From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Tue Oct 22 2002 - 19:21:50 MDT
gts writes
> [Dan wrote]
> > Actually, I explicitly want to bracket that question. It's
> > my argument that we can solve the moral problems and questions
> > posed by personal backups/dupes/xoxes etc *without* settling the
> > question as to whether your dupe is "really you".
>
> Maybe so.
Well, the most obvious thing that I think gts and Dan are
missing is that one keeps to one's promises *because* one
is thereby rewarded for doing so. In our society, it is
not practical to go about breaking one's word all the time.
The reason for this is very pertinent to the identity
argument. The reason is, of course, that to all outward
appearances (and I would add for inside particulars as
well) one is seen as the same person over a very long
period of time. Law sometimes goes overboard on that IMO
and prosecutes a very old man for crimes committed while
extremely young. (Yes, true, there is the deterrence
angle.)
> So then to determine if a dupe is equal to his original, we need only
> compare the list of attributes. Given that our personality changes
> through time in response to events in our lives, and given that the life
> experiences of duplicates differ from their original's, it seems quite
> obvious to me that the dupe's personal attributes will be different from
> the original's personal attributes, even if only slightly.
Yes, one's duplicate's attributes *do* vary from one's, but
to a ridiculously small degree. One is far more similar to
one's duplicate made a few hours ago than one is to oneself
of a month ago.
> Thus we can answer the question of identity in the negative.
> A dupe is not the original. The original and the dupe begin
> to diverge immediately after the moment of duplication.
Of course they do, but the question has hardly been answered,
since you are arguing that a list of attributes is key. Just
as you are the same person you were a second ago, so I say
you are also the same person as a duplicate created a second
ago but happens to be in the next room.
> Lee's argument for the equivalency of dupes (which leads him to make
> nonsensical statements such as "A person can be in two places at the
> same time") fails to account for changes in personality. He focuses only
> on the duplication of memories, forgetting that personalities change
> through time.
I have not forgotten that!! ;-) OF course one's personality *slowly*
changes over time, and one *slowly* becomes someone else. Memories
are crucial, but I gave up decades ago on the requirement that identity
is preserved only through memory supersets. We forget things all the
time, but with little impact on our identities.
> For that matter, there is no important difference in my mind between an
> xox and an identical twin sibling. Fortunately identical twins have
> enough sense to know they are not the same person in two places at one
> time.
Well, they're *really* not the same person, you know! ;-)
Parents and close friends readily sense the difference.
But no one would sense the difference between you and
your duplicate. You and your duplicate could trade
places every day, and (except for occasionally thinking
you a bit absent-minded) your spouse would never know
the difference.
There is a reason that he or she would never know the
difference: it's because you have the same attributes
and are thereby the same person. Take that *list*
of attributes quite literally. Were 10^12 or so
statements regarding you written down, we would find
a tremendous overlap between them and those that would
describe you last month. Or next month. But those
would pale in comparison to how close the descriptions
would be for you and your very recently created duplicate
in the next room.
Lee
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