diff options
| author | Michael Hendricks <michael@ndrix.org> | 2012-01-30 21:33:02 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | bitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org> | 2012-01-31 04:33:09 +0000 |
| commit | 9cf054778682b4903a5d2398187b3a58c04d1083 (patch) | |
| tree | df0f83dab06cd8d6f5542468c9526efcb648aaad | |
| parent | d4585af0868f3e1ebaf3da27477f05fec10b2c7d (diff) | |
| download | pi-bitcoindev-9cf054778682b4903a5d2398187b3a58c04d1083.tar.gz pi-bitcoindev-9cf054778682b4903a5d2398187b3a58c04d1083.zip | |
Re: [Bitcoin-development] CAddrMan: Stochastic IP address manager
| -rw-r--r-- | 3c/e2cc17e445a44fa35101ebc91af3263437e469 | 108 |
1 files changed, 108 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/3c/e2cc17e445a44fa35101ebc91af3263437e469 b/3c/e2cc17e445a44fa35101ebc91af3263437e469 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0035098b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/3c/e2cc17e445a44fa35101ebc91af3263437e469 @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] + helo=mx.sourceforge.net) + by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) + (envelope-from <michael@ndrix.org>) id 1Rs5P3-0006e6-Gf + for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; + Tue, 31 Jan 2012 04:33:09 +0000 +X-ACL-Warn: +Received: from out3-smtp.messagingengine.com ([66.111.4.27]) + by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) + (Exim 4.76) id 1Rs5P2-0003CM-I4 + for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; + Tue, 31 Jan 2012 04:33:09 +0000 +Received: from compute1.internal (compute1.nyi.mail.srv.osa [10.202.2.41]) + by gateway1.nyi.mail.srv.osa (Postfix) with ESMTP id D112220F6A + for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>; + Mon, 30 Jan 2012 23:33:02 -0500 (EST) +Received: from frontend1.nyi.mail.srv.osa ([10.202.2.160]) + by compute1.internal (MEProxy); Mon, 30 Jan 2012 23:33:02 -0500 +X-Sasl-enc: o7iC7JBRu7C237LGhOcfFt0jeIpFElMoHTuXbCcdY9cP 1327984382 +Received: from mail-qw0-f54.google.com (mail-qw0-f54.google.com + [209.85.216.54]) + by mail.messagingengine.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A34668E0169 + for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>; + Mon, 30 Jan 2012 23:33:02 -0500 (EST) +Received: by qaea17 with SMTP id a17so3449360qae.13 + for <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>; + Mon, 30 Jan 2012 20:33:02 -0800 (PST) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Received: by 10.224.174.76 with SMTP id s12mr25371476qaz.11.1327984382467; + Mon, 30 Jan 2012 20:33:02 -0800 (PST) +Received: by 10.229.238.147 with HTTP; Mon, 30 Jan 2012 20:33:02 -0800 (PST) +In-Reply-To: <CABsx9T0avsrL3134WaA3boG-cdx2NcgEH1mQG7Cef78ZV5UNkw@mail.gmail.com> +References: <CAPg+sBjNTS3n8Q3XzZi5GpBL6k_-4AxRKr0BkWa=-AAVgqS=2Q@mail.gmail.com> + <CAFHuXub52Lu4T0mCWoPoCrHGhCXyLpmEpSWn32_PZPjaRGL2LQ@mail.gmail.com> + <CABsx9T0avsrL3134WaA3boG-cdx2NcgEH1mQG7Cef78ZV5UNkw@mail.gmail.com> +Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 21:33:02 -0700 +Message-ID: <CAFHuXuZ78y3nHfuKBgjO1j+bNsdnbngDee_Xii4xGhUshJqtZQ@mail.gmail.com> +From: Michael Hendricks <michael@ndrix.org> +To: Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com> +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable +X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/) +X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. + See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. + 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, + not necessarily valid + -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature +X-Headers-End: 1Rs5P2-0003CM-I4 +Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net +Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] CAddrMan: Stochastic IP address manager +X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net +X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 +Precedence: list +List-Id: <bitcoin-development.lists.sourceforge.net> +List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>, + <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=unsubscribe> +List-Archive: <http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development> +List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net> +List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=help> +List-Subscribe: <https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development>, + <mailto:bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net?subject=subscribe> +X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2012 04:33:09 -0000 + +On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 7:05 PM, Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com> w= +rote: +> Given the randomness in Pieter's design, that seems extremely unlikely +> / difficult to do. Is it possible to do a back-of-the-envelope +> calculation to figure out what percentage of nodes on the network an +> attacker would have to control to have a (say) 1% chance of a +> successful Sybil attack? + +The randomness prevents finely crafted attacks since an attacker can't +predict which bucket his address ends up in. I don't think it helps +against brute force attacks though. If 60% of the network's nodes are +controlled by an evil botnet, 60% of the nodes we pull out of the +address manager point to the attacker. If a client has 8 connections +to the network, a Sybil attack would succeed 1.7% of the time. At +current network size, 60% of listening nodes is 2,800; only 2-5% of a +decent botnet. + +Nodes that accept incoming connections are far less vulnerable, since +the probability of success decreases exponentially with the number of +connections. 95% botnet control with 125 connections has 10^-6 chance +of success. + +Perhaps we could add a command-line option for increasing the maximum +number of outbound connections. That way, nodes unable to accept +incoming connections can easily decrease their susceptibility to Sybil +attack. + +> I've also been wondering if it is time to remove the IRC bootstrapping +> mechanism; it would remove a fair bit of code and we'd stop getting +> reports that various ISPs tag bitcoin as malware. =C2=A0When testing the +> list of built-in bootstrapping IP addresses I always connect fairly +> quickly, and the DNS seeding hosts seems to be working nicely, too. + +I think it should be disabled by default one release after the new +address manager is released. That way, we're not changing too many +parts of the bootstrapping process at once. + +As an aside, I can't help but wonder whether ISPs blocking IRC traffic +filters some botnets out of the IRC bootstrapping channels; keeping +them more "pure". + +--=20 +Michael + + |