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author | Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr.org> | 2017-01-28 19:43:48 +0000 |
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committer | bitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org> | 2017-01-28 19:45:01 +0000 |
commit | a739eb1dcb0766c1417e601505655dc47a3ae9cb (patch) | |
tree | 1cf3398f6a053d87aa91a9c67dc083fa991f5c14 | |
parent | 42dab80c51b155c8510da8fc5741e7ae010c76ca (diff) | |
download | pi-bitcoindev-a739eb1dcb0766c1417e601505655dc47a3ae9cb.tar.gz pi-bitcoindev-a739eb1dcb0766c1417e601505655dc47a3ae9cb.zip |
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Three hardfork-related BIPs
-rw-r--r-- | 9b/72e64aee8c3cb4c573c0f3b55c84a17d430c3d | 96 |
1 files changed, 96 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/9b/72e64aee8c3cb4c573c0f3b55c84a17d430c3d b/9b/72e64aee8c3cb4c573c0f3b55c84a17d430c3d new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b2411e5c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/9b/72e64aee8c3cb4c573c0f3b55c84a17d430c3d @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +Return-Path: <luke@dashjr.org> +Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org + [172.17.192.35]) + by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 946438EE + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Sat, 28 Jan 2017 19:45:01 +0000 (UTC) +X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 +Received: from zinan.dashjr.org (zinan.dashjr.org [192.3.11.21]) + by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E389714D + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Sat, 28 Jan 2017 19:45:00 +0000 (UTC) +Received: from ishibashi.localnet (unknown + [IPv6:2001:470:5:265:a45d:823b:2d27:961c]) + (Authenticated sender: luke-jr) + by zinan.dashjr.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1544E38A0087; + Sat, 28 Jan 2017 19:43:51 +0000 (UTC) +X-Hashcash: 1:25:170128:natanael.l@gmail.com::L0DQGrovLa4AHXS=:cYl8w +X-Hashcash: 1:25:170128:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org::P5bOZxpTJVSQDFD+:E35T +X-Hashcash: 1:25:170128:andrew.johnson83@gmail.com::XzSn2jSIbhL5tLaP:bk+m= +From: Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr.org> +To: Natanael <natanael.l@gmail.com> +Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2017 19:43:48 +0000 +User-Agent: KMail/1.13.7 (Linux/4.4.39-gentoo; KDE/4.14.24; x86_64; ; ) +References: <201701270107.01092.luke@dashjr.org> + <201701280403.05558.luke@dashjr.org> + <CAAt2M183=L=9N3HKVgGbsFbug4LWkGfMQzzcDQu9xxMJL+L1oA@mail.gmail.com> +In-Reply-To: <CAAt2M183=L=9N3HKVgGbsFbug4LWkGfMQzzcDQu9xxMJL+L1oA@mail.gmail.com> +X-PGP-Key-Fingerprint: E463 A93F 5F31 17EE DE6C 7316 BD02 9424 21F4 889F +X-PGP-Key-ID: BD02942421F4889F +X-PGP-Keyserver: hkp://pgp.mit.edu +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: Text/Plain; + charset="iso-8859-15" +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit +Message-Id: <201701281943.49975.luke@dashjr.org> +X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RP_MATCHES_RCVD + autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 +X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on + smtp1.linux-foundation.org +Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Three hardfork-related BIPs +X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org +X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 +Precedence: list +List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> +List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> +List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> +List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> +X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2017 19:45:01 -0000 + +On Saturday, January 28, 2017 10:36:16 AM Natanael wrote: +> Den 28 jan. 2017 05:04 skrev "Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev" < +> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>: +> > Satoshi envisioned a system where full nodes could publish proofs of +> > invalid blocks that would be automatically verified by SPV nodes and used +> > to ensure even they maintained the equivalent of full node security so +> > long as they were not isolated. But as a matter of fact, this vision has +> > proven impossible, and there is to date no viable theory on how it might +> > be fixed. As a result, the only way for nodes to have full-node-security +> > is to actually be a true full node, and therefore the plan of only having +> > full nodes in datacenters is simply not realistic without transforming +> > Bitcoin into a centralised system. +> +> Beside Zero-knowledge proofs, which is capable of proving much so more than +> just validity, there are multi types of fraud proofs that only rely on the +> format of the blocks. Such as publishing the block header + the two +> colliding transactions included in it (in the case of double spending), or +> if the syntax or logic is broken then you just publish that single +> transaction. + +Why would someone malicious follow the format sufficiently to make those +proofs possible? + +> There aren't all that many cases where fraud proofs are unreasonably large +> for a networked system like in Bitcoin. If Zero-knowledge proofs can be +> applied securely, then I can't think of any exceptions at all for when the +> proofs would be unmanageable. (Remember that full Zero-knowledge proofs can +> be chained together!) + +ZK proofs do to a large extent simplify the situation, but still fail in one +case (and one case is all an attacker needs, since he can choose how he +attacks). Specifically, the attacker can create a block which is 100% well- +formed and valid (or not - nobody will really ever know), and simply withhold +a single transaction in it, such that nobody ever has the complete block's +data. Full nodes will of course not accept such a block until they have the +complete data to validate, but they similarly cannot prove it is invalid +without the complete data, and any non-full nodes cannot prove there is data +missing without fetching and (to an extent) checking the entire block +themselves. + +Luke + |