From: gts (gts_2000@yahoo.com)
Date: Wed Nov 20 2002 - 14:30:01 MST
Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
> gts wrote:
>> There is a lot more to Hugh Hefner's identity than his memories
>> and data structures. There is also his face and body (old, but I
>> hear the ladies still love it) and there is his property and his
>> business empire, and his personality (which may or may not fall
>> under your "data structure" category).
>
> ### The ideas you describe above are something new in this thread
> - you say the material configuration of Mr. Hefner's environment
> is a part of his *personal* identity?
No, his identity does not include the material configuration of his
environment. It does however include his own body and his own property.
Certainly Mr. Hefner considers his body an important part of his
non-nominal identity (especially given the nature of his lifestyle). And
his personal property is defined as an extension of his person under
law, as it should be.
>> To be Hugh Hefner one would need to be and have all those
>> things. But this is to say only that to be Hugh Hefner, one must
>> be Hugh Hefner.
>
> ### You aren't saying that Mr. Hefner deprived of his bank
> account and silk pajamas would be no longer Mr. Hefner, are you?
No, I'm saying that if you want to be Hugh Hefner at time t then you
must have and be everything that Hugh Hefner has and is at time t.
> ### Say, if I, in full possession of my mental faculties, decide
> to open a direct and reciprocal neural link with my computer, and
> exchange about 1% of my data, am I still me? What if I do the
> same by reading and writing ?
Yes and yes.
> Now, let's say, instead of contacting my computer, I open a link
> to Mr. Hefner (with his consent). Am I still me if I am able to
> access Mr. Hefner's memory of publishing his first issue of
> Playboy, in a first-person perspective? (of course, while still
> aware of my own memories, and personal history).
Yes.
> What if we keep exchanging memories, with full mutual consent, to
> the point where all our data structures are identical? At which
> point (%-wise) does Mr. Hefner stop being himself (legally, in
> terms of interpersonal relationships)?
I don't believe he would ever stop being himself in this scenario you
describe. He would merely become Hugh Hefner with access to Rafal
Smigrodzki's memories. Those memories of yours might just as well be on
DVD's on the shelf in his library.
> Do you see an objective yardstick for measuring such smooth
> transitions, or would you rather agree that identity is, after
> all, arbitrary, a matter of taste?
As above, he remains him and you remain you, though each of you now has
access to a lot more data.
I suspect that your appreciation of his memories will far exceed his
appreciation of yours. :-)
>> Yes and I think this is the only correct approach. One's copies
>> are not the same person, even if they differ only slightly. And
>> they become more different from one another with each passing
>> moment.
>
> ### It's OK if you see it as the only correct approach to your own
> identity - but what I really want to know, is whether you also
> think *I* am obliged to treat myself this way.
Yes, that is after all the million dollar question.
If you bifurcated into two people, Rafal-1 and Rafal-2, and Rafal-2
committed a crime against me, then I would not hold Rafal-1 responsible.
I would consider Rafal-1 innocent regardless of what Rafal-1 thought
about his identity. If Rafal-1 wanted to accept responsibility for
Rafal-2's criminal acts then I would consider him deluded and take pity
on him.
-gts
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