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| author | ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com> | 2019-07-20 11:07:14 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | bitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org> | 2019-07-20 11:07:23 +0000 |
| commit | 97f56bbf149d7ac02714c65f89bcbd86ad88612d (patch) | |
| tree | dbda5b2eea0af9ae59a1682c4204d1ecf721be50 | |
| parent | 925161e5dd23fc45ad64e8ec67faf8f1fba4b4a7 (diff) | |
| download | pi-bitcoindev-97f56bbf149d7ac02714c65f89bcbd86ad88612d.tar.gz pi-bitcoindev-97f56bbf149d7ac02714c65f89bcbd86ad88612d.zip | |
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin
| -rw-r--r-- | 22/49a31a99e62e3236fdf95330a955f65780c087 | 170 |
1 files changed, 170 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/22/49a31a99e62e3236fdf95330a955f65780c087 b/22/49a31a99e62e3236fdf95330a955f65780c087 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2b4383e64 --- /dev/null +++ b/22/49a31a99e62e3236fdf95330a955f65780c087 @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +Return-Path: <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com> +Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org + [172.17.192.35]) + by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 86BBD2419 + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Sat, 20 Jul 2019 11:07:23 +0000 (UTC) +X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 +Received: from mail-40136.protonmail.ch (mail-40136.protonmail.ch + [185.70.40.136]) + by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 707A4E6 + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Sat, 20 Jul 2019 11:07:22 +0000 (UTC) +Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2019 11:07:14 +0000 +DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; + s=default; t=1563620839; + bh=1+Yb/6Hv0UCvwUQvzxyZLduvqLEfFLh2uCyK9imvI3o=; + h=Date:To:From:Cc:Reply-To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References: + Feedback-ID:From; + b=SBHLU/7Slfcii9RocFMWbxaFoa5EQLdfjPqwW0+t2Qp/zk8wruKM3MgwvAgZisES9 + SjnFOSQdlF9lSnHrW23IH4EkOQhtNaxmZIU3FnFmV1Q6PNSnDF+PhgMBDNUa9mNIpX + 6NotJjWToLo3eFZ+z9loluMAoNVa5UDZbhgg2MZk= +To: "Kenshiro []" <tensiam@hotmail.com> +From: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com> +Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com> +Message-ID: <LDVRsI_WqicA9u8WYrBo71H0Xkw7FgwZbjvkWCh_aycSY2awgRdlYsoba2Vf0cRLiye3Sh5ISR2pVI1mUcceVDP0sLukRbrEgYM3ngIza9o=@protonmail.com> +In-Reply-To: <DB6PR10MB1832F6395C1E6337FD896235A6CA0@DB6PR10MB1832.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> +References: <DB6PR10MB183264613ED0D61F2FBC6524A6F30@DB6PR10MB1832.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> + <Hyx4PP6c5-kzdKTCrIQLO1W3Hve-bm5gDiY5pBq8wi6ry2J-1KPO4TDJrRxk7rwq-3aEIUIkkYdKqmPwTzlQZBU-3xUf-fru_drJ9PM4yRI=@protonmail.com> + <DB6PR10MB1832BAAB9D194B6AA61C2573A6C90@DB6PR10MB1832.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> + <207DBF48-E996-440D-ADDC-3AEC9238C034@voskuil.org>, + <brBQhROvRWwcPjdOBU0_7e0_dpBN4Noy1gP9TaEB6bEiOWTa3Huumz242_pjVI27u_G_edcTX7Ko6aD6pi6ta1vdQMzHCAli5Q_-55HD2SU=@protonmail.com> + <DB6PR10MB183268A7D3C744B1269E46EAA6C80@DB6PR10MB1832.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>, + <-FVjDC_47DKPnkjAvcOAh3XMnIBIKspnLWrbpNlgE043OsEAJx9ZT5I3m7XWgwbsVps3QlwP7XSDu5yZ5JWSLxGiJM99T1ycjqqP7AUrtzo=@protonmail.com> + <DB6PR10MB1832C21C602126F797132A4AA6C80@DB6PR10MB1832.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>, + <hv2EyhKHfNd-TmH2j-8jLFWw6nUMYHOsNF_5Vy-eZLQLessR9Quy4uXn8ZVYLK4dZrwcVq3QeCcEXdCHPOJ0tgya5P34S1seEAGSRyPYpks=@protonmail.com> + <DB6PR10MB1832EF2ACF6539E03494A381A6CB0@DB6PR10MB1832.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>, + <zs4_imeOmpTHJLNyl90kuY8HWoLEjgmCcims6fESt2Fg5goLfUdcKdcPIsKCWRfojPifaNfg5XKi24fwAIRW_LUnAz-yzwOA6S362R4g5RA=@protonmail.com> + <DB6PR10MB1832F6395C1E6337FD896235A6CA0@DB6PR10MB1832.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> +Feedback-ID: el4j0RWPRERue64lIQeq9Y2FP-mdB86tFqjmrJyEPR9VAtMovPEo9tvgA0CrTsSHJeeyPXqnoAu6DN-R04uJUg==:Ext:ProtonMail +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable +X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, + DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, FROM_LOCAL_NOVOWEL, + RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 +X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on + smtp1.linux-foundation.org +X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sat, 20 Jul 2019 11:48:36 +0000 +Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Secure Proof Of Stake implementation on Bitcoin +X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org +X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 +Precedence: list +List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> +List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> +List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> +List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> +X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2019 11:07:23 -0000 + +Good morning Kenshiro, + + +> +> >>>=C2=A0For example, if you are capable of disrupting a coin such that i= +ts value