From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Thu Nov 14 2002 - 01:08:48 MST
Hal writes
> The simplest conclusion is that forgotten experiences "don't count".
> Unless you can remember it, it might as well not have happen. Hence you
> should choose the 55 because the experience effectively didn't happen.
I think that this is what Jef Albright is saying.
> I don't think this is a valid conclusion, and I kind of doubt that
> anyone would argue that it is. I won't go into my reasons for doubting
> its validity unless someone wants to argue the other side. But it is
> certainly an easy and quick conclusion to draw from the experiment.
>
> If this is not the desired conclusion, then what exactly does the
> experiment mean? Is it just an example of how people can be forced to
> act against their best interests? Well, so what? People are imperfect,
> and the flesh is weak. We knew that already.
I agree that this is a case of the flesh being weak and
that the person is not acting in his own best interest
when he chooses 55. You are quite right. Consider that
if I can hold down a electric circuit for ten seconds
that tortures me, then the Nazis will not come in and
torture me for two hours. Yet perhaps if the electric
torture is bad enough, I cannot hold the circuit down.
When I was a child, I would never have even gone to a
dentist for just the same reason.
The point of the thought experiment is, of course, how
are we to value experiences not remembered? Or, as in
Total Recall, how are we to value memories never
experienced? This is what these sorts of experiments
are really about.
> Consider this variation. Instead of deciding each minute, you get to
> decide and commit once and for all, beforehand. Either you will always
> do the 10, or you will always do the 55 (or perhaps you could choose some
> mixture, but I imagine that people would mostly go for a constant choice).
I would choose the "10" in advance.
> Therefore I think there are many people who would choose 10 if they could
> commit in advance, and 55 if they have to decide during the experiment.
> This raises the question of whether they are being irrational in one or
> the other choice. I'm not sure of the answer.
I think that you answered it before. The flesh is weak.
> By choosing the reward, he [the heroin addict] imposes the cost on
> himself. If he could do so in advance, he would prevent himself
> from making this choice.
Yes, he gives in to the temptation of the moment.
> Both of these elements are present in Lee's example and also in
> the heroin addict's dilemma. So my feeling is that the question
> of the rational choice is similar in the two cases.
Yes, although as you said "The subject in this experiment doesn't
face quite the same decision...". But it is similar. For me, I
have an urge to cling to what is objectively best for me, if such
can be determined. When I cast my eye over my life's events up
till now, I can maintain a sort of God's eye view, and see the
places where my life went well, and where it went poorly. I should
try to maximize the former for the rest of my life, and minimize
the latter. I will select "10" so long as I can stand it, just
as I will submit to the dentist's drill so long as I can stand it.
Lee
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