From: gts (gts_2000@yahoo.com)
Date: Thu Nov 21 2002 - 13:50:44 MST
Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
> ### You seem to mean something different from most people when
> you are talking about "identity" - now it is something that
> includes personal property. Well, no surprise we cannot seem to
> agree.
The idea that personal property is an extension of the person is not
something I just pulled from a hat. It is the legal definition of
personal property, and for good reason.
Consider how Hugh Hefner would perceive himself if he suddenly lost his
property and business empire as the result of some act by you made in an
attempt to replace him but without his property. Would he consider his
new property-less self to be the same person he was before? Of course
not. He would consider himself to be a penniless intransigent, whereas
he was once a wealthy business mogul. His self-concept would have
changed drastically as a result of your effort, and who are we to
over-ride Hugh Hefner's own self-concept? Even you would agree that his
subjective idea of himself is critical to his identity.
>> No, I'm saying that if you want to be Hugh Hefner at time t then
>> you must have and be everything that Hugh Hefner has and is at
>> time t.
>
> ### So I need to buy a silk pajamas to be Hugh Hefner?
If Hugh Hefner is wearing silk pajamas tonight, and you want to be Hugh
Hefner tonight, then you had better get yourself some silk pajamas.
>> I don't believe he would ever stop being himself in this
>> scenario you describe. He would merely become Hugh Hefner with
>> access to Rafal Smigrodzki's memories. Those memories of yours
>> might just as well be on DVD's on the shelf in his library.
>
> ### No, I wrote "our data structures are identical", meaning much
> more than mere memories are identical. I meant the full content
> of subjective experience. At which point does Mr. Hefner stop
> being Mr. Hefner?
If you really meant "the full content of subjective experience" then you
need to go back and correct one of your original conditions, in which
you stated that you would still be aware of your own memories and
personal history despite your access to Hugh Hefner's data structures.
Presumably this would mean you were also still aware of your own beliefs
and values and opinions (i.e., aware of your own personality even while
accessing Hugh Hefner's records).
>>> ### It's OK if you see it as the only correct approach to your
>>> own identity - but what I really want to know, is whether you
>>> also think *I* am obliged to treat myself this way.
>>
>> Yes, that is after all the million dollar question.
>
> ### You dodged it. Would you use the means of coercion at your
> disposal to stop me from claiming identity with my synched copies?
No I didn't dodge it. My answer was in the following paragraph:
>> If you bifurcated into two people, Rafal-1 and Rafal-2, and
>> Rafal-2 committed a crime against me, then I would not hold
>> Rafal-1 responsible. I would consider Rafal-1 innocent
>> regardless of what Rafal-1 thought about his identity. If
>> Rafal-1 wanted to accept responsibility for Rafal-2's criminal
>> acts then I would consider him deluded and take pity on him.
>>
> ### Actually, this is good. It means I can spawn a copy, rob you,
> and enjoy the loot, letting you take the body of the copy (which
> would self-terminate after the robbery). I like your idea of
> identity, after all. It's useful to me.
If you spawned a copy and that copy robbed me and gave the loot to you,
then I would prosecute your copy for theft and you for conspiracy and
for receiving stolen property.
By the way your copy is not going to "self-terminate" (commit suicide)
merely because you tell him to do so.
-gts
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Jan 15 2003 - 17:58:17 MST