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| author | Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com> | 2017-06-19 12:04:33 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | bitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org> | 2017-06-19 16:04:35 +0000 |
| commit | c17e5f2a5209ffb7f0487cdea5eef2520109dfe7 (patch) | |
| tree | cf2e560c53c49f4aae336b189afccc0ef39000ab | |
| parent | aecd655b3efd30fe4e8e177abba58ae7f4a1a899 (diff) | |
| download | pi-bitcoindev-c17e5f2a5209ffb7f0487cdea5eef2520109dfe7.tar.gz pi-bitcoindev-c17e5f2a5209ffb7f0487cdea5eef2520109dfe7.zip | |
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain RfD -- Follow Up
| -rw-r--r-- | 83/5a5533e05b4612ed35e20ab7b48051ffb94b30 | 259 |
1 files changed, 259 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/83/5a5533e05b4612ed35e20ab7b48051ffb94b30 b/83/5a5533e05b4612ed35e20ab7b48051ffb94b30 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c18522956 --- /dev/null +++ b/83/5a5533e05b4612ed35e20ab7b48051ffb94b30 @@ -0,0 +1,259 @@ +Return-Path: <truthcoin@gmail.com> +Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org + [172.17.192.35]) + by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3864AB1E + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Mon, 19 Jun 2017 16:04:35 +0000 (UTC) +X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 +Received: from mail-qk0-f179.google.com (mail-qk0-f179.google.com + [209.85.220.179]) + by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0998925A + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Mon, 19 Jun 2017 16:04:31 +0000 (UTC) +Received: by mail-qk0-f179.google.com with SMTP id r62so37143638qkf.0 + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Mon, 19 Jun 2017 09:04:31 -0700 (PDT) +DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; + h=subject:to:cc:references:from:message-id:date:user-agent + :mime-version:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding:content-language; + bh=3QrAvfuYaehCZ/IbvCpwz1a4AKfNYCY6ckWX1PHtkbQ=; + b=Zt03YpH/KkGsZ++e+J3B/XOuqdahWMvnOlETv3Xb1QFVEGPcmTI2UEgWeSDVpcwNCX + RrGwdwoflSebvf8uBBCLZagQM9eE5lX+aCNY0Y/MiEPrG3IExs//Vn9qqzm5KYnRflA/ + /QSz/K4X+N6Ud0jaLOkQPAsZg6JB2xi3snzncHD5jZncV6fjHvlckoGDLoEKARnlKPhK + 6Yq8F3/ivAGmUlDzD86PnkODWvuao9HG84JZyySHMmbW35KnQs9VyJWp1NT5WsA7jwKk + +Gy5igoRaAouVVf6XCkYjIAjVjGuBTxprjZnUaLaLqh9gBVUrDcXeBmoT409+dP6aLY0 + k76w== +X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; + d=1e100.net; s=20161025; + h=x-gm-message-state:subject:to:cc:references:from:message-id:date + :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding + :content-language; + bh=3QrAvfuYaehCZ/IbvCpwz1a4AKfNYCY6ckWX1PHtkbQ=; + b=gYnWTjqhl+rya7sEGGzZvnQpba03Kibe7juAEbmfkyjYT9sqAzAOVvMxVa2gsLCmeK + zEcPFjXDtO9OdBwamGAIKhtODh7klXVUxqhHHQ6C+MgBs4L4W7OFT5Uz5Bs9dkD4/+vj + oElquw2ed5JLah5/GqrqbvzrttSmiGfTSGzalzJA+VguFL9OcksO7wyygfbM3m0ZlfDZ + S75UELpWz6Xzf8wkJzlmcfsPPOmdFH38TFWGWTMFrNk8rHjXhaiPLRnZkoJ0AR7iywzI + WZ4CHahkya99fdWGeWl5G3aNBPL07+DFxqHhmbNIgEUUzJ/UWweg39ieo+tB+mjNnjSA + V9eA== +X-Gm-Message-State: AKS2vOxlj5Ef2RcjlwO4ylhQu4oT2xU+gCtyDshDOJZ0Mtn0aKcbQkZs + vZg2W+up2Lj9lNZB +X-Received: by 10.55.182.135 with SMTP id g129mr29558669qkf.111.1497888270576; + Mon, 19 Jun 2017 09:04:30 -0700 (PDT) +Received: from [192.168.1.102] (ool-45726efb.dyn.optonline.net. + [69.114.110.251]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id + i30sm7223369qtc.19.2017.06.19.09.04.29 + (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); + Mon, 19 Jun 2017 09:04:29 -0700 (PDT) +To: Tao Effect <contact@taoeffect.com> +References: <24f2b447-a237-45eb-ef9f-1a62533fad5c@gmail.com> + <83671224-f6ff-16a9-81c0-20ab578aec9d@gmail.com> + <AAC86547-7904-4475-9966-138130019567@taoeffect.com> +From: Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com> +Message-ID: <6764b8af-bb4c-615d-5af5-462127bbbe36@gmail.com> +Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 12:04:33 -0400 +User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 + Thunderbird/52.2.0 +MIME-Version: 1.0 +In-Reply-To: <AAC86547-7904-4475-9966-138130019567@taoeffect.com> +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable +Content-Language: en-US +X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, + DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, + RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 +X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on + smtp1.linux-foundation.org +Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Drivechain RfD -- Follow Up +X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org +X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 +Precedence: list +List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> +List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> +List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> +List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> +X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 16:04:35 -0000 + +Hi Greg, + +Responses below: + +On 6/18/2017 5:30 PM, Tao Effect wrote: +> In Drivechain, 51% of miners have total control and ownership over all +> of the sidechain coins. + +It would not be accurate to say that miners have "total" control. Miners +do control the destination of withdrawals, but they do not control the +withdrawal-duration nor the withdrawal-frequency. + +So, if miners wish to 'steal' from a sidechain, they _can_ initiate a +theft, but they can not change the fact that their malfeasance will be +[a] obvious, and [b] on display for a long period of time. + +We might draw a comparison between: + +1. Classic Theft -- A majority hashrate reorganizes the main Bitcoin +chain to double-spend funds (or coordinate with someone who is +double-spending). This is prevented/discouraged by waiting for many +confirmations. +2. Channel Theft -- A majority hashrate assists a Lightning-Network +thief, by censoring the punitive audit txn (possibly by exploiting some +excuse regarding fullness of blocks, or possibly induced to do so by the +thief provably splitting the proceeds with miners). This is +prevented/discouraged by using lengthy custodial periods, paying high +fees with your attacker's money, and using fungibility/non-communication +to interact with miners as little as possible (so as to frame LN-theft +as undermining the entire LN system, and not merely a single tragedy). +3. Drivechain Theft -- A majority hashrate initiates an unrepresentative +withdrawal from some sidechain. This is prevented/discouraged by only +using 'popular' sidechains (those that [a] increase the usefulness +("market price") of bitcoin, and [b] generate tx fees for miners). It is +also discouraged by the fact that egregious theft would probably end the +sidechain experiment, meaning that all present and future sidechains +would be forever unavailable (and unable to buoy the price or the tx +revenues). + +I do not think that any of the three stands out as being categorically +worse than the others, especially when we consider the heterogeneity of +use-cases and preferences. As Luke-Jr has been pointing out on social +media recently, the very group which is more associated with miners (and +explicitly more willing to trust them, ie Bitcoin Unlimited et al), +happens to be the same group that would be expected to make use of a +LargeBlock drivechain. Some can argue that one type of security is more +"cryptographic" than others, but I think this is misguided (how many +'bits' of security does each have?) -- imho, all three security models +are 'game theoretic' (neither computer scientific, nor cryptographic). + +More importantly, before a miner has any "control" over the sidechain +coins, users must voluntarily agree to subject themselves to these new +rules. This is similar to how an arbitrary piece of (open source) +software can have "total" control over your computer...if you choose to +install it. + +> Thus the effect of Drivechain appears to be the creation of a new kind +> of digital border imposed onto the network ... + +I'm not sure it would "create a border", given that sidechains are +currently not accessible at all. If anything drivechain cuts a door into +an existing impassible border. + +> ... where everyone hands over ownership of their Bitcoins to a +> /single/ mining cartel when they wish to interact with /any/ sidechain.= + + +The qualifier "/any/ sidechain" would seem to imply that there is a way +to do sidechains that does not involve handing over some control to 51% +hashrate...I think this is false (even in the fabled case of ZK-SNARKS). +The first thing I do in the drivechain spec ( +truthcoin.info/blog/drivechain ) is explain why. + +> Drivechain would be a reasonable idea if that weren't the case, but +> since it is, Drivechain now introduces a very real possible future +> where Bitcoins can be confiscated by the Chinese government in exactly +> the same manner that the Chinese government today confiscates +> financial assets in other financial networks within China. + +Yes, but money could also be confiscated from _any_ Bitcoin users +(Chinese or otherwise) using any of the three methods I mentioned above. +And confiscation could strike Chinese Bitcoin users if they decided to +sell their Bitcoin for Chinese Yuan, which they then deposited in a +Chinese bank. Or if they sold their Bitcoin for an Altcoin controlled by +the Chinese govt in some other way. + +It is not up to the members of this list to decide, USSR style, what +other people are allowed to do with their own money. + +The exceptions to this rule would be (ie, "bitcoin-dev should care