From: Robert Owen (rowen@technologist.com)
Date: Sat Dec 18 1999 - 19:01:16 MST
> It should be noted that I am in no way the originator of the thought
> example I used in my post; rather I was first exposed to a similar example
> through the writings of John Perry (who made the argument that indexicals
> are "essential," that is, not irreducible to any other terms).
>
> As for the analogy of qualia and propositions, I do take that to be
> original to me, though to a great extent it comes naturally with some
> basic assumptions within analytic philosophy.
Dan,
Still brooding over your original paper; I've no problem at all with your
exposition of "token-reflexives", and while I am inclined to regard the
experience "now" as an irreducible datum (i.e. a qualium) the situation
with respect to "I" seems far more ambiguous.
I want to emphasize that my particular approach to the phenomenology
of consciousness in no way implies that I regard the "I" of putative
"self-awareness" to be such a datum (or, if we must, a "qualium"). I am
simply unable to find a convincing phenomenological referent for this
pronoun either through introspection or logical analysis. The "First-
Person Singular" has always seemed very mysterious to me.
Let me end with a request and another question:
[1] Would you please read "Self-Identification and Self-Reference"
by Ingar Brinck at http://www.phil.indiana.edu/ejap/ejap.html
and share with me your impressions and opinions?
[2] With respect to your analogy in part drawn from analytic philosophy,
did you have anyone specific in mind, e.g. Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein,
the logical positivists, Ryle, Austin, Bergmann, or Quine? Maybe you
could discuss this a little more?
Respectfully,
Bob
=======================
Robert M. Owen
Director
The Orion Institute
57 W. Morgan Street
Brevard, NC 28712-3659 USA
=======================
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