is very likely to drop, you can buy short options as leverage. +> Suppose you hold a large stake of coins and know you control a significan= +t fraction, enough that a censorship attack by you will be so disruptive th= +at the coin price will drop. +> You take out a short contract with the contract price at the "hopium" lev= +el others have (say 10% higher), buying enough options that you can cover t= +he current price of your owned stake, plus some more options. +> Suppose you buy, a number of options equal to twice your stake. +> +> Thank you for the explanation, I understand it now. But what percent of B= +TC trades are short options? If everyone is doing short options, the attack= + is very dangerous as you say, but if only a small percent of trades is don= +e in short options, then it's not a big problem.=C2=A0 + +It is immaterial, because this is just *one* possible economic attack. +Further leverage can always be had as Bitcoin does not exist in isolation. + +> +> And this type of attack could also be done in PoW by evil miners. It's on= +ly one step more, they have to purchase a lot of BTC before the attack, buy= + many short options and execute the attack. Purchasing 50% of BTC is a prob= +lem because of the price, but that's the same for PoW or PoS. + +Miners cannot feasibly take over 50% of energy sources in the world. + +> +> >>>=C2=A0Let's suppose there are two big whales in your coin. +> Each of them owns 50% of the total staked value. +> Let's say "wait many blocks" parameter is 100 blocks. +> +> >>>One whale puts all his coin in a single UTXO. +> The other has distributed his stake in 100,000 different UTXOs. +> +> I think there is a misunderstanding here, you forgot to divide the 50% st= +aking weight of the evil whale by 100.000. + +No, you have a misunderstanding of your ***own*** system. +You forgot that you indicated that a staking UTXO is banned from adding a n= +ew block for "wait many blocks", as you indicated. +Thus it is immaterial that each tiny stake of the evil whale is tiny: only = +the tiny stakes of the evil whale are in play during the time that the sing= +ular big UTXO by the honest whale is banned. +Thus it has 100% of the stake during those 100 blocks. +The honest whale gets 1 block (with very high probability) and then the evi= +l whale gets the rest of the blocks for 100 blocks. + +?Now again, consider that the situation indicates that there are in fact on= +ly two actual stakers, each of whom have 50% of the staked funds, thus ther= +e are no other stakers (even though the evil whale appears to be multiple s= +eparate stakers) because 50% + 50% =3D 100%. +I did indicate "each of them owns 50% of the total staked value", did I not= +? + +The rest of your counterargument ***completely forgets*** this, so I will i= +gnore it. +A whale composed of many tiny fishes is still a whale. +It is immaterial that there may exist many small stakers who individually c= +an overpower a tiny stake of the evil whale: the evil whale will still domi= +nate during those times that the honest whale is banned because of your add= +itional rule that "a staker who creates a block is banned from creating ano= +ther block for many blocks": the evil whale simply dominates from having ma= +ny tiny stakes, each of which can be banned with little effect on the actua= +l power of the evil whale over the coin. + +> >>>=C2=A0We already know that miners are setting up mines at locations wh= +ere energy is being wasted (e.g. oil well gas flares, putting up solar pane= +ls instead of just letting sunshine pointlessly heat up their roofs, etc.),= + and channeling the wasted energy into productive activity. +> +> I'm sure a big percent of mining will be done in this way, but if there i= +s still dirty energy like nuclear energy or others is because we can't get = +all the energy we need from clean sources (and that's excluding bitcoin min= +ing). So even being very optimistic about bitcoin mining, it will steal cle= +an energy sources from other human needs which will make us keep using dirt= +y energy. So PoW makes use dirty energy sources in a direct or indirect way= +. + +It is immaterial: what matters is the economics. +Dirty energy is dirty because it causes damage to the economy by creating s= +ickness and preventing people from surviving long lives and producing for t= +he economy, destroys ecology and reduces biodiversity (and many products ar= +e derived from the variety of lifeforms available) and so on. +Thus, all energy uses will inevitably move towards cleaner energy sources a= +s competition arises. + +> +> >>>=C2=A0Thus, adding more rules is rarely the optimal thing to do. +> +> Proof of Stake is more complex than PoW, so you need to add a few more ru= +les. Of course the rules must be well designed and tested, but as I explain= +ed above there is no problem with the extra rule of giving a great increase= + in staking weight to coins together in a single UTXO, because there is wai= +t time for each staking deposit. + +You have demonstrated no such thing, merely demonstrated your own willful i= +ncompetence in designing protocols. + +I will no longer respond. + +Regards, +ZmnSCPxj + |