From: Dickey, Michael F (michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com)
Date: Wed Oct 23 2002 - 09:21:30 MDT
> Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> > Yes, one's duplicate's attributes *do* vary from one's, but
> > to a ridiculously small degree.
>
> Even people who differ by "ridiculously small" degrees are different
> people, Lee. There is no equivalency between them, which means they are
> not "one person in two places at the same time."
"It seems to me that you keep ducking *my* question, or my insinuations, at
least: isn't it true that you *are* the same person that you were yesterday
despite the fact that there are small differences between you? And if you
agree to that, then you
can see why logically I can consider myself to be the same person as a close
duplicate."
Ahh, it has been a couple months since we had this discussion. I still find
it difficult to understand how people can assert that a copy of you is you.
gts may at the same time consider himself the same person as he was a few
minutes ago while considering himself a different person than a copy made a
few minutes ago and still be logically consistent. You said "And if you
agree to that, then you can see why logically I can consider myself to be
the same person as a close duplicate" But gts is made up of the same atoms,
molecules, and nuerons in the same pattern performing the same functions as
gts t-10s was. However, a duplicate of gts is made up of entirely different
atoms, molecules, and nuerons, even though they are in the same pattern.
Imagine this thought experiment. You walk into a room, a non-destructive
scanner copies you and creates a duplicate, now you and your duplicate are
isolated. Can you see, feel, hear, taste anything that your duplicate can?
If you think you can, then you are indeed the same person in two different
places, but this hardly seems logical. If you think you cant, then you are
two seperate persons in seperate places, albiet persons that are identical.
However, since everything you experience is now seperate, the you in the
other room is a different person. If it is a kept a secret who is the
original and who is the copy, then no test can tell them apart. But just
because no one can tell who the original is, does not mean there wasnt an
original in the first place.
I consdier there to be three parts to a person
1) the pattern of his molecules / atoms
If we took our brain and put it into a blender, we still have the same
atoms, but no person, so the pattern is important
2) the molecules / atoms that make up his pattern
If we took different molecules / atoms and put them into the same pattern
(copying) then the person behaves identical to the original, but can not
sense, feel, what the original feels when sensorly isolated. Therefore they
are different persons, and the atoms that we are made up of are important.
Destroying the original does not change this.
3) the rate of change of those molecules / atoms in that part are orders of
magnitude smaller than the total atoms / molecules that make up the pattern,
so at any given time the vast majority of the molecules and atoms that make
up your pattern are the same as the ones at the instant before.
If none of our atoms are replaced, we remain the same person (same pattern,
same atoms) if all are replaced, we are a different person (same pattern,
different atoms, different subjective experience). If only one atom were
changed per second, then the vast majority of our atoms in our pattern are
the same as the second before. It seems reasonable that if the rate of
replacement is kept significantly low (whatever the existing natural rate
is, say .001% of nuerons are replaced each day) than at any given instant
the vast majority of you (99.999%) is the same atoms and pattern as you were
the instant before.
Our brains are in a constant state of change, we are not made up of the same
atoms today that we were made up of 1 year ago, yet we still consider
ourselves to be the same person as we were a year ago (albiet with some new
bits). Does this mean that we are justified in saying that a copy is me,
because just as the atoms in our brains change over time to eventually all
be replaced, a copy merely replaces all of those atoms at once. I think
logically the significant difference is that in one case all of the atoms
are replaced, thus none of the molecules and atoms that make up your pattern
were the same ones that made up your pattern the instant before. It is
clear from case 2) that the molecules are important to the subjective you,
to your continual perception of concioussness, because in a different group
of molecules with the same atoms seperated sensory experiences occur.
Replaceing All of your atoms in your pattern is a far different effect than
replacing less than all, or less than 1 millionth of them. As in ANY case
other then replacing them all, that vast majority of atoms that make up your
pattern are the same ones that were making up your pattern the instant
before.
I, for one, will not ever walk into a destructive copying or uploading
mechamism, as this will surely lead to my demise. If I were to persue
uploading, I would prefer a few nuerons be replaced at a time, at a rate
near or less the normal background replacement rate of the atoms that make
up my pattern. If I were to persue distributed backups, I would create
other nuerons that are linked to mine at the same or slower rate than they
are naturally replaced. If my pattern were distributed amongst multiple
groups of atoms in that particular pattern at any given time, then the
destruction of one (as long as it were a minority of the overall group)
would not lead me to consider myself a different person. Thus uploading and
distributed backups are both possible while retaining a continuity of
conscioussness with logically sound perception that you are still the same
you.
GTS, I believe Harvey, myself, and a few others seem to be the rare
defenders of this position (that a copy is not me and were I destroyed and
copied, I would still be dead) Last time it came up it was even mentioned
that being destroyed and copied is no different from going to sleep and
waking up. I would hardly considers these similiar, as one involves a
complete destruction of you, and the other does not. 'How do you know you
are the same person when you wake up that you were when you went to sleep'
was the question I believe. Such questioning seems to ignore basic
principles in science such as parsimony and occam's razor. I am reasonable
in assuming I am the same person because a) my atoms are the same b) my
pattern is the same C) there is no destructive scanner copying machine in my
room that I wake up out of
Michael
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