From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Mon Oct 28 2002 - 22:21:47 MST
gts writes
> If survival of identity *separate from self* (i.e., as
> a non-living label or record) is the only object here
> then this discussion is pointless and trivial.
>
> We might just as well make holographic interactive
> talking images of ourselves now so that posterity will
> be able to pretend to interact with us after we die.
> Such devices would not allow for true *survival*. They
> would be nothing more than high-tech tombstones.
That's right. The key thing to discuss, in my opinion,
is the kind of personal identity that actually causes
one's own experiences to continue. Needless to say,
just what that is is very problematical!
You also wrote (earlier, I think---sorry I've lost track)
> Jef Allbright wrote:
> > I'm saying that in this hypothetical future we will
> > fondly appreciate seeing our "branches" set out on
> > their own, but will think of them as a new kind of
> > twin sibling, rather than as "our self".
> Yes, that is exactly how I see it also, Jef.
I see my duplicate as my true self for most purposes
of anticipation and all purposes of survival.
For example, pinch me but not my duplicate, and he
does not cry out. Yet I believe that just because
I'm not forming memories of something at one location
doesn't mean that it isn't happening to me at another.
Suppose (as is often the case, it seems) both my
duplicate and I are tied down, and the Nazi officer
says, "Okay, ve have decided to kill one of you
[he gestures to me] and zen torture ze other [he
gestures to my duplicate] to death."
A certain animal part of me says "Do it to him,
please just kill me!", but I firmly believe that
it is only an illusion that this is an escape.
The torture WILL STILL HAPPEN TO ME. From the
objective, physics oriented account of what
transpires in that room, Lee Corbin gets tortured
to death.
Moreover, I *must* identify with the entity that
gets tortured because we are so alike physically.
In fact, I *will* be him if the three operations
(a) erase five minutes of my memories
(b) teleport me to where my poor duplicate
is tied down
(c) add five minutes' memories of the
appropriate experiences
are carried out. Note that (a), (b), and (c) do
not affect identity by our normal intuitions.
(Assuming that one is "past", so to speak, the
first few of my "Seven Levels of Identity".)
> However in your following passage to Lee, to which I
> was responding, you seem to be giving validity to the
> idea that "survival of identity" is something
> important and distinct from "survival of self."
>> Jef Allbright wrote to Lee:
>>>
>>> In your posts later today, two of your points
>>> have become clearer, at least to me: (1) You are
>>> talking about survival of identity, and (2) you
>>> are saying that in the future, as the technical
>>> means become available, it makes sense for us to
>>> value the survival of our identity with
>>> importance equal to our current concept of
>>> survival of self.
> Those may be two of Lee's points, but do they really
> make any sense upon careful analysis?
> Because of divergence in experience and personality
> after a bifurcation, other versions of what were once
> "you" will be going about in life calling themselves
> by your name. However they will each have slightly
> different personalities, none of them exactly like
> yours,
Yes, but Gordon, the "you" of tomorrow will have
diverged from the you of today, as you know. And
so this is why you claim not to be the same person
tomorrow that you are today. Most people here,
including, me simply cannot accept that each micro-
second we become someone else.
"Other version of what were once "you" will be
going about in life calling themselves by your
name"? Well, according to you, *your* self will
also be going around calling itself by your name
too. All the duplicates have an equal claim on
"being you", of course.
> and those personalities will continue to diverge
> until they lose any resemblance to you. Thus
> they will not in actuality be carrying your true
> identity. Or to put it another way, they will be
> carrying your identity *in name only*.
Well, according to you---unless you've come around
to agreeing that you will be alive tomorrow---
*nobody* will be "carrying your true identity".
That's where I find a flaw in your thinking.
> If it is proposed by Lee that survival of our
> identities "in name only" is something we should seek
> and value more in the future,
oh, no, absolutely not.
> I for one at least find little satisfaction in knowing
> that I might live on in name only, and I hardly need
> to embrace extropianism as a means of finding ways to
> do so.
Exactly right. Non-cryonicists who imagine that they'll
live on because someone will read their books (e.g.,
Heinlein), or because they've had children, are cruelly
mistaken. Do any of your ancestors live on because you
do? If the Nazi officer lined up five of your ancestors
and you, and threatened to shoot someone, you would live
only if he happened to shoot your ancestors and not you.
> The desire for the survival of identity in that
> sense is trivial and common already in the world
> today, as in for example a father who wants sons so
> that his surname might survive into future
> generations.
Yes. Exactly so.
> The truth is that all we really want is survival of
> our *sense of self*. We want to transport this sense
> of self into other objects or persons. That is what
> this thread is about, or so I thought.
I say that this "sense of self" is completely inadequate.
Many insane people have the sense of being Napoleon, but
in fact they are not Napoleon, and poor Napoleon is as
dead as he can be (no cryonic chance for him to ever
live again!).
I have little interest in someone of the future becoming
so familiar with my posts, recorded conversations, taped
episodes on TV (if there ever are any), that they can
claim to be me. Unless they've got my MEMORIES and my
DISPOSITIONS, they're out of luck. Or rather, of course,
*I'm* out of luck!
Lee
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