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authorBrian Erdelyi <brian.erdelyi@gmail.com>2015-01-31 18:15:53 -0400
committerbitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org>2015-01-31 22:16:02 +0000
commite18937f65b5cd2832ac92d2a225a082becfe2065 (patch)
tree8b2f90cbb2164bcd1cee916318d1664388f6998e
parent6ba5aa25c03b8c533b210802266369b10a2397c6 (diff)
downloadpi-bitcoindev-e18937f65b5cd2832ac92d2a225a082becfe2065.tar.gz
pi-bitcoindev-e18937f65b5cd2832ac92d2a225a082becfe2065.zip
[Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware
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+Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 18:15:53 -0400
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+Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal to address Bitcoin malware
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+Hello all,
+
+The number of incidents involving malware targeting bitcoin users =
+continues to rise. One category of virus I find particularly nasty is =
+when the bitcoin address you are trying to send money to is modified =
+before the transaction is signed and recorded in the block chain. This =
+behaviour allows the malware to evade two-factor authentication by =
+becoming active only when the bitcoin address is entered. This is very =
+similar to how man-in-the-browser malware attack online banking =
+websites.
+
+Out of band transaction verification/signing is one method used with =
+online banking to help protect against this. This can be done in a =
+variety of ways with SMS, voice, mobile app or even security tokens. =
+This video demonstrates how HSBC uses a security token to verify =
+transactions online. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DSh2Iha88agE =
+<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DSh2Iha88agE>.
+
+Many Bitcoin wallets and services already use Open Authentication (OATH) =
+based one-time passwords (OTP). Is there any interest (or existing =
+work) in in the Bitcoin community adopting the OATH Challenge-Response =
+Algorithm (OCRA) for verifying transactions?
+
+I know there are other forms of malware, however, I want to get thoughts =
+on this approach as it would involve the use of a decimal representation =
+of the bitcoin address (depending on particular application). In the =
+HSBC example (see YouTube video above), this was the last 8 digits of =
+the recipient=E2=80=99s account number. Would it make sense to convert =
+a bitcoin address to decimal and then truncate to 8 digits for this =
+purpose? I understand that truncating the number in some way only =
+increases the likelihood for collisions=E2=80=A6 however, would this =
+still be practical or could the malware generate a rogue bitcoin address =
+that would produce the same 8 digits of the legitimate bitcoin address?
+
+Brian Erdelyi
+
+--Apple-Mail=_8D6BCAAD-07BE-4D6B-8E28-5FDE3C76084F
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+<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
+charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
+-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" =
+class=3D"">Hello all,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
+class=3D"">The number of incidents involving malware targeting bitcoin =
+users continues to rise. &nbsp;One category of virus I find particularly =
+nasty is when the bitcoin address you are trying to send money to is =
+modified before the transaction is signed and recorded in the block =
+chain. &nbsp;This behaviour allows the malware to evade two-factor =
+authentication by becoming active only when the bitcoin address is =
+entered. &nbsp;This is very similar to how man-in-the-browser malware =
+attack online banking websites.</div><div class=3D""><br =
+class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Out of band transaction =
+verification/signing is one method used with online banking to help =
+protect against this. &nbsp;This can be done in a variety of ways with =
+SMS, voice, mobile app or even security tokens. &nbsp;This video =
+demonstrates how HSBC uses a security token to verify transactions =
+online. &nbsp;<a href=3D"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DSh2Iha88agE" =
+class=3D"">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DSh2Iha88agE</a>.</div><div =
+class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Many Bitcoin wallets and =
+services already use Open Authentication (OATH) based one-time passwords =
+(OTP). &nbsp;Is there any interest (or existing work) in in the Bitcoin =
+community adopting the OATH Challenge-Response Algorithm (OCRA) for =
+verifying transactions?</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
+class=3D"">I know there are other forms of malware, however, I want to =
+get thoughts on this approach as it would involve the use of a decimal =
+representation of the bitcoin address (depending on particular =
+application). &nbsp;In the HSBC example (see YouTube video above), this =
+was the last 8 digits of the recipient=E2=80=99s account number. =
+&nbsp;Would it make sense to convert a bitcoin address to decimal and =
+then truncate to 8 digits for this purpose? &nbsp;I understand that =
+truncating the number in some way only increases the likelihood for =
+collisions=E2=80=A6 however, would this still be practical or could the =
+malware generate a rogue bitcoin address that would produce the same 8 =
+digits of the legitimate bitcoin address?</div><div class=3D""><br =
+class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Brian Erdelyi</div></body></html>=
+
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