From: hal@rain.org
Date: Mon Apr 05 1999 - 11:29:56 MDT
Darin Sunley, <umsunley@cc.umanitoba.ca>, writes:
> You said earlier that "consciousness is an inherent property of some
> class of agents." The assignation of all other "inherent properties"
> changes across ontological levels. Why should consciousness be any
> different.
>
> We say the virtual thunderstorm is virtually wet. I say the simulated
> personality, or the deterministic playback of a human personality is
> "virtually" conscious.
I am having trouble understanding your definition of consciousness.
It may be different enough from my own that the conclusions you draw
will not have any applicability, from my point of view.
Would you say that the fact of your own consciousness is relative to
the observer? Suppose we are living in a computer simulation. Would you
say that an observer from outside that simulation would be justified in
saying that you are not conscious, that you have no more consciousness
than a rock?
How can you trust any observer's claims in this regard, no matter how
privileged his position? You think, therefore you are conscious, to
paraphrase Descartes. If someone else thinks you aren't conscious,
they are simply mistaken.
Now, maybe you have a definition of consciousness in which you view it
as a relative matter, so that by your definition there is a sense in
which you really aren't conscious, from the point of view of an outside
observer. But in that case, isn't there still some unnamed property
which you have and which a rock does not? You don't want to call it
"consciousness", but isn't there a fundamental awareness that you have
and that no observer's conclusions can take away from you?
Hal
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