From: Dan Fabulich (daniel.fabulich@yale.edu)
Date: Mon Nov 29 1999 - 23:09:36 MST
'What is your name?' 'Zeb Haradon.' 'IT DOESN'T MATTER WHAT YOUR NAME
IS!!!':
> You're starting to lead into the real issue. I can draw you a diagram of an
> earth and a sun, with the earth revolving around the sun, explain how the
> earth rotates, draw a little stick figure guy on the surface of the earth,
> and explain, in a way which would be comprehensible given a little insight,
> how although the earth revolves around the sun, it seems the other way
> around since the earth is rotating. Nobody can currently give a similar
> description of consciousness.
Reductive: Sure I can. You're only saying that because you insist on
there being something spooky, something non-verifiable about
consciousness. If I argue that none of the relevant spooky stuff exists,
and define my terms entirely materialistically, then I can give you a
verifiable physical description of the reasons you do the things you do; I
can even explain why you believe that there are qualia.
Eliminative: The Reductivist could TRY to provide you with an explanation
like that, but really, there's no reason to use words like "qualia,"
"consciousness," "belief," etc. [Well, MAYBE belief, but we should use a
different word anyway, since belief is so muddled.] Nobody can give you a
picture of consciousness because it doesn't exist; by that I mean there is
no referent to the word "consciousness." Sure, the Reductivist could make
up a definition of consciousness, and show how THAT exists, but it's my
opinion that what you mean by "consciousness/qualia" doesn't exist, and
that the Reductivist is just confusing the issue by using your
terminology.
I would say qualia is "what it seems like", or, if qualia
> only seem to exist and don't really exist, I refine my definition saying
> qualia is ""what it seems like" seems like".
I don't understand your redefinition.
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
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