From: gts (gts@optexinc.com)
Date: Mon Oct 14 2002 - 17:08:23 MDT
Dan Fabulich wrote:
> This is an extraordinary situation in which to find yourself;
> if you're at you'll like me, you have no relevant moral intuitions
> with which to settle this matter.
I think neither of us have moral intuitions to settle the matter as you
see it. But I think you see it wrongly. :)
> I'm used to the idea that I
> should try to keep me() alive, and I'm not at all used to the idea
> that me[now] might die while me[past]
> might live. I want them both to live, I guess...
In our example there are two instantiations of me[past]! One of them is
a subset of me in the frozen state and one is a subset of me in the
active state in which I'm pondering the vaporization questions. I can
eliminate either instantiation of me[past] without eliminating me[past]
or me[now]. Me[past] dies only if the frozen person and I both die.
Me[now] dies only if I die.
> If you want to reject this notion, you'll have to give some
> kind account of why I would pay more attention to one or the other:
> why I'd pay attention to me[now]() over me[past](), *or vice versa*.
>
> Certainly, if you think that me[now]() is the only
> interesting property, [perhaps because "I" is automatically present
tense?]
Yes, that is exactly why me[now] is the only interesting property. I am
not who I was at that time in the past at which that rascal Lee Corbin
xoxed me and zapped my duplicate with a freeze gun. I am who I am at
this present moment.
The killing of the frozen copy of me from the past will not eliminate my
past identity nor will it eliminate my current identity. But the killing
of my current identity will surely eliminate my current identity even if
my past identity survives.
-gts
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