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authorAlan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail.com>2013-06-19 15:00:42 -0400
committerbitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org>2013-06-19 19:00:58 +0000
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Optional "wallet-linkable" address format - Payment Protocol
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+Message-ID: <51C1FFDA.1050308@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2013 15:00:42 -0400
+From: Alan Reiner <etotheipi@gmail.com>
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+Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
+Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Optional "wallet-linkable" address format
+ - Payment Protocol
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+On 06/19/2013 02:36 PM, Adam Back wrote:
+> This maybe simpler and trivially compatible with existing type2 public
+> keys
+> (ones that are multiples of a parent public key): send an ECDSA
+> signature of
+> the multiplier, and as we know you can compute ("recover") the parent
+> public
+> key from an the ECDSA signature made using it.
+>
+> Adam
+>
+> On Wed, Jun 19, 2013 at 05:28:15PM +0200, Adam Back wrote:
+>> [q-th root with unknown no discrete log artefact]
+>>
+>> If it was a concern I guess you could require a proof of knowledge of
+>> discrete log. ie as well as public key parent, multiplier the
+>> address must
+>> include ECDSA sig or Schnorr proof of knowledge (which both demonstrate
+>> knowledge of the discrete log of Q to base G.)
+
+It's a cool trick but requiring a signature on each multiplier defeats
+one of the purposes of a deterministic wallet. I don't want to have to
+explicitly export a whole bunch of signatures from my offline system
+just to exercise this address option. The "observer wallet" should be
+able to do anything it needs to on its own, without help from the
+offline wallet.
+
+Unless you mean that there is a one-time signature from the offline
+computer that works for all addresses, that can be exported with the
+observer wallet...? If all you want to do is prove that /someone/ owns
+that private key, you could send {Sign(MagicString), Multiplier}. So
+it becomes one signature operation *per wallet*, but creating new
+wallets would require going back to the offline computer for that
+one-time signature. That's better than the alternative, but it's still
+extra bloat for the wallet apps.
+
+Either way, I'm not convinced that these are a problem for the specified
+use cases I outlined. In cases where you have a persistent business
+relationship, they need to verify the parent public key exchange
+anyway. After that, the software doesn't technically require the
+transmission of the PubKey, it only needs the Name/ID of the party and
+the multiplier and it will fetch the PubKey from its data store. Or it
+is transmitted and the payer verifies it's correct. Computing an
+alternate {PubKey', Mult'} that produces the same address and then using
+it in a MitM attack doesn't work here if the two parties pre-verified
+the public keys.
+
+In the case that a business is checking whether the cashout address of a
+customer is the same as the last time: if the first payout was not
+replaced by an attacker, then the business already has the correct
+public key in their DB and a replacement of further payout requests will
+fail validation. If the first payout was replaced... well that could've
+been done anyway (with or without this alternate form), and the customer
+wouldn't have received their money and the whole process would be
+flagged and terminated before further transactions.
+
+-Alan
+
+
+
+--------------050302010302050007010608
+Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
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+<html>
+ <head>
+ <meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
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+ <body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
+ On 06/19/2013 02:36 PM, Adam Back wrote:<br>
+ <blockquote
+ cite="mid:20130619183657.GA16708@netbook.cypherspace.org"
+ type="cite">This maybe simpler and trivially compatible with
+ existing type2 public keys
+ <br>
+ (ones that are multiples of a parent public key): send an ECDSA
+ signature of
+ <br>
+ the multiplier, and as we know you can compute ("recover") the
+ parent public
+ <br>
+ key from an the ECDSA signature made using it.
+ <br>
+ <br>
+ Adam
+ <br>
+ <br>
+ On Wed, Jun 19, 2013 at 05:28:15PM +0200, Adam Back wrote:
+ <br>
+ <blockquote type="cite">[q-th root with unknown no discrete log
+ artefact]
+ <br>
+ <br>
+ If it was a concern I guess you could require a proof of
+ knowledge of
+ <br>
+ discrete log.&nbsp; ie as well as public key parent, multiplier the
+ address must
+ <br>
+ include ECDSA sig or Schnorr proof of knowledge (which both
+ demonstrate
+ <br>
+ knowledge of the discrete log of Q to base G.)
+ <br>
+ </blockquote>
+ </blockquote>
+ <br>
+ It's a cool trick but requiring a signature on each multiplier
+ defeats one of the purposes of a deterministic wallet.&nbsp; I don't want
+ to have to explicitly export a whole bunch of signatures from my
+ offline system just to exercise this address option.&nbsp; The "observer
+ wallet" should be able to do anything it needs to on its own,
+ without help from the offline wallet.&nbsp; <br>
+ <br>
+ Unless you mean that there is a one-time signature from the offline
+ computer that works for all addresses, that can be exported with the
+ observer wallet...?&nbsp; If all you want to do is prove that <i>someone</i>
+ owns that private key, you could send {Sign(MagicString),
+ Multiplier}.&nbsp;&nbsp; So it becomes one signature operation <b>per wallet</b>,
+ but creating new wallets would require going back to the offline
+ computer for that one-time signature.&nbsp; That's better than the
+ alternative, but it's still extra bloat for the wallet apps.<br>
+ <br>
+ Either way, I'm not convinced that these are a problem for the
+ specified use cases I outlined.&nbsp;&nbsp; In cases where you have a
+ persistent business relationship, they need to verify the parent
+ public key exchange anyway.&nbsp; After that, the software doesn't
+ technically require the transmission of the PubKey, it only needs
+ the Name/ID of the party and the multiplier and it will fetch the
+ PubKey from its data store.&nbsp; Or it is transmitted and the payer
+ verifies it's correct.&nbsp; Computing an alternate {PubKey', Mult'} that
+ produces the same address and then using it in a MitM attack doesn't
+ work here if the two parties pre-verified the public keys.&nbsp; <br>
+ <br>
+ In the case that a business is checking whether the cashout address
+ of a customer is the same as the last time:&nbsp; if the first payout was
+ not replaced by an attacker, then the business already has the
+ correct public key in their DB and a replacement of further payout
+ requests will fail validation.&nbsp; If the first payout was replaced...
+ well that could've been done anyway (with or without this alternate
+ form), and the customer wouldn't have received their money and the
+ whole process would be flagged and terminated before further
+ transactions.<br>
+ <br>
+ -Alan<br>
+ <br>
+ <br>
+ </body>
+</html>
+
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+