RE: duck me!

From: Dickey, Michael F (michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com)
Date: Thu Oct 24 2002 - 09:42:25 MDT


-----Original Message-----
From: John K Clark [mailto:jonkc@att.net]

"Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com> Wrote:

>If you claim that they are only one person, then by necessity they should
>share the same sensory input.

"Certainly, otherwise they would no longer be identical because they would
have different memories."

AND

>If we were to separate the two bodies we would find they experience
>different sensory input.

"Not if they were equally distant from the center of a symmetrical room,
then
each would see exactly the same thing the other saw."

Aside from the unusual special case you noted above, if you accept that to
be one person one must share sensory input with oneself, then noting and
accepting that a copy and an original *do not* share sensory input would
acknowledge that they are two, separate, distinct individuals. If a copy
does not experience the same sensory information that an original does, then
it is obvious that they (the two of them) are not one person. If the
original were destroyed in the process, it is still just as logical to
assume that the copy would not share sensory experience with the original
had he not been destroyed. Thus they are not the same people (i.e., the
original does not experience the sensory input of the copy)

To assert that this new copy is sharing subjective experience with the
original even if the original were destroyed is no different than asserting
it would have some magical telepathic link with the original were it not
destroyed. If that turned out to be the case if this thought experiment
were actually performed, I would definitely rethink my position. But
somehow I doubt that would be the result of the experiment.

"Both are made of atoms and both contain the same information so if an exact
copy of me is not me then just what is it that the one has and the other
does not? I can't think of a damn thing unless it turns out that religious
people were correct after all and everybody possesses a non material soul
that can only be made by God. I'm not holding my breath."

But both are not made up of the *same* atoms. Reference the though
experiments mentioned previously, but in short, if I copied your pattern to
new atoms, but kept you around. You would not share sensory experience,
thus the copy and the original you are two separate individuals (although
identical) To assert that a copy is you implies a telepathic magical
connection that transcends both the patterns and the atoms. It is clear the
subjective experience of the original you ends with the destruction of the
original you, because if the original was still hanging around after a copy,
the copy and the original you would not share sensory input. If you did,
*that* would imply some kind of religious magical soul.

Michael

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