From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Wed Dec 04 2002 - 10:41:13 MST
Eliezer writes
> I don't think that "It is MORALLY WRONG that x!" is equivalent with "I and
> most people disapprove of x", but if I did, I would probably say something
> like this:
Thanks for the loan of your brain.
> "Starting from only "I and most people disapprove of x", I can construct a
> description of "It is MORALLY WRONG that x!" which accounts for everything
> that I and most people mean by MORALLY WRONG."
Uh, actually, not quite. The description is what they *should*
mean. Unfortunately, people who write "X is morally wrong" in
careful discussion mean much more than that. They mean that God
is on their side, or that they have deduced correct moral behavior
akin to mathematical results, or that they perceive moral correctness
the way that I perceive geographic facts when I study an atlas.
> If you said that, I might *disagree* with you, but I don't think it would
> automatically make you a moral relativist - your description might account
> for the existence of the very same phenomena that it would make you a
> moral relativist to deny.
Could you tell me what you believe moral relativism to be?
(But see below.) For once, I don't insist on what is
necessarily the common view, but what, logically and
consistently, moral relativism ought to be taken to be.
> Personally, I don't think the relation between "disapproval" and "MORALLY
> WRONG" is such that "disapproval" is the simple phenomenon from which
> "MORALLY WRONG" is constructed. But it would be interesting to see such
> an attempted description.
I guess that such an attempted description would allow me
to predict under what conditions the "absolutists" would
be likely to say "X is morally wrong". It still would, to
me, mean that their epistemology is erroneous---just as,
arghh, the logical positivists would have claimed (shudder).
> A non-exhaustive list of some phenomena that I think would need to be
> explained:
>
> * The existence of perceived higher and lower quality in alternative
> moralities;
In my brand of relativism---definitely NOT the usual meaning
of "moral relativism" wherein the approval and disapproval
of processes depends on context or surrounding phenomena---
the "higher" is only the more consistent, and the "lower"
only the less consistent.
Though I have said this before in this thread, I see more
clearly than ever how this brings me closer to the moral
absolutists. For example, someone such as the infamous
Charles Ng who enjoyed torturing women hitchhikers to
death evidently does not highly disapprove of human
nervous systems being subjected to intense pain. But he
possesses a human nervous system, and physically there is
not so much difference (IMO?) between his suffering (of
which he presumably disapproves greatly) and that of one
of his victims. I accuse him of inconsistency.
> Explaining morality doesn't make you a moral relativist.
> Explaining away morality probably would. Of course,
> explaining away morality doesn't make you *wrong* unless the
> explanation is *incorrect*. My own work attempts to explain
> morality, rather than explain it away, so I tend to be highly
> skeptical of moral relativism; but I could be wrong.
Yes, I completely agree: in all cases, intellectually,
we want explanations of the world. You've also captured
why I am always uncomfortable after a "moral relativist"
has spoken.
Hmm. It's like I'm coming to the same conclusions in most
cases as the moral absolutists, it's just that my criterion,
consistency, sounds so much more wimpish than their great
annunciations. If the "moral absolutists" would just
immediately 'fess up that there isn't any objective place
to stand (except consistency) well, hmm, then I guess that
they wouldn't be moral absolutists.
> > Since your foregoing example, logic, and good word usage
> > suggests that I am a moral relativist, I mainly wonder why
> > most moral relativists seem to me to stand for nothing at
> > all, and to have no strong preferences. They might approve
> > of sati in India, and disapprove of exactly the same process
> > ---incinerating a woman---elsewhere.
> In fact, it seems likely that among the phenomena which
> moral relativists attempt to explain away are agreement
> about disapproval, the existence of any self-consistent
> position from which to communicate disapproval or take
> social action based on disapproval, and perhaps even
> disapproval itself.
All right, then it's starting to sound as though I (at
least) cannot be considered either a moral relativist
nor a moral absolutist. What about you?
Lee
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