From: Dickey, Michael F (michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com)
Date: Wed Oct 23 2002 - 14:19:06 MDT
> still find it difficult to understand how people can assert that a
> copy of you is you. gts may at the same time consider himself the same
"A perfectly synched copy of you is you. Because there is no measurable
difference between them, by definition."
If a perfectly synched copy of me is me, then how come my copy would not
experience the same sensory information that I experience? Dont I
experience all the sensory input that I experience? Would I then see, hear,
and feel what my copy feels? If not, then that copy is not me, it is
someone else who thinks they are me.
Just because there is no measurable difference between two sub atomic
particles, does not mean they are the *same* sub-atomic particle, does it?
What if two electrons have the same mass, same spin, same momentum, etc.
etc. etc. Are they the 'same' electrons, or do they have an existence
independant of one another, and are merely identical?
No measurable difference does not mean that two entities are one, only that
they are identical.
Michael
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