From: Mike C. (mikec@jax.gulfnet.com)
Date: Wed Apr 09 1997 - 14:31:38 MDT
>From: Anders Sandberg <nv91-asa@nada.kth.se>
>Date: Sun, 30 Mar 1997 12:46:36 +0200 (MET DST)
>Subject: Re: Protean Self-Transformation
>
>On Sat, 29 Mar 1997, Gregory Houston wrote:
>> Emotions are felt in a physical manner. I *feel* sexual pleasure via my
>> organs. I *feel* hunger via my organs. I *feel* excitement via my
>> organs. Without this specialized hardware I would *feel* nothing. As a
>> computer I might be "aware" of conditions, but I would not *feel* those
>> conditions unless someone created specialized hardware that would allow
>> me to *feel*.
>
>OK, what you seem to say is that if I put damage sensors in a robot, it
>would be able to feel pain. But this relates to the awfully tricky
>problem of qualia: does the robot *experience* pain, or doe it just think
>"pain"? How can we tell?
I do not think there is much difference.
I believe thinking is a register/reaction
and feeling is simply a reaction of higher intensity
(even becoming a prolonged willfull action
{note: will is not always conscious}).
I would rather limit my reactions
from what I would consider motivational distractions
(I need no motivation when I have programming that can not be ignored).
Think about how many distracting reactions are related to addiction/habit
(fill in the blank_____________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________)
and how many are related to withdrawl/restlessness,
such as tapping fingers, bouncing knees, biting lips, scratching iches, etc.
I do not need to care.
I do not live for pleasure.
I live to get things done.
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