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authorPeter R <peter_r@gmx.com>2015-08-07 11:36:32 -0700
committerbitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org>2015-08-07 18:36:34 +0000
commit9671d4dd83e6868b1f6d517de4ba2e035263b628 (patch)
tree6966f0796e8b8eeda8471655463d995cecb0db29
parentaedaf09a8f5590e0ced250abc492b48bbf3ad150 (diff)
downloadpi-bitcoindev-9671d4dd83e6868b1f6d517de4ba2e035263b628.tar.gz
pi-bitcoindev-9671d4dd83e6868b1f6d517de4ba2e035263b628.zip
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fees and the block-finding process
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+From: Peter R <peter_r@gmx.com>
+In-Reply-To: <CABsx9T16fH+56isq95m4+QWsKwP==tf75ep8ghnEcBoV4OtZJA@mail.gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2015 11:36:32 -0700
+Message-Id: <17105AA2-F85D-4B81-8D2C-D71D9A1B5F3C@gmx.com>
+References: <CABsx9T16fH+56isq95m4+QWsKwP==tf75ep8ghnEcBoV4OtZJA@mail.gmail.com>
+To: Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com>
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+Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
+Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Fees and the block-finding process
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+--Apple-Mail=_C6E85C60-E730-4D95-AF91-C8137EE738DD
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+
+> ...blocks are found at random intervals.
+>=20
+> Every once in a while the network will get lucky and we'll find six =
+blocks in ten minutes. If you are deciding what transaction fee to put =
+on your transaction, and you're willing to wait until that =
+six-blocks-in-ten-minutes once-a-week event, submit your transaction =
+with a low fee.
+>=20
+> All the higher-fee transactions waiting to be confirmed will get =
+confirmed in the first five blocks and, if miners don't have any floor =
+on the fee they'll accept (they will, but lets pretend they won't) then =
+your very-low-fee transaction will get confirmed.
+>=20
+> In the limit, that logic becomes "wait an infinite amount of time, pay =
+zero fee."
+> ...
+>=20
+> Gavin Andresen
+
+Yes, I see this as correct as well. If demand for space within a =
+particular block is elevated (e.g., when the network has not found a =
+block for 30 minutes), the minimum fee density for inclusion will be =
+greater than the minimum fee density when demand for space is low (e.g., =
+when the network has found several blocks in quick succession, as Gavin =
+pointed out). Lower-fee paying transaction will just wait to be =
+included at one of the network lulls where a bunch of blocks were found =
+quickly in a row. =20
+
+The feemarket.pdf paper ( =
+https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/43331625/feemarket.pdf ) shows that =
+this will always be the case so long as the block space supply curve =
+(i.e., the cost in BTC/byte to supply additional space within a block =
+[rho]) is a monotonically-increasing function of the block size (refer =
+to Fig. 6 and Table 1). The curve will satisfy this condition provided =
+the propagation time for block solutions grows faster than log Q where Q =
+is the size of the block. Assuming that block solutions are propagated =
+across physical channels, and that the quantity of pure information =
+communicated per solution is proportional to the amount of information =
+contained within the block, then the communication time will always grow =
+asymptotically like O(Q) as per the Shannon-Hartely theorem, and the fee =
+market will be healthy. =20
+
+Best regards,
+Peter
+
+
+--Apple-Mail=_C6E85C60-E730-4D95-AF91-C8137EE738DD
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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+ charset=us-ascii
+
+<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
+charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
+-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
+"><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div =
+class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div><font =
+color=3D"#000000">...</font>blocks are found at random =
+intervals.</div><div><br></div><div>Every once in a while the network =
+will get lucky and we'll find six blocks in ten minutes. If you are =
+deciding what transaction fee to put on your transaction, and you're =
+willing to wait until that six-blocks-in-ten-minutes once-a-week event, =
+submit your transaction with a low fee.</div><div><br></div><div>All the =
+higher-fee transactions waiting to be confirmed will get confirmed in =
+the first five blocks and, if miners don't have any floor on the fee =
+they'll accept (they will, but lets pretend they won't) then your =
+very-low-fee transaction will get confirmed.</div><div><br></div><div>In =
+the limit, that logic becomes "wait an infinite amount of time, pay zero =
+fee."</div><div>...</div></div></div></div></blockquote><blockquote =
+type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div =
+class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_signature">Gavin =
+Andresen</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>Yes, I see this as =
+correct as well. &nbsp;If demand for space within a particular block is =
+elevated (e.g., when the network has not found a block for 30 minutes), =
+the minimum fee density for inclusion will be greater than the minimum =
+fee density when demand for space is low (e.g., when the network has =
+found several blocks in quick succession, as Gavin pointed out). =
+&nbsp;Lower-fee paying transaction will just wait to be included at one =
+of the network lulls where a bunch of blocks were found quickly in a =
+row. &nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>The feemarket.pdf paper (&nbsp;<a =
+href=3D"https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/43331625/feemarket.pdf">https:=
+//dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/43331625/feemarket.pdf</a>&nbsp;) shows =
+that this will always be the case so long as the block space supply =
+curve (i.e., the cost in&nbsp;BTC/byte&nbsp;to supply additional space =
+within a block [rho]) is a monotonically-increasing function of the =
+block size (refer to Fig. 6 and Table 1). &nbsp;The curve will satisfy =
+this condition provided the propagation time for block solutions grows =
+faster than log Q where Q is the size of the block. &nbsp;Assuming =
+that&nbsp;block solutions are propagated across physical channels, and =
+that the quantity of pure information communicated per solution is =
+proportional to the amount of information contained within the block, =
+then the communication time will always grow asymptotically like O(Q) as =
+per the Shannon-Hartely theorem, and the fee market will be healthy. =
+&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>Best =
+regards,</div><div>Peter</div><div><br></div></body></html>=
+
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+