From: Dickey, Michael F (michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com)
Date: Fri Oct 25 2002 - 14:21:10 MDT
-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc@att.net]
"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com>
>This is the core of my argument. If you copy and original, the
>original and the copy do not share the same sensory experience,
>so they *must not* be the same person
"If that's the core then I don't see what were arguing about. I've said many
times that usually (but not always) the two would not share the same sensory
experience and yes that would soon make them non identical and yes that
would soon make them different people. All I'm saying is that as long as
they remain the same (and that won't be long in most cases) there is only
one person."
Then this is where we disagree. There is not 'one person' because there are
obviously two of them standing in front of me, even if they are in boxes and
sharing the same sensory input. Unless they share the same exact subjective
experience at the same exact time (that is, they are two manifestations of
one consciousness) then they are logically not one person. You can say that
the appear to be if there external conditions are manipulated to make them
appear to share the same experiences (e.g. put them both in black boxes, for
instance) but the second they are outside of identical subjective
experience, it is clear that they do not share the same subjective
experience. If they do not share it outside their box, why do you propose
that the nature of the universe alters the second they step into that box?
At no point in time are they 'one' person as A) they are not two
manifestations of one consciousness and b) are obviously two people. Please
point out the flaw in this logic.
>if you copy an original and destroy the original, there is
>no reason to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
>of the subjective experience of the original.
"Oh I think there is an excellent reason to suspect a continuation of
consciousness, just ask the fellow if he had any subjective experience
yesterday or last month or last year and I'll bet he'll say "yes"."
So because he thinks he had continually subjective experience then he did?
I was not aware that our thoughts formed the structure of the universe.
What if we copied the pattern and reproduced as a computer program and that
computer program insisted that it had its own subjective history. Would you
consider that a continuation of the subjective history of the original, who
stands outside the computer looking amused at the computer program? It is
quite obvious that even though this program (i.e., a different manifestation
of this pattern) believes itself to be the continuation of the consciousness
of the original, it does not make it so, and it is not a continuation, as
this is clearly impossible with the original still around and watching the
even. If we kill off the original, this does not make the problem
disappear, the copy is still not a continuation of the original conscious
subjective experience.
> It does not happen at the macroscopic level, so the analogy is flawed.
"Macroscopic objects are made of atoms, you say atoms are what give us a
unique subjective experience but science says atoms are identical and I just
don't see how something without individuality can give us individuality."
That is not what I said, please stop mischaracterizing my arguments. At no
point in time did I imply that any particular atom has any property
different from any other of the same type. In fact I explicitly stated that
this is not the case. The only significance to these atoms is that 1) they
are the atoms that the pattern is made of (all other atoms in the universe
are not part of the atoms that make up this pattern) and 2) that vast
majority of the atoms that make up this pattern at any particular instant in
time is the same ones that made up the pattern at the instant before.
"Besides your atoms are in flux, you are literally not the man you were a
year ago."
Again, at any particular instant in time the atoms that make up your pattern
are the same ones that made up your pattern the instant before. If all of
them change over a great deal of time, it matters not, because from one
instant of time to the next, that vast majority of them are identical. If
your pattern was comprised of 100 atoms, and atom 01 was replaced at one
instant in time, then at the next instant in time your pattern is now also
comprised of 100 atoms, but atom 01 is now atom 01a. This does not change
the fact that NOW at this instant, your pattern is comprised of 100 atoms,
at the next instant, atom 74 may be replaced by 74a. But at any one
particular instant in time, 99 of your atoms that comprise your pattern were
the same as the instant before. It matters not that ALL of your atoms are
replaced over a great deal of time at one at a time, it matters if ALL of
your atoms are replaced AT ONCE. There is a significant difference between
these two scenarios, in one of them almost every single atom that made up
your patter was present at the instant before. In the other NONE of your
atoms that made up your pattern before are present. We can clearly show
that in the second case, when NONE of your atoms are the ones that made up
your pattern before, that the new pattern made of new atoms is a different
person, because it does not share the same subjective experience as the
original group of atoms. You seem to assert that replacing one atom at a
time is no different then replacing all atoms. This does not seem
logically, given the circumstance described above.
