From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Mon Oct 14 2002 - 18:32:30 MDT
Dan Fabulich has written a fabulous account of the identity paradox.
He wrote today
> gts wrote:
>
> > I can see no reason that your act of self-vaporization would make you
> > and your alleged duplicate into a single thawed-out person with a
> > continuous sense of self. Can anyone explain the mechanism by which one
> > individual's sense of self should pass to another individual upon the
> > death of the first individual? It seems to me that belief in such a
> > thing is tantamount to a belief in witchcraft.
>
> The argument is that "your" (past) sense of self passed into the duplicate
> *ahead* of time, as the duplicate was made... the confusion here has to
> do with the use of the indexical pronouns "I" and "you", especially as it
> refers to the present, or the past, or the whole history.
That is exactly the case.
> However, they now also each have their own indexical property that was
> co-extensive with me() when there was only one person: one split has
> me[1](), the other has me[2](). You *were* me[1]() as well as me[2]().
> Now, each split is one or the other, and not both.
>
> Now, as you point out, when the Nth split talks and thinks about
> himself in the present, he'll be thinking about the property me[N](), not
> the original property me(). That's as may be, but there's something
> interesting about me[N+1](), even if you're just the Nth split; it's not
> merely the case that you're "very similar", but you used to be the same
> person.
This is the key point. Call the thinker A, the duplicate B, and the
person that they both were yesterday C. Now A identifies with C
and is quick to accede "A and C are the same person". But it's also
clear that B and C are the same person in the same way. Therefore,
A and B are the same person. Now I admit that this is too facile,
but it conveys the right idea IMO.
> That person me(), who both of you used to be, will survive so long as at
> least one me[N]() property continues. So when any Nth split thinks about
> the person he was in the past, he'll think about me()... for example, all
> splits will remember being the same person, etc.
Yes, that's true because you really all *are* the same person.
Recall that we don't have any trouble believing that the same
person can be at two different times in the same place, and
we should just get used to the idea that the same person can
be in two different places at the same time. It just takes
a little while getting used to the alienness of the idea,
that's all.
> We can make time-indexed synonyms from the perspective of the Nth split:
> me[now]() is synonymous with me[N](), and me[past]() is synonymous with
> me(), the original property. And then what you notice is this:
>
> If I push that button, me[now]() will die, but me[past]() will survive.
>
> This is an extraordinary situation in which to find yourself; if you're at
> all like me, you have no relevant moral intuitions with which to settle
> this matter.
Yes, it is extraordinary, but only by historical accident.
It might have turned out that duplicating physical objects
was no harder than exploiting nuclear energy. Now if we
were very used to duplicates being around, I predict that
over time we'd accommodate the perspective from physics,
namely, there isn't much difference between someone and
his duplicate. The whole difference is in a few memories,
and we forget things all the time. Besides, since I'll
be the same person next month, I can hardly fail (from the
point of view of physics) to be the same person as my xox.
So since you have realized that your "moral intuitions" aren't
founded on anything objective, you *can* decide that duplicates
are self because that's what a completely physical materialistic
analysis would suggest.
> If you want to reject this notion, you'll have to give some kind account
> of why I would pay more attention to one or the other: why I'd pay
> attention to me[now]() over me[past](), *or vice versa*.
Yes. But you'll wait in vein, I predict, because I don't believe
that such an account exists. IMO, people simply haven't gotten
used to the idea of being in two places at the same time.
> It just makes no sense to say "I will/will not survive the vaporization"
> without specifying whether what is meant is me[now] or me[past], in much
> the same way that it doesn't make sense to say that my car is 10 long,
> without specifying units. Conversationally, we can get in the habit of
> choosing one or the other, but morally, neither seems to be any less
> interesting than the other.
You're right here too. This by the way is why I doubt Emlyn's
principle, which in one form casts doubt on how objective the
question is. I believe that "whether X is Napoleon" is an
objective question, and has a true/false answer (modulo degree).
For example, if you are presented with a collection of molecules
that claims to be Napoleon, it's either true or false that it
has enough memories and personality dispositions to be Napoleon
or it doesn't (module to what extent, of course). It's even
possible that a certain collection of molecules would deny that
it is Napoleon, ridiculing the suggestion that it could be a
famous 19th century personage, yet truly be Napoleon because
a scan of Napoleon was taken at Waterloo, and then subjected
to intense brainwashing whose point was to convince him that
he was really the author of a book on Napoleonic warfare.
In the same way, something is either me or isn't me (again up
to a matter of degree). But my *opinion* on the question may
not be important.
Lee
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