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author | Tomas <tomas@tomasvdw.nl> | 2017-06-08 11:50:08 +0200 |
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committer | bitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org> | 2017-06-08 09:50:10 +0000 |
commit | 7071465a674c4dcd57f6d920d3504724c0c72e66 (patch) | |
tree | fb490b5dbd1447a57b67c15e3f6e845e44e9c85c | |
parent | 32df7a8404de42dbc3dff6089d92240c53b111ac (diff) | |
download | pi-bitcoindev-7071465a674c4dcd57f6d920d3504724c0c72e66.tar.gz pi-bitcoindev-7071465a674c4dcd57f6d920d3504724c0c72e66.zip |
Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for Light Clients
-rw-r--r-- | 43/4ac92494ed5689d2ea4febfeb510847fbd8a50 | 153 |
1 files changed, 153 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/43/4ac92494ed5689d2ea4febfeb510847fbd8a50 b/43/4ac92494ed5689d2ea4febfeb510847fbd8a50 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ac63d90d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/43/4ac92494ed5689d2ea4febfeb510847fbd8a50 @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +Return-Path: <tomas@tomasvdw.nl> +Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org + [172.17.192.35]) + by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A3E2088A + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Thu, 8 Jun 2017 09:50:10 +0000 (UTC) +X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 +Received: from out1-smtp.messagingengine.com (out1-smtp.messagingengine.com + [66.111.4.25]) + by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9CFA412A + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Thu, 8 Jun 2017 09:50:09 +0000 (UTC) +Received: from compute2.internal (compute2.nyi.internal [10.202.2.42]) + by mailout.nyi.internal (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB99E20AD6 + for <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>; + Thu, 8 Jun 2017 05:50:08 -0400 (EDT) +Received: from web3 ([10.202.2.213]) + by compute2.internal (MEProxy); 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boundary="_----------=_149691540815833692" +X-Mailer: MessagingEngine.com Webmail Interface - ajax-72fcb609 +In-Reply-To: <CAO3Pvs8ccTkgrecJG6KFbBW+9moHF-FTU+4qNfayeE3hM9uRrg@mail.gmail.com> +References: <CAO3Pvs8ccTkgrecJG6KFbBW+9moHF-FTU+4qNfayeE3hM9uRrg@mail.gmail.com> +Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2017 11:50:08 +0200 +X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, + DKIM_VALID,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 +X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on + smtp1.linux-foundation.org +X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 08 Jun 2017 13:31:41 +0000 +Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Compact Client Side Filtering for + Light Clients +X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org +X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 +Precedence: list +List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev.lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/options/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=unsubscribe> +List-Archive: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/> +List-Post: <mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> +List-Help: <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=help> +List-Subscribe: <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>, + <mailto:bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org?subject=subscribe> +X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2017 09:50:10 -0000 + +This is a multi-part message in MIME format. + +--_----------=_149691540815833692 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit +Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" + +On Thu, Jun 1, 2017, at 21:01, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:> Hi y'all, +> +> Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for +> consideration: +> * https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki> +> + +Very interesting. + +I would like to consider how this compares to another light client type +with rather different security characteristics where each client would +receive for each transaction in each block, +* The TXID (uncompressed) +* The spent outpoints (with TXIDs compressed) +* The pubkey hash (compressed to reasonable amount of false positives) + +A rough estimate would indicate this to be about 2-2.5x as big per block +as your proposal, but comes with rather different security +characteristics, and would not require download since genesis. +The client could verify the TXIDs against the merkle root with a much +stronger (PoW) guarantee compared to the guarantee based on the +assumption of peers being distinct, which your proposal seems to make. +Like your proposal this removes the privacy and processing issues from +server-side filtering, but unlike your proposal retrieval of all txids +in each block can also serve for a basis of fraud proofs and +(disprovable) fraud hints, without resorting to full block downloads. +I don't completely understand the benefit of making the outpoints and +pubkey hashes (weakly) verifiable. These only serve as notifications and +therefore do not seem to introduce an attack vector. Omitting data is +always possible, so receiving data is a prerequisite for verification, +not an assumption that can be made. How could an attacker benefit from +"hiding notifications"? +I think client-side filtering is definitely an important route to +take, but is it worth compressing away the information to verify the +merkle root? +Regards, +Tomas van der Wansem +bitcrust + + +--_----------=_149691540815833692 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit +Content-Type: text/html; charset="utf-8" + +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html> +<head> +<title></title> +</head> +<body><div>On Thu, Jun 1, 2017, at 21:01, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:<br></div> +<blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div>Hi y'all, <br></div> +<div><br></div> +<div>Alex Akselrod and I would like to propose a new light client BIP for<br></div> +<div>consideration: <br></div> +<div> * <a href="https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki">https://github.com/Roasbeef/bips/blob/master/gcs_light_client.mediawiki</a><br></div> +<div><br></div> +<div><br></div> +</div> +</blockquote><div><br></div> +<div>Very interesting. <br></div> +<div><br></div> +<div>I would like to consider how this compares to another light client type with rather different security characteristics where each client would receive for each transaction in each block, <br></div> +<div><br></div> +<div>* The TXID (uncompressed)<br></div> +<div>* The spent outpoints (with TXIDs compressed)<br></div> +<div>* The pubkey hash (compressed to reasonable amount of false positives)<br></div> +<div><br></div> +<div>A rough estimate would indicate this to be about 2-2.5x as big per block as your proposal, but comes with rather different security characteristics, and would not require download since genesis. <br></div> +<div><br></div> +<div>The client could verify the TXIDs against the merkle root with a much stronger (PoW) guarantee compared to the guarantee based on the assumption of peers being distinct, which your proposal seems to make. Like your proposal this removes the privacy and processing issues from server-side filtering, but unlike your proposal retrieval of all txids in each block can also serve for a basis of fraud proofs and (disprovable) fraud hints, without resorting to full block downloads.<br></div> +<div><br></div> +<div>I don't completely understand the benefit of making the outpoints and pubkey hashes (weakly) verifiable. These only serve as notifications and therefore do not seem to introduce an attack vector. Omitting data is always possible, so receiving data is a prerequisite for verification, not an assumption that can be made. How could an attacker benefit from "hiding notifications"?<br></div> +<div><br></div> +<div>I think client-side filtering is definitely an important route to take, but is it worth compressing away the information to verify the merkle root?<br></div> +<div><br></div> +<div>Regards,<br></div> +<div>Tomas van der Wansem<br></div> +<div>bitcrust<br></div> +<div><br></div> +</body> +</html> + +--_----------=_149691540815833692-- + + |