diff options
| author | Bram Cohen <bram@chia.net> | 2018-06-18 13:40:26 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | bitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org> | 2018-06-18 20:40:44 +0000 |
| commit | a42787e2ccba34db3f5e8ace57086a3593101a19 (patch) | |
| tree | bd0d146edf0f17759d1d851ba1cd6403d11960df | |
| parent | 79e9c0a072ec58e7c1ba576001eeb6eaa91e2a63 (diff) | |
| download | pi-bitcoindev-a42787e2ccba34db3f5e8ace57086a3593101a19.tar.gz pi-bitcoindev-a42787e2ccba34db3f5e8ace57086a3593101a19.zip | |
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Miner dilution attack on Bitcoin - is that something plausible?
| -rw-r--r-- | c4/f1cea9f1b3a5a3425e268ac7c4e45bbbb381ad | 171 |
1 files changed, 171 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/c4/f1cea9f1b3a5a3425e268ac7c4e45bbbb381ad b/c4/f1cea9f1b3a5a3425e268ac7c4e45bbbb381ad new file mode 100644 index 000000000..57c1f8112 --- /dev/null +++ b/c4/f1cea9f1b3a5a3425e268ac7c4e45bbbb381ad @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +Return-Path: <bram@chia.net> +Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org + [172.17.192.35]) + by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 78E92D63 + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Mon, 18 Jun 2018 20:40:44 +0000 (UTC) +X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 +Received: from mail-wm0-f67.google.com (mail-wm0-f67.google.com [74.125.82.67]) + by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BE3F4326 + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Mon, 18 Jun 2018 20:40:43 +0000 (UTC) +Received: by mail-wm0-f67.google.com with SMTP id v16-v6so16265113wmh.5 + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Mon, 18 Jun 2018 13:40:43 -0700 (PDT) +DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; + d=chia-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; + h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; + bh=SYziJtVX+QrP4HhjUjyM0geZVmkmMI0W3GYBwA2/BtA=; + b=gDPjYVJcrBfg2hwSSu9DfL+yIu4m1JWERlUkMzudr53778rQBvPSWYcMZXmXBwO5jU + 9FKIkKuA7U8nFSK+oVJwOUh8ioaI2LtP1FAksFWGH99wdAZEB5qxf8+ZcGQlYaXTZXBF + 7xpgsW0H6ybF4WgRCW9sO3lqhBVqCnd8EqHHWUgiqjGup9KHWN0ZeMzwsbve+XMW5Nt6 + jDoeBn6huU+YNQ8ZX2j/nJIarORVbGDroyXT2OoUwTfs5bAW6eLFg2PsaAbgEYhB/rzM + otqhjKCmCJBr3C5tE9zfd8Uvz1ul0DHAFe8gcy+/j4RwB2yo/+VylClG5Fnrjqgp7nN5 + hmAQ== +X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; + d=1e100.net; s=20161025; + h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date + :message-id:subject:to; + bh=SYziJtVX+QrP4HhjUjyM0geZVmkmMI0W3GYBwA2/BtA=; + b=SPTCUy6x0RmBkZwLkjiIIy1koMR58srN711lU0Pf+10/LjuUT5C/UfDXr+cXzrAm06 + B8lvj/Ll8KbePifscD0i4NPPMbXyT3xg0Wee1CLk1k43/TYQG5dzGVVR+OOqBrQANhS3 + fCOOUHV4qqMoAx4o7YOa7KShnxaEf63LQCEf40jRO1pzTmMKvNHJmW8OkqVHW+yiopSO + xS1m9rdYGNT8IMImAad1L4j4330a6Oha/p3nUuUFXZ5dQtX8pxZTtaesGtZPqhAcjuLT + 0Fk59HEPX41546Z2b61ftBzvOuu9Wham10god1ExwG/Yw+7reMZZXKpdqVpo2CFqO1WJ + IEMQ== +X-Gm-Message-State: APt69E3q1Xdpk9Gayih3LtzOH9WSu8H2DcLkip7YS3ouDXCWlNTqaeY9 + qIJ///rx5+MyJFF+71ydo5b22q/0JAyh4sqtkZh6Ag== +X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADUXVKJINYdpZMe2FxliUO19czQvBgecI44m929c14YoVlAA/dv7t7vmQ0wrjgRistasxbHsp8x7TTWi8ckADQUnmUI= +X-Received: by 2002:a1c:ae8b:: with SMTP id + x133-v6mr10407152wme.125.1529354442180; + Mon, 18 Jun 2018 13:40:42 -0700 (PDT) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +References: <CAJRVQkDM390Y4sVzA8WwM93PY4UqUa8gvPKkT-iA2UcYL6FQ+g@mail.gmail.com> +In-Reply-To: <CAJRVQkDM390Y4sVzA8WwM93PY4UqUa8gvPKkT-iA2UcYL6FQ+g@mail.gmail.com> +From: Bram Cohen <bram@chia.net> +Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 13:40:26 -0700 +Message-ID: <CAHUJnBAU2exMFgPTQx_+h_bktL3Z3B3rsh09aciVtRnGrHJBEw@mail.gmail.com> +To: theartlav@gmail.com, + Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000431fc5056ef094f2" +X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, + DKIM_VALID, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 +X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on + smtp1.linux-foundation.org +X-Mailman-Approved-At: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 20:43:27 +0000 +Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Miner dilution attack on Bitcoin - is that + something plausible? +X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org +X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 +Precedence: list +List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> +List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> +List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> +List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> +X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 18 Jun 2018 20:40:44 -0000 + +--000000000000431fc5056ef094f2 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" +Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable + +Not sure what you're saying here. The block rate can't be particularly +increased or decreased in the long run due to the work difficulty +adjustment getting you roughly back where you started no matter what. +Someone could DOS the system by producing empty blocks, sure, that's a +central attack of what can happen when someone does a 51% attack with no +special countermeasures other than everything that Bitcoin does at its +core. An attacker or group of attackers could conspire to reduce block +sizes in order to increase transaction fees, in fact they could do that +with a miner activated soft fork. That appears both doable and given past +things which have happened with transaction fees in the past potentially +lucrative, particularly as block rewards fall in the future. Please don't +tell the big mining pools about it. + +On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 11:39 AM =D0=90=D1=80=D1=82=D1=91=D0=BC =D0=9B=D0= +=B8=D1=82=D0=B2=D0=B8=D0=BD=D0=BE=D0=B2=D0=B8=D1=87 via bitcoin-dev < +bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: + +> Dilution is a potential attack i randomly came up with in a Twitter +> arguement and couldn't find any references to or convincing arguments of = +it +> being implausible. +> +> Suppose a malicious actor were to acquire a majority of hash power, and +> proceed to use that hash power to produce valid, but empty blocks. +> +> As far as i understand it, this would effectively reduce the block rate b= +y +> half or more and since nodes can't differentiate block relay and block +> production there would be nothing they can do to adjust difficulty or bla= +ck +> list the attacker. +> +> At a rough estimate of $52 per TH equipment cost (Antminer pricing) and +> 12.5 BTC per 10 minutes power cost we are looking at an order of $2 billi= +on +> of equipment and $0.4 billion a month of power costs (ignoring block +> reward) to maintain an attack - easily within means of even a minor +> government-scale actor. +> +> Is that a plausible scenario, or am i chasing a mirage? If it is +> plausible, what could be done to mitigate it? +> +> +> -Artem +> _______________________________________________ +> bitcoin-dev mailing list +> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org +> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev +> + +--000000000000431fc5056ef094f2 +Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" +Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable + +<div dir=3D"ltr">Not sure what you're saying here. The block rate can&#= +39;t be particularly increased or decreased in the long run due to the work= + difficulty adjustment getting you roughly back where you started no matter= + what. Someone could DOS the system by producing empty blocks, sure, that&#= +39;s a central attack of what can happen when someone does a 51% attack wit= +h no special countermeasures other than everything that Bitcoin does at its= + core. An attacker or group of attackers could conspire to reduce block siz= +es in order to increase transaction fees, in fact they could do that with a= + miner activated soft fork. That appears both doable and given past things = +which have happened with transaction fees in the past potentially lucrative= +, particularly as block rewards fall in the future. Please don't tell t= +he big mining pools about it.</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir= +=3D"ltr">On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 11:39 AM =D0=90=D1=80=D1=82=D1=91=D0=BC = +=D0=9B=D0=B8=D1=82=D0=B2=D0=B8=D0=BD=D0=BE=D0=B2=D0=B8=D1=87 via bitcoin-de= +v <<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org">bitcoin-dev@= +lists.linuxfoundation.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmai= +l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left= +:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><div><div>Dilution is a potential att= +ack i randomly came up with in a Twitter arguement and couldn't find an= +y references to or convincing arguments of it being implausible.<br><br></d= +iv>Suppose a malicious actor were to acquire a majority of hash power, and = +proceed to use that hash power to produce valid, but empty blocks.<br><br><= +/div>As far as i understand it, this would effectively reduce the block rat= +e by half or more and since nodes can't differentiate block relay and b= +lock production there would be nothing they can do to adjust difficulty or = +black list the attacker.<br><br></div>At a rough estimate of $52 per TH equ= +ipment cost (Antminer pricing) and 12.5 BTC per 10 minutes power cost we ar= +e looking at an order of $2 billion of equipment and $0.4 billion a month o= +f power costs (ignoring block reward) to maintain an attack - easily within= + means of even a minor government-scale actor.<br><br></div>Is that a plaus= +ible scenario, or am i chasing a mirage? If it is plausible, what could be = +done to mitigate it?<br><br><br></div>-Artem<br></div> +_______________________________________________<br> +bitcoin-dev mailing list<br> +<a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">= +bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org</a><br> +<a href=3D"https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev" = +rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= +man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev</a><br> +</blockquote></div> + +--000000000000431fc5056ef094f2-- + |