> The huge difference is that they are two distinct separate entities. In
>the case of sub-atomic particles, one is at point xyz in space and
>the other is at point x+1,y+1,z+1 in space. They exist in two
>separate spaces, thus they are two different entities. I can point at
>them, one with each finger, and say 'see, they are two different
>particles,
"Are they? How do you know they are not constantly exchanging positions?
It's not as silly a question as it may sound at first because that thought
experiment is at the core of one of the most important ideas in modern
physics, exchange forces."
Is there any evidence to suggest that they are as the simplest explanation?
If not, then it is more reasonable to assume that they are not then it is to
assume that they are. You have mentioned using the scientific methodology
before, the scientific methodology does not place all possible explanations
as equally likely.
> A soul is not necessary to invoke,
"The laws of Physics say the two atoms are identical and a difference in
their history can never be found even in theory but you say the two are
nevertheless somehow very different."
I say they are different because one is in one place and the other is in a
different place. Actually, every atom is different because they are all in
different places. Do you dispute this? If you do, then you must be
insisting that all atoms are in the same place simultaneously, have any
experimental evidence that suggests this as the simplest explanation? They
are even more significantly different in this scenario because of ones
location it may be part of a pattern that creates a sentient being, while
another may be part of a pattern of a rock. Is this not a significant
difference?
Michael
-----------------------------------
GTS - John K Clark wrote to Michael F Dickey:
>> if you copy an original and destroy the original, there is
>> no reason to suspect that this new copy is a continuation
>> of the subjective experience of the original.
> Oh I think there is an excellent reason to suspect a continuation of
> consciousness, just ask the fellow if he had any subjective experience
> yesterday or last month or last year and I'll bet he'll say
> "yes". In fact you will probably have an extremely difficult
> time convincing him that he's the copy made just last night
> and not the original.
I agree. In fact I think the words "original" and "copy" have no real
meaning in any discussion of perfect copying.
This must be where your and my opinions diverge then. If one of these
entities steps out of the scanning side of the machine, he is obviously the
'original' If one of these entities atoms that comprised his pattern were
at the moment before scanning also part of the groups of atoms that made up
his pattern, then this is clearly different from the 'copy'. The copies
atoms that make up his pattern at the previous instant in time were
obviously part of a different structure, perhaps a pile of stock atoms ready
to be assembled. In these cases, the atoms of the original are 'different'
from those of the copy in a recognizable manner.
Similarly, as mentioned above, if the vast majority of the atoms that are
present in the original were present in the original at the previous instant
in time then it is reasonable to assume he has had a subjective continuation
of consciousness. It is reasonable to assume this since the opposite of
almost all atoms being present at the instant before is no atoms being
present at the instant before but sharing the same pattern can be clearly
shown to NOT produce a continuation of consciousness (ask a copy and an
original if they see the same thing) in only two logical scenarios one can
be proven not true, then the other must be true.
> Macroscopic objects are made of atoms, you [Michael] say atoms
> are what give us a unique subjective experience but science
> says atoms are identical and I just don't see how something
> without individuality can give us individuality.
> Besides your atoms are in flux, you are literally not the man
> you were a year ago.
"Indeed you are not even the same man you were a moment ago."
Which is something I have never disputed. We are all different as we travel
through time, but as the above example about atoms making up the pattern
attempts to show is that there is a significant difference between very few
atoms being replaced at one instant to the next verses every atom being
replaced at one instant to the next. one (the later) clearly does not
include a subjective continuity of consciousness.
This statement and objection also implies that ALL ATOMS must remain the
same for continuity to continue, thus if all atoms are eventually replaced,
continuity is destroyed, thus, so this argument seems to go, it does not
matter if they are replaced all at once or one at time. The above thought
experiment clearly shows, however, why replacing all of the atoms at once is
different then replacing one at a time, as replacing all creates a new
entity with its own subjective consciousness. I only argue that the vast
majority of atoms need to be the same as the ones that were present the
previous instant. The fact that all atoms are otherwise identical is what
makes it possible for you to both 'not be the same man you were a moment
ago' (made of all the same atoms) while simultaneously still being the same
man you were a moment ago (pattern) the key difference is the RATE of
replacement.
