From: Jef Allbright (jef@jefallbright.net)
Date: Thu Nov 14 2002 - 21:54:36 MST
gts wrote:
> In terms of their experience after they exit, they are
> both equally valid continuations of the original
> (*continuations of the orginal*, mind you -- neither
> is the original himself).
Correct. They are both equally valid continuations of the original.
To be logically consistent you can say neither is the original, or you can
say both are the original, but you can't claim that one is the original and
one is not, because they are by definition exactly the same at the moment of
duplication. So far, all makes sense.
> They both have equal claim to having *been* the
> original subject-0 who entered the chamber, because
> they both have equally valid memories of being
> Subject-0, but neither of them actually *are* the
> original. Each of them can say only that he *was* the
> original Subject-0. This verb tense is very important.
> The original Subject-0 is gone, just as Monday is gone
> on Tuesday.
Okay, again this is logically consistent. And the essentials of the
physical process are not in dispute. They are either all the same
self-identity, or they have all diverged to become different
self-identities, depending on how broadly you choose to define
self-identity. So let's proceed...
>> So which would you choose? To tomorrow take the
>> dangerous helicopter ride, or to tomorrow enter the
>> 1000-way duplication chamber?
>
> The helicopter ride, of course. My odds of surviving
> there is .75 vs a miniscule .001 in your chamber of
> horrors.
This is not logically consistent. Now you're saying that there is something
special, something uniquely you, about one of the multiple copies. It
really seems that somehow you believe you have a unique soul that attaches
to one of the bodies.
- Jef
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