Re: The nature of obligation

From: Anders Sandberg (asa@nada.kth.se)
Date: Thu Oct 31 2002 - 08:14:58 MST


On Wed, Oct 30, 2002 at 06:27:20PM -0800, Dan Fabulich wrote:
> Anders Sandberg wrote:
>
> > It is also possible to leave a copyhood legally. After that point
> > the individual is to be regarded as an independent person. Debts
> > and obligations have to be resolved beforehand (or it won't be a
> > legal divorce), and the relevant part of the copyhood's assets
> > has to be paid to the leaving member.
>
> If we adopt this view, then we're still on the road to ruin. Again,
> consider the serial suicide-murderer. Suppose the murderer (with the
> intent to kill) spawns a copy, who then legally leaves the copyhood,
> [perhaps he'd have to file a statement or something,] commits a
> murder, and kills himself.
>
> If we took the copy's "leaving the copyhood" seriously in a court of law,
> then I don't see how we could hold the copyhood responsible for the copy's
> actions.

The problem with your assumption is that you consider the law as
something unchanging that will not adapt to new situations. If the above
situation becomes a problem, laws will adapt. It might even be that the
first case gets away with it, but hardly the second. Legal systems tend
to patch themselves without throwing away basic principles.

[ At least here in Sweden the above situation might be resolved
medically rather than legally. Since the copy behaved in a suicidal
manner, there is more than enough reason to deduce that the other copy
might suffer from the same condition, and that is enough to have him
committed for evaluation. The current rules on taking people into
custody to prevent them from possibly harming themselves are rather
frightening... ]

Another aspect worth thinking of: the technology necessary to produce
copies implies very complete brain scanning. It is likely that this
would enable truth machines or memory audits. While such technology
might or might not be allowed in everyday interaction, it seems likely
it would be regarded as admissible evidence in such a future court.
Hence the issue of whether the leaving-murder-suicide was premeditated
or not could be resolved.

> I therefore conclude that we ought *not* to permit leaving the copyhood;
> that we ought to treat the entire copyhood as a single moral entity.

Even after a million years? Even after my copy underwent a religious
conversion? Even after my other copy got orbitofrontal brain damage and
couldn't control his impulses?

-- 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Anders Sandberg                                      Towards Ascension!
asa@nada.kth.se                            http://www.nada.kth.se/~asa/
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