From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rms2g@virginia.edu)
Date: Tue Nov 19 2002 - 10:12:59 MST
Samantha Atkins wrote:
>> ### Well, imagine there are 25,000 initial libertarian settlers, who
>> own all the land. One thousand of them let in 1000 peons each
>> (running away from neighboring evil tyrannies). The peons are happy,
>> they finally have enough money to each buy a gun. Do you think that
>> the 24,000 libertarians would be a match for 1 x 10e6 peons?
>>
>
> What reason to these people have to resort to force? It is a rational
> society. If they can outwork or out-produce me then they will soon
> own some of the land themselves. The upwardly mobile seldom need to
> resort to force in rebellion.
### The point I was making, is that in either case (force or buyout), the
initial anarchy would be transformed into whatever system the immigrants
bring in their minds, once the control of the land changed hands. Since most
of them were coming from a tyranny, a tyranny would develop (except if the
immigration was slow enough to allow a change in the beliefs and
expectations of the immigrants). This is why I agree with Mike Lorrey that
uncontrolled immigration would bring the end of an anarchy, except an
anarchy in marginal or poorly accessible land. Some method of regulating
immigration is needed, and so far nobody here presented a way of achieving
it without a state or state-like organization.
--------
>
>> How would they enforce the arbitration and
>> against whom? The peon-importers? The peons themselves? The free gun
>> makers who sell 24,000 guns to the libertarians and one million guns
>> for the peons?
>>
>>
> Enforcement against initiation of force is always against those who
> initiated the force. Nothing else makes sense.
### Enforcement by 25,000 against a million is likely to be difficult, if
not impossible under most conditions.
Rafal
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