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authorjl2012 <jl2012@xbt.hk>2015-08-07 01:20:21 -0400
committerbitcoindev <bitcoindev@gnusha.org>2015-08-07 05:21:13 +0000
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Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size implementation using Game Theory
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+Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2015 01:20:21 -0400
+From: jl2012@xbt.hk
+To: Wes Green <maveric100@gmail.com>
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+Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size implementation using Game Theory
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+It won't work as you thought. If a miner has 95% of hashing power, he
+would have 95% of chance to find the next block and collect the penalty.
+In long term, he only needs to pay 5% penalty. It's clearly biased
+against small miners.
+
+Instead, you should require the miners to burn the penalty. Whether this
+is a good idea is another issue.
+
+Wes Green via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-08-06 19:52 寫到:
+> Bitcoin is built on game theory. Somehow we seem to have forgotten
+> that and are trying to fix our "block size issue" with magic numbers,
+> projected percentage growth of bandwidth speeds, time limits, etc...
+> There are instances where these types of solutions make sense, but
+> this doesn't appear to be one of them. Lets return to game theory.
+>
+> Proposal: Allow any miner to, up to, double the block size at any
+> given time - but penalize them. Using the normal block reward,
+> whatever percentage increase the miner makes over the previous limit
+> is taken from both the normal reward and fees. The left over is
+> rewarded to the next miner that finds a block.
+>
+> If blocks stay smaller for an extended period of time, it goes back
+> down to the previous limit/ x amount decrease/% decrease (up for
+> debate)
+>
+> Why would this work?: Miners only have incentive to do raise the limit
+> when they feel there is organic growth in the network. Spam attacks,
+> block bloat etc would have to be dealt with as it is currently. There
+> is no incentive to raise the size for spam because it will subside and
+> the penalty will have been for nothing when the attack ends and block
+> size goes back down.
+>
+> I believe it would have the nice side effect of forcing miners to hold
+> the whole block chain. I believe SPV does not allow you to see all the
+> transactions in a block and be able to calculate if you should be
+> adding more to your reward transaction if the last miner made the
+> blocks bigger. Because of this, the miners would also have an eye on
+> blockchain size and wont want it getting huge too fast (outsize of
+> Moore's law of Nielsen's Law). Adding to the gamification.
+>
+> This system would encourage block size growth due to organic growth
+> and the penalty would encourage it to be slow as to still keep reward
+> high and preserve ROE.
+>
+> What this would look like: The miners start seeing what looks like
+> natural network growth, and make the decision (or program an
+> algorithm, the beauty is it leaves the "how" up to the miners) to
+> increase the blocksize. They think that, in the long run, having
+> larger blocks will increase their revenue and its worth taking the hit
+> now for more fees later. They increase the size to 1.25 MB. As a
+> result, they reward would be 18.75 (75%). The miner fees were .5BTC.
+> The miner fees are also reduced to .375BTC. Everyone who receives that
+> block can easily calculate 1) if the previous miner gave themselves
+> the proper reward 2) what the next reward should be if they win it.
+> Miners now start building blocks with a 31.25 reward transaction and
+> miner fee + .125.
+>
+>
+> _______________________________________________
+> bitcoin-dev mailing list
+> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
+> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
+
+