about +what users are doing when..."): + +1. [Unreasonable use of Reviewer Time] The user's use-case is either +nonexistent (ie "no one wants that"), or totally unachievable ("we can't +do that") thus rendering the conversation a complete waste of time / +reviewer attention. +2. [Harmful Interference] The user's use-case would impose harm on some +existing use-case(s). + +No reasonable person will claim the first, given today's scaling debate +(not to mention today's 'bitcoin dominance index'). Therefore, critics +must claim the second (as, for example, Peter Todd has been doing on +this list). + +Which is why I narrowly focus on inter-chain harms [1], leading +ultimately to a focus on the mining ecosystem [2,3] and the development +of Blind Merged Mining [4]. + +[1] +https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3D0goYH2sDw0w&list=3DPLw8-6ARlyVciNjgS_NF= +hAu-qt7HPf_dtg&index=3D1 +[2] http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/mirage-miner-centralization/ +[3] http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/mining-threat-equilibrium/ +[4] http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/blind-merged-mining/ +[5] http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/measuring-decentralization/ + +> 1. The Bitcoin network centralizes more, because more power (both +> financial power and power in terms of capability/control) is granted +> to miners. + +I think that one has some duty to very clearly define something (like +"mining centralization" [2] or "centralization" [5]) before complaining +about it. I feel that people will occasionally use selfless complaints +to accomplish a selfish goal...especially when the artificial selfless +part is hard to discuss by virtue of its being poorly defined +(especially vague or abstract items like "the company", "our country", +etc). For example, those who take it upon themselves to "defend" "the +Bitcoin community" may have exactly that in mind as their primary +goal...but they may also end up with more visibility (and with it: more +influence, more job offers, more conference invites, more friends, etc) +and they may also end up with a megaphone for which to broadcast their +other views, or just a defend-able excuse for bragging loudly about how +great cypherpunks are and/or how devoted they-in-particular are to the +cypherpunk tribe, et cetera. To avoid this problem in my own technical +discourse, I try to avoid abstractions like "centralization" until I +have defined them [2,5]. + +You have defined centralization above, but the definition is itself +vague to the point where I do not think even you actually endorse it. +For example, you would need to say that Bitcoin centralizes whenever the +exchange rate increases (as this grants additional financial power to +miners) or when any new user joins Bitcoin, or when tx fee revenues +increase for any reason. You might also be forced to say that LN +centralizes Bitcoin (as LN grants new capability/control to miners), and +probably even that Bitcoin becomes more centralized when developers +release new software (as this grants new capability to miners, +specifically the ability to deny upgrades). This probably isn't what you +meant, but since you did not clearly explain what you meant we have no +way of knowing for sure. + +It seems to me that you reject the premise that BMM [4] addresses these +issues. This is probably because BMM only addresses miner's interactions +with each other, and it does not address miner abilities as a group in +relation to other groups (for example, vs. users, developers, +investors). But, as I consistently emphasize, these groups of people are +free to ignore any sidechains that they do not like. In law there is a +saying 'volenti non fit injuria' which I would translate as "he who +volunteers cannot claim later to have been injured". This is a legal +theory, because otherwise everyone would be arbitrarily liable for +choices beyond their control (ie, responsible for decisions of other +unrelated people), which would be nonsense. + +> 3. Drivechain limits user's existing choice when it comes to who is +> acting as custodian of their Bitcoins, from any trustworthy exchange, +> down to a single mining cartel under the control of a single set of law= +s. + +Currently no (P2P) sidechains exist, and therefore the set of choices +today would seem to be more "limited" than in a post-sidechain future. +(The set of options may decrease later, for ecological reasons, if and +only if 'exchanges' are a strictly inferior option to 'sidechains' for +some reason...I don't see why this would be the case. I also don't +understand the emphasis on "exchanges" [SCs are much more like Altcoins, +than exchanges] in the first place, nor the dubious qualifier +"trustworthy".) + +--Paul + + |