From: gts (gts_2000@yahoo.com)
Date: Fri Nov 22 2002 - 18:31:28 MST
--- Lee Corbin <lcorbin@tsoft.com> wrote:
> gts writes
>> No, the 1000 come into existence at t1 already
>> experiencing different outcomes. That is WHY they
>> come into existence in the first place, as per MWI.
>
> Your first statement is incorrect, if by
> "experience" you mean a human being experiencing
> something. Experiencing something means that
> neurons have fired. See above that the
> duplicates do not observe until t10^35 or more.
I'm saying that your time-line is wrong in the first
place if we use MWI as the means of creating
duplicates. We seem to be experiencing some dreadful
miscommunication here.
> You are trying to employ the quantum mechanical
> notion of observation with human observation, and
> the two are entirely different in concept. In QM,
> one speaks of a measurement causing an MWI split.
Correct, and in MWI *the observer splits* when that
measurement is registered in the observer. It happens
at the moment of actually observing a measurement
(i.e., the firing of neurons as you like to say.)
> In the early days of QM, it was thought by some that
> human consciousness had to intervene in order to
> collapse the wave function.
There is no need to explain any "collapse of the wave
function" in MWI. That is the beauty of MWI.
> From the outset I was using "observation" to mean
> something that causes a human being to realize---
> consciously or unconsciously---that he's in a
> particular situation as opposed to being in some
> other situation.
That is also a perfect definition of measurement in
MWI for purposes of defining the moment at with the
observer splits. I'm happy with it.
> This takes a lot longer than 10^-43 seconds.
But, Lee, it makes no difference whatsoever how long
it takes. That time interval occurs *before* the
observer splits. It is *in the moment of observation*
that the *observer* spliNever mind
Nevermind when the rest of the universe splits. We are
seeking to split the observer. (In other words, while
it true to state that the world splits before the
observation, we are here concerned with creating
copies *of the observer*.)
Consider the infamous Shrodinger's cat thought
experiment. It's true under MWI to state that the cat
splits before the box is opened. However *the
observer* does not split until he makes his
observation, i.e., until he opens Shroedinger's box
and finds a live cat or dead cat. At that instant in
time an alternate observer comes into existence in an
alternate universe to experience the contrafact.
> The duplication happens much, much
> faster than human neurons can fire.
Of course the duplication of the observers happens
faster (instantly actually), but that fact is
irrelevant. WHEN the neurons fire (more accurately,
when the observation finally registers in the brain,
however that may ultimately be defined to occur) the
observer splits into a multitude of observers each
experiencing a different outcome.
Whether this correct understanding of MWI actually
makes a difference to the veracity of your over-all
argument is unknown to me, but let's at least agree on
the physics of MWI!
Personally I find it very helpful to understand the
production of duplicates in terms of MWI. If MWI is
true then the universe is doing the duplication work
for us already, and we can glean something about the
nature of those duplications from the theory of MWI.
Our only task would be to discover and develop some
(admittedly hard to imagine) futuristic technology
that would allow us to retain or retrieve our copies
from alternate universes. It's a very pleasing concept
to me, asthetically speaking.
Hugh Everett places the split of the observer at the
moment at which the observer becomes aware of the
measured empirical data. If you want to reject the
theory of MWI for this reason then you may choose to
do so but let's at least get our facts straight.
-gts
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