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authorTamas Blummer <tamas.blummer@gmail.com>2019-07-28 16:17:35 +0200
committerbitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org>2019-07-28 14:17:38 +0000
commit809b897f8da1d1aed347eb991a2e2cad5656af79 (patch)
tree3071c34b6571a92a9bf3f765714b3eb3dcf3b504
parentf6372187be1d96437dcc4f5c5bed75dec361aedc (diff)
downloadpi-bitcoindev-809b897f8da1d1aed347eb991a2e2cad5656af79.tar.gz
pi-bitcoindev-809b897f8da1d1aed347eb991a2e2cad5656af79.zip
Re: [bitcoin-dev] Improving JoinMarket's resistance to sybil attacks using fidelity bonds
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+From: Tamas Blummer <tamas.blummer@gmail.com>
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+Date: Sun, 28 Jul 2019 16:17:35 +0200
+In-Reply-To: <20190727193417.cxf544dbempencql@ganymede>
+To: "David A. Harding" <dave@dtrt.org>,
+ Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
+References: <985792b1-e7aa-677b-a7a1-6a5f672da884@riseup.net>
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+Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Improving JoinMarket's resistance to sybil
+ attacks using fidelity bonds
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+Hi David,
+
+Aquiring coin age is hard not only for an attacker but for any user that
+happened to move his funds lately.
+
+Even if coin age is available, proofs of using it to fund a particular =
+operation
+are not sybill resistant. Only a centralized service would know for sure =
+that
+proof is only used once and such centralization would defeat the =
+purpose.
+
+In contrast time locking such that it is uniquely linked with the =
+operation
+is always possible as funds could also be rented to lock in a =
+decentralized manner.
+
+Regards,
+
+Tamas Blummer
+
+> On Jul 27, 2019, at 21:34, David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev =
+<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
+>=20
+> On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 12:47:54PM +0100, Chris Belcher via =
+bitcoin-dev wrote:
+>> A way to create a fidelity bond is to burn an amount of bitcoins by
+>> sending to a OP_RETURN output. Another kind is time-locked addresses
+>> created using OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY where the valuable thing being
+>> sacrificed is time rather than money, but the two are related because =
+of
+>> the time-value-of-money.
+>=20
+> Timelocking bitcoins, especially for long periods, carries some =
+special
+> risks in Bitcoin:
+>=20
+> 1. Inability to sell fork coins, also creating an inability to =
+influence
+> the price signals that help determine the outcome of chainsplits.
+>=20
+> 2. Possible inability to transition to new security mechanisms if
+> a major weakness is discovered in ECC or a hash function.
+>=20
+> An alternative to timelocks might be coin age---the value of a UTXO
+> multiplied by the time since that UTXO was confirmed. Coin age may be
+> even harder for an attacker to acquire given that it is a measure of
+> past patience rather than future sacrifice. It also doesn't require
+> using any particular script and so is flexible no matter what policy =
+the
+> coin owner wants to use (especially if proof-of-funds signatures are
+> generated using something like BIP322).
+>=20
+> Any full node (archival or pruned) can verify coin age using the UTXO
+> set.[1] Unlike script-based timelock (CLTV or CSV), there is no =
+current
+> SPV-level secure way to prove to lite clients that an output is still
+> unspent, however such verification may be possible within each lite
+> client's own security model related to transaction withholding =
+attacks:
+>=20
+> - Electrum-style clients can poll their server to see if a particular
+> UTXO is unspent.
+>=20
+> - BIP158 users who have saved their past filters to disk can use them =
+to
+> determine which blocks subsequent to the one including the UTXO may
+> contain a spend from it. However, since a UTXO can be spent in the
+> same block, they'd always need to download the block containing the
+> UTXO (alternatively, the script could contain a 1-block CSV delay
+> ensuring any spend occurred in a later block). If BIP158 filters
+> become committed at some point, this mechanism is upgraded to =
+SPV-level
+> security.
+>=20
+>> Note that a long-term holder (or hodler) of bitcoins can buy =
+time-locked
+>> fidelity bonds essentially for free, assuming they never intended to
+>> transact with their coins much anyway.
+>=20
+> This is the thing I most like about the proposal. I suspect most
+> honest makers are likely to have only a small portion of their funds
+> under JoinMarket control, with the rest sitting idle in a cold wallet.
+> Giving makers a way to communicate that they fit that user template
+> would indeed seem to provide significant sybil resistance.
+>=20
+> -Dave
+>=20
+> [1] See, bitcoin-cli help gettxout
+> _______________________________________________
+> bitcoin-dev mailing list
+> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
+> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
+
+
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