From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Mon Oct 28 2002 - 21:33:31 MST
Michael writes
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-extropians@extropy.org
> [mailto:owner-extropians@extropy.org]On Behalf Of Dickey, Michael F
> Sent: Monday, October 28, 2002 1:52 PM
> [The title of this thread] should read 'Does the continuation
> of a particular perceived consciousness depend upon a 'particular'
> group of atoms (and not just any atoms)' With that in mind,
> does your answer remain the same?
That's what my title meant, and I don't think that you need
worry about people misinterpreting it. I understand completely
that at the present moment in history, one's identity indeed
*does* depend on atoms; what was meant, of course, as you
say, is "does it depend on particular atoms". If I have
understood you correctly, then yes, my answer remains the
same. Namely: in no way does one's identity depend on
particular atoms. (As hinted here, atoms in the long run
may have *nothing* to do with our identities---we might
eventually become plasma entities or patterns of photons.
All that is important is the pattern, and, as Frank points
out the *process*.)
> what I dispute is that the pattern [in a copy], which is identical
> to the reference pattern, and is imprinted upon a new group of atoms,
> is not a subjective continuation of the reference pattern. That is,
> it is not you.
You don't really know this! How can you be so *sure* that
teleporters really do anything to someone besides change
their location? Why, atoms were unknown to vastly better
philosophers than you or I for millenia, and you must read
at least enough SF to understand that duplicates would be
accepted as the original people *regardless* of what the
underlying theories are, so long as the theories do not
contain the equivalent of souls.
> The evidence I have for the fact that the same pattern
> in a different group of atoms is that if we were to copy
> the pattern and imprint it into a new group of atoms
> the new group/pattern will be identical to the reference,
> but would not experience the same subjective events as the
> reference, and therefore *would not* be a continuation of the
> subjective experiences of the reference (original)
Have you considered the case that the replacement is
done without altering the location? In that case, the
experience would be the same.
Most importantly, however, if your location suddenly
changes and so you start having "different experiences"
it does *not* alter your identity. The key word in
your paragraph is "continuity". You intuit that
continuity of experience is lost, while everyone who
argues with you about atoms does not see it that way.
Your posts are very long, and I'm sorry that I don't have
time at present to respond to them in detail.
> I should have emphasized 'continuation' of subjective experience, which I
> guess I skipped over in typing that particular message.
Yes, right.
> Since the result says "copy and original, ...do not share same sensory
> experience" And you say that does not follow, the converse would be that the
> copy and original DO share the SAME sensory experience. Would you assert
> then that both the reference and the copy *share* subjective experiences?
No, of course not. I would simply say that choosing which one
is the *reference* version is an arbitrary choice.
> I really do not know if I can explain it any clearer. This is either
> because I can not convey my ideas clearly enough, or there is a fundamental
> misunderstanding of what I am saying. If I walk into a scanner, and a copy
> is made of me, and we both walk out, I can not see what he sees, and he can
> not see what I see.
An axiom of your thought---which you seem unable to challenge
---is that you *would* be the original and *would not* be
the duplicate. Here you should say "neither can see what
the other sees" without presuming to know which is the
*real* you.
Please remember that if *physics* is all that is really true,
and, as Jef agree with me, it's only our evolutionarily
derived identification with one set of bones that causes
us to think the "other" as *alien*, then there is
NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM.
Again: suppose that indeed *physics* is all there is,
and that an almost infinitely long description using
only physical terms of one of them is therefore
extremely similar to an analogous description of the other.
Then in this case, we have *no* reason to suppose that
the one who happened physically to be the original
differs in any important way from the other. The
key point again (sorry to be repetitive): the
description from the point of view of physics
may be complete!
>> Suppose that you were forced (by the way, have you ever
>> read much SF?) to teleport the first few times---friends
>> grab you and throw you in to the teleporter terminal just
>> as the Thought Police are about to capture you all.
>> And then, to avoid an incredibly taxing mile-high climb
>> each morning, you just eventually relent and agree to
>> teleport. The social effect on you of seeing your friends
>> and loved ones teleport over and over again with no bad
>> effects would get to you. "
>
> When you speak of my seeing my friends and loved ones
> teleported with no ill effects is really a red herring.
> I know that when they are teleported a virtually exact
> copy of them was made, a copy which from every external
> measurement is identical to the original... I would
> never lose the nagging feeling that ... [despite the copy
> in front of me, my loved one] now ceases to exist.
I predict that you would quickly get used to it.
We relate to others overwhelmingly powerfully
on non-intellectual levels, and when the same
old foibles, the same old expressions, the same
old everything continued as before, your certainty
that that person was really gone would evaporate.
> Incidentally, I have not read a lot of sci fi really, I stick mostly to
> non-fiction, but if you can suggest a book that will help to clarify the
> logical implications of copying / teleporting I would check it out.
There have been treatments of this all the way back to
"Rogue Moon", a 1947 book, if I recall correctly. But
Greg Egan's AXIOMATIC is *the* book with which to jolt
your unconscious assumptions and gain a different and
puzzling (for me too!) take on all this.
Lee
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