Michael Dickey wrote:
>> The huge difference is th...
>> can point at them, one with each finger, and say 'see,
>> they are two different particles,
John Clarke replied:
> Are they? How do you know they are not constantly exchanging
> positions? It's not as silly a question as it may sound...
> changed and by knowing that two completely different looking equations
> are really the same all sorts of interesting things can be found.
"Yes. It is very possible that the universe ultimately contains only a
single electron, only a single proton, only a single neutron, etc. (Kinda'
reminds me of Platonism.)"
It is possible, but it is not likely. Would you bet your life on the
'possibility' that the universe is made up of only one proton, one nuetron,
and one electron? Or would you bet your life on the 'possibility' that the
universe is made up of the number of electrons, protons, and nuetrons that
seem to be present by counting.
-------------------------
Dan said
"To answer Michael/Jef's objections, *even the history gets obscured in
this example*. If mere history was enough to distingush particles with
perfectly similar quantum properties, *even logically* [by name], a
variety of important proofs in physics would fall apart."
Those are the same innacurate representations of my argument that John seems
to subscribe to. I have never asserted that any particular atom has some
magical signature that makes us able to tell it apart from all others. The
driving factor of this argument is that if two sub atomic particles, other
indistinguishable, are indeed recognizable as 'two' seperate particles, then
they must, be definition, be different in some way. As GTS pointed out,
position is part of the quantum description of a particle that is also
described by the Pauli Exclusion principle, which means no two fermions can
take up the same space at the same time. If it is acceptable to agree that
two atoms exist, and not just one, then, if they are otherwise identical, we
must be able to tell them apart by where they are. We can easily see that
one is part of a pattern that makes up a consciouss entity, while the other
is part of a homogenous pile of atoms that is ready to be assembled into a
copy of another pattern. At this state in time, these atoms are clearly
different from one another.
"But if identity doesn't inhere in the atoms *or* in the history of those
atoms, then in what does it inhere? How can you tell whether something
counts as "you" or not? The answer, as I've argued, is "whatever we
decide is relevant.""
I of course disagree, it is not a case of whatever we believe is fine. It
is quite clear that a copy and an original do not share the SAME subjective
experience, if they do not, then the copy can not be considered a
continuation of the subjective conscious experience of the original, but
instead must be considered a separate unique being.
----------------------
Ok, whats the problem here? Do other posters find me grossly incapable of
clearly expressing my ideas? This seems like I keep saying these same
things over and over again and are not seeing what I consider to be valid
objections or, it seems, even accurate representations of what I am saying?
Please point out the faults in my originally represented thought experiments
and I will concede defeat on any point that is show to be logically invalid,
I am not in the business of merely ideologically defending my ideas, I truly
see this as the simplest explanation for the way the world is, if someone
can point to me why this is not the simplest explanation, please inform me!
1) - the pattern is important to subjective continuity of consciousness
if we destroy the pattern, but keep the atoms, continuity appears to be
destroyed. e.g. mashed up an originals brain in a blender, same atoms,
different pattern, no response to question 'who are you?'
2) - the atoms are important to subjective continuity of consciousness
if we keep the pattern, but use different atoms, continuity appears to be
destroyed. e.g. arranged new group of atoms into pattern identical to
original, copy can not experience any subjective sensations that original
does, therefore the subjective experience of original and copy are isolated
and separate.
(note, it is not the particular atoms that have a magic property, it only
matters that some were member of a pattern of a conscious entity, while
other did not make up that particular pattern)
3 - the rate of atom replacement is critical
if too many atoms are replaced at once, subjective consciousness continuity
is not present. e.g. we replace all atoms, use the same pattern, copy does
not experience the same subjective sensations that the original does. If
very few atoms are replaced, subjective continuity of conscious appears to
be retained. At any given moment the vast majority of the atoms are the
same ones that were present in the previous moment.
Regards,
Michael
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