From: Eliezer S. Yudkowsky (sentience@pobox.com)
Date: Tue Oct 26 1999 - 16:41:12 MDT
Matt Gingell wrote:
>
> "Eliezer S. Yudkowsky" <extropians@extropy.com>
> >> On what basis do you define qualia as non-Turing-computable?
> >
> > Well, they aren't, so why should I define them as Turing-computable?
>
> The assertion that qualia are not computable is totally meaningless.
> Compare against the assertion that baseballs are non-computable or
> that qualia are NP-complete. Do you have any idea what you're talking about?
Yes, I do. Baseballs are non-computable, although the *important* part
of their behavior is easily computable. Baseballs are quantum-random,
but not visibly. NP-completeness is a predicate that describes
problems, not algorithms, so it can't apply to qualia.
I might point also point out that truly random processes, strictly
speaking, require a minor extension of Turing computability; it's just
that the qualitative behavior of a random process can be simulated by
pseudo-random processes (or, for finite processes, hidden variables in
the initial state). The assertion that baseballs are non-computable is
not only meaningful, it is trivially true. Frankly, your assertion that
the noncomputability of a process is "meaningless" is so odd that I'm
starting to question your own understanding of Turing computability.
> > I ain't goin' over this again; search the archives.
>
> If you don't want to go into it then provide a direct reference.
No.
> The above is just juvenile.
Nyah nyah.
--
sentience@pobox.com Eliezer S. Yudkowsky
http://pobox.com/~sentience/tmol-faq/meaningoflife.html
Running on BeOS Typing in Dvorak Programming with Patterns
Voting for Libertarians Heading for Singularity There Is A Better Way
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