From: Dickey, Michael F (michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com)
Date: Tue Oct 29 2002 - 12:55:48 MST
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc@att.net]
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com>
> the pattern, which is identical to the reference pattern, and is
> imprinted upon a new group of atoms, is not a subjective
> continuation of the reference pattern. That is, it is not you.
>The evidence I have for the fact that the same pattern in a
>different group of atoms is that if we were to copy the
> pattern and imprint it into a new group of atoms the new
>group/pattern will be identical to the reference, but would
>not experience the same subjective events as the reference
"You must get paid by the word, I will say the same thing more concisely:
"The evidence the subjective experience is not the same is that the
subjective experience is not the same." I must say I'm not entirely
convinced."
No, unfortunately I do not. I am trying to understand the positions in this
argument, and trying to convey mine accurately, unfortunately this is a
difficult medium to convey ideas accurately, people argue against what they
think you must mean, or skip through your statements and attack literal
snippets out of context instead of the idea you are trying to convey. Words
are merely inefficient mechanisms to convey ideas, and filtering thoughts
and ideas into words is not a lossless compression, so some redundancy seems
to be required sometimes. But I digress...
Do we actually need to perform this experiment to see how it would come out?
As I have said, copy me and my copy and I do not share the same subjective
experiences (ask us what we see) Since my copy can not share the same
subjective experiences as me, then it can not be a continuation of me. It
is obvious it is a different individual entity with its own experiences.
Thus, the evidence that subjective experience is not the same for a copy and
an original is that if you perform the experiment (currently only a thought
experiment) they are indeed not the same, can you think of better evidence
than that? If there subjective experiences are not the same, they MUST be
unique, isolated, separate individuals. Thus a copy is not me.
I will continue to argue this point until A) I argue adequately that this as
the logical position to take or B) someone convinces me of a better more
logical position to take.
The latter would require, as far as I can tell, someone to argue that
logically a copy is indeed a continuation of the subjective consciousness of
the original. Given the fact that a copy and me will see different things,
and that we both can exist simultaneously, and are spatially separated, it
seems unlikely.
It seems to me that extropian are much more likely to embrace this
worldview, that a copy and a back up, etc. are indeed you, since it fits
nicely and conveniently into their visions of the future. I have yet to see
why one should logically believe this to be the case though, and I have
presented reasons to logically think it is not.
I also think trying to find an exact definition of survival and death is
pointless, like most things we learn the meaning of those words from example
not definition."
What about agreeing on a definition for identity? For 'you, me, I' For
entities being 'the same' (are they two separate, identical entities but
spatially separated, or are they one entity entirely?) Is it not reasonable
to agree on definitions before we attempt to make arguments that involve
such words?
Michael
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