From: Peter C. McCluskey (pcm@rahul.net)
Date: Sun Nov 03 1996 - 16:26:32 MST
hanson@hss.caltech.edu (Robin Hanson) writes:
>I will present a paper of mine which has a model which explains why
>rational regulators would ban products for rational consumers, rather
>than to label them. I explain such behavior as a commitment failure;
>both sides would rather commit to no such bans, but once bans are
>possible, regulators often choose them in the game-theoretic
>equilibrium, since not banning would be taken as an endorsement of
>product quality.
Why are you trying to argue that regulators would rather avoid such
bans? My impression is that most people find it hard to hold beliefs
that their work is harming people, and that it is much easier to
assume that regulatory agencies attract mainly those workers who
are inclined to believe that such bans are good.
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Peter McCluskey | | Vote Libertarian! pcm@rahul.net | http://www.rahul.net/pcm | See http://www.lp.org pcm@quote.com | http://www.quote.com | for more info.
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