From: gts (gts_2000@yahoo.com)
Date: Thu Oct 24 2002 - 09:00:02 MDT
Lee Corbin wrote:
> Jef referees the identity wrestling match:
>> Lee is saying that for all practical purposes, a copy of
>> someone should be considered to be effectively the same person.
>> He is saying that, in general, differences are not significant,
>> since we routinely think of ourselves as the same person even
>> after many years of differences have accumulated. This
>> viewpoint has interesting implications.
>
> Yes.
I'm reminded of the old saying: "Almost" only counts with horse-shoes
and H-Bombs. :)
>> gts is saying that even the slightest difference between
>> the original and the copy means they're not the same, by definition
Right, by definition.
However the problem also goes deeper than the question of absolute
copies: it is about the continuity of the sense of self. Even assuming a
perfect copy of me can exist, how can I be in two places at one time as
you say is possible?
If I am tasting wine in Napa Valley while my allegedly perfect duplicate
is guzzling beer in Tijuana, then does my wine taste like beer? Or does
my duplicate's beer taste like wine? Or do we both complain that our
drinks have been adulterated with wine or beer as the case may be?
The idea that a person can be in two places at one time, Lee, is to my
way of thinking sheer and utter nonsense.
As I wrote in a previous message:
"If Lee wants to be (almost) in two places at one time then he needs to
project his sensory apparatus while maintaining his one original
brain/mind as the instrument that cognizes his perceptions. He needs
something analogous to a periscope."
I think you should reformulate your arguments and your published essay
to advance a theory of how me might someday manufacture what might be
called "clairvoyance tools." It is after all clairvoyance that you seek
-- not the ability to be in two places at one time. Such robotic
clairvoyance tools would be something like mindless xoxes. You could
make these tools appear as you and behave according to your demand. They
would not be true copies of you but they would be true *representations*
of you. From that representation angle you might then be able to
structure an argument for the possibility of something very similar to
"being in two places at one time" that does not insult the intelligence
of your readers.
-gts
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