From: Robin Hanson (hanson@econ.berkeley.edu)
Date: Wed Dec 09 1998 - 10:26:48 MST
Nick Bostrom wrote:
>I wonder if anybody here could help me with the following
>philosophical problem, relating to the discussion of Pascal's
>wager?
>
>If one doesn't time discount future benefits, then it would seem that
>the expected utility of *any* human action is infinite, since there
>is always a finite probablility that it will lead to eternal
>bliss.
>
>Under these circumstances it could seem reasonable to choose the
>action that has the highest probability of giving eternal bliss, even
>though it would not affect expected utility. At least I would, if the
>choice were between a 1% chance in heaven and a 50% chance in heaven,
>definitely prefer the latter.
Flipping the argument around, anyone who doesn't choose their actions
soley on how it influences the chance for eternal bliss *does*
discount future benefits. Thus the vast majority of people do
discount the future.
Robin Hanson
hanson@econ.berkeley.edu http://hanson.berkeley.edu/
RWJF Health Policy Scholar FAX: 510-643-8614
140 Warren Hall, UC Berkeley, CA 94720-7360 510-643-1884
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