji","Segoe UI S= +ymbol";font-size:14px">My two questions 1) are how useful could this b= +e for you/users/devs/service providers etc.. and 2) is any security loss oc= +curring and whether it is negligible or not?</span><br></p><p style=3D"box-= +sizing:border-box;margin-bottom:16px;margin-top:0px"><span style=3D"font-fa= +mily:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px">Best regards,</span></p><= +/div><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"m_6668330300381286486m_-575678971359378= +551m_6711322012586516752gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">= +<div style=3D"font-size:12.8px;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><spa= +n><br>Steven</span>=C2=A0<span>Hatzakis</span>=C2=A0</div><div style=3D"fon= +t-size:12.8px;font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"><span class=3D"gmail_= +default" style=3D"font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif"> </span></div></d= +iv></div></div></div></div></div></div></div> +_______________________________________________<br> +bitcoin-dev mailing list<br> +<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">= +bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br> +<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" = +rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= +man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br> +</blockquote></div> +_______________________________________________<br> +bitcoin-dev mailing list<br> +<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">= +bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br> +<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" = +rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= +man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br> +</blockquote></div> +</blockquote></div></div> + +--000000000000af88c3057c319a4b-- + |