diff options
| author | ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com> | 2021-10-04 03:59:34 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | bitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org> | 2021-10-04 03:59:40 +0000 |
| commit | d003250843fd458e7994145765c449ba7d6909a1 (patch) | |
| tree | 30c4497d4309eafe75f45a7b21930c4ef73c7b23 | |
| parent | 6136ad174d5cf9618b7c6a0a3a2c5c64e3bf12aa (diff) | |
| download | pi-bitcoindev-d003250843fd458e7994145765c449ba7d6909a1.tar.gz pi-bitcoindev-d003250843fd458e7994145765c449ba7d6909a1.zip | |
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Mock introducing vulnerability in important Bitcoin projects
| -rw-r--r-- | 1e/a285924fe1cb7ad684443b2f618d6550a81581 | 127 |
1 files changed, 127 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/1e/a285924fe1cb7ad684443b2f618d6550a81581 b/1e/a285924fe1cb7ad684443b2f618d6550a81581 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d15a6de67 --- /dev/null +++ b/1e/a285924fe1cb7ad684443b2f618d6550a81581 @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +Return-Path: <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com> +Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::138]) + by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4975AC000D + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Mon, 4 Oct 2021 03:59:40 +0000 (UTC) +Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) + by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 383328412B + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Mon, 4 Oct 2021 03:59:40 +0000 (UTC) +X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org +X-Spam-Flag: NO +X-Spam-Score: 0.3 +X-Spam-Level: +X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.3 tagged_above=-999 required=5 + tests=[BAYES_20=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, + DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, + FROM_LOCAL_NOVOWEL=0.5, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4=0.001, + RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] + autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no +Authentication-Results: smtp1.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); + dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=protonmail.com +Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) + by localhost (smtp1.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) + with ESMTP id UFe_Itk02GD1 + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Mon, 4 Oct 2021 03:59:39 +0000 (UTC) +X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 +Received: from mail-4319.protonmail.ch (mail-4319.protonmail.ch [185.70.43.19]) + by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 67DD984102 + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Mon, 4 Oct 2021 03:59:39 +0000 (UTC) +Date: Mon, 04 Oct 2021 03:59:34 +0000 +DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; + s=protonmail; t=1633319976; + bh=ao4CSbapt76oiwOfpzvUjfXCtj1v5oqdyq/smauHbRU=; + h=Date:To:From:Cc:Reply-To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; + b=VZVPh5YUJXyg9oyjZ3Xb59G4izKHgEGC1XkwKUiQh5EanxqA1FeJuX9QEz82/cdyq + J/ixTG37rmuhqXI9tYk9WoEgHAi86Xhq1cx7VmTlC0YfKxQZTx7HQzUdBc0snMu2E9 + 3R7YkZds8dRx+heiweRoUkxeo2J++2i57eZfffxQ= +To: Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr.org>, + Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com> +Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com> +Message-ID: <sez9AuvBEnKKkLkJ4aivnaLJz5M5VFz3yTOdreTGmFb6RzwMv7h0dRFbEiB1_aup4Daw7t9YwlZKp2YvbgCu1fzym28cHhlzRVC3efmfBpE=@protonmail.com> +In-Reply-To: <202110032133.44726.luke@dashjr.org> +References: <MkZx3Hv--3-2@tutanota.de> <Ml-IIuL--3-2@tutanota.de> + <CAAxiurb1_-p2yO8183MvB2x_i9H+WAo9t0RH85faRrrKz9YxGg@mail.gmail.com> + <202110032133.44726.luke@dashjr.org> +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable +Cc: Prayank <prayank@tutanota.de> +Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Mock introducing vulnerability in important + Bitcoin projects +X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org +X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 +Precedence: list +List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> +List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> +List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> +List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> +X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 04 Oct 2021 03:59:40 -0000 + + +Good morning Luke, + +> All attempts are harmful, no matter the intent, in that they waste +> contributors' time that could be better spent on actual development. +> +> However, I do also see the value in studying and improving the review pro= +cess +> to harden it against such inevitable attacks. The fact that we know the N= +SA +> engages in such things, and haven't caught one yet should be a red flag. + +Indeed, I believe we should take the position that "review process is as mu= +ch a part of the code as the code itself, and should be tested regularly". + +> Therefore, I think any such a scheme needs to be at least opt-out, if not +> opt-in. Please ensure there's a simple way for developers with limited ti= +me +> (or other reasons) to be informed of which PRs to ignore to opt-out of th= +is +> study. (Ideally it would also prevent maintainers from merging - maybe +> possible since we use a custom merging script, but what it really needs t= +o +> limit is the push, not the dry-run.) + +Assuming developers are normal humans with typical human neurology (in part= +icular a laziness circuit), perhaps this would work? + +Every commit message is required to have a pair of 256-bit hex words. + +Public attempts at attack / testing of the review process will use the firs= +t 256-bit as a salt, and when the salt is prepended to the string "THIS IS = +AN ATTACK" and then hashed with e.g. SHA256, should result in the second 25= +6-bit word. + +Non-attacks / normal commits just use random 256-bit numbers. + +Those opting-out to this will run a script that checks commit messages for = +whether the first 256-bit hexword concatenated with "THIS IS AN ATTACK", th= +en hashed, is the second 256-bit hexword. + +Those opting-in will not run that script and ignore the numbers. + +The script can be run as well at the maintainer. + +Hopefully, people who are not deliberately opting out will be too lazy to r= +un the script (as is neurotypical for humans) and getting "spoilered" on th= +is. + +***HOWEVER*** + +We should note that a putative NSA attack would of course not use the above= + protocol, and thus no developer can ever opt out of an NSA attempt at inse= +rting vulnerabilities; thus, I think it is better if all developers are for= +ced to opt in on the "practice rounds", as they cannot opt out of "the real= + thing" other than to stop developing entirely. + +Regards, +ZmnSCPxj + |