From: Technotranscendence (neptune@mars.superlink.net)
Date: Fri Sep 27 2002 - 16:03:46 MDT
I thought this might be of interest.
Dan
>From
http://www.wetheliving.com/pipermail/atlantis/Week-of-Mon-20020923/03303
2.html
PaleoObjectivist@aol.com PaleoObjectivist@aol.com
Fri, 27 Sep 2002 16:06:48 EDT
In his 1968 essay "What is Perception?", neurophysiologist and
former Objectivist Robert Efron carefully sorts out the concepts
and terminology pertaining to perception and sensation.
He begins by noting that "perception" refers to any form of
"direct, immediate awareness of external reality" that results
from "energy absorption by receptor organs." He distinguishes
this from the other category of direct, immediate awareness
that gives us information about not external reality, but the
"physiological state or condition of our body" (e.g., our
experiences of nausea, hunger, pain, cramp). We can
differentiate between these two categories of awareness in
two ways: (1) psychologically, the latter are clearly and
directly experienced as "inside us," while the former give
us direct awareness of what is "out there;" epistemologically,
the latter tells us about our physiological condition, while
the former tells us about external entities.
The latter type of awareness is sometimes called "sensation,"
"feeling," or "enteroception." What we call it is not so important
to Efron as our keeping it distinguished from our awareness of
the external world, which he wants to call "perception."
(Personally, I think that both forms of direct awareness should
be categoried as "perception," and that our awareness of the
external world should be called "exteroception," and our
awareness of our internal physiological states "enteroception.")
Efron says that all perception is the "immediate consequence of
energy absorption," but that we do ~not~ perceive "energy qua
energy." Instead, we perceive "discriminated existents." Efron
proceeds to unpack this term. An existent is simply "something
which exists." He says that "it is the only word which is
sufficiently abstract to encompass all the different kinds of
things we perceive. We need a word to refer to the ~objects~
which we see or touch, to the ~sounds~ we hear such as the
'chirp' of a bird, to the ~shadow~ cast by an object, or to an
~odor~ or ~taste~ of an object." While the term "existent"
applies to ~all~ perceptual contents, the terms "object" or
"entity" typically are used to apply more narrowly to
"spatially cohering collections of matter." As for the term
"discriminated," it calls our attention to the psychological
pre-condition for perceptual awareness of reality, which is
also the ~defining~ characteristic of perception: "the action
of perceptually isolating and treating as a unit some ~part~
of the total spatio-temporal stimulus configuration" that
interacts with our bodies. (He acknowledges that the term
"discriminated" is redundant here. "How could one be aware
of an existent that was ~not~ discriminated?") Thus, Efron
intends to use the term "discriminated existent" to refer to
"the segregated, isolated, cohering 'thing' which is perceived.
The objects we see or touch; the notes, tones, or voices we
hear; the odors we smell, and the flavors we taste."
What, then, is sensation? Efron notes that "there are so
many different ways in which [the term] is used that it is
impossible today to use this word without inviting confusion."
While he declines to decide on "the most defensible meaning
for the term sensation," he does list the seven most common
meanings and gives them alternate labels, preferring to avoid
the inevitable confusion of the term "sensation."
1. forms or modalities or perception -- many writers refer to
the "sensation of light" or the "sensation of sound" (note that
Helmholtz does this in his 1862 work on musical awareness,
and that Rand picks up this usage in "Art and Cognition",
referring to our "sensation" of tones)
2. attributes of discriminated existents -- e.g., the "sensation
of brightness", the "sensation of loudness"
3. enteroceptions as contasted with exteroceptions -- e.g.,
the "sensations" of pain, hunger, cramp, or nausea
4. marginal awareness of discriminated existents -- e.g.,
"sensations from the toe" of which we are marginally aware
while perceiving something else; anyhing of which we are
not focally aware would be a "sensation" by this usage
5. undiscriminated, unintegrated raw sense data -- Efron
mentions the two schools of thought on this kind of
"sensation" (a) some hold that we are ~never~ conscious
of such sense data, that such data is not a phenomenon
of ~consciousness~ but instead "action potentials in
nerve fibers," which is a ~physiological~ phenomenon.
(b) others hold that we only experience such sense data
in early infancy prior to beginning to perceive discriminated
existents. (Note: this is the concept of "sensation" that
Rand borrowed from William James and which she uses
in 1966 in ~Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology~.)
6. unretained perceptions -- "sensation" here refers to
awareness of unintegrated facts that are fleeting,
unattended, and unretained
7. undifferentiated perceptions -- this use of "sensation"
refers to experiences such as a vague awareness of
"light" with no precise location, shape, or color. Efron
explains that this usage is arbitrary and unjustified,
because such perceptions lie on a continuum with
the most highly differentiated perceptions (see p.
155 of his essay)
In my opinion, Efron has performed an ~enormous~ service
to the world of psychology by sorting and clarifying these
various usages of "sensation." He is a largely unsung hero
of the Objectivist movement, and (IMO) we are considerably
poorer without his continued efforts on our behalf.
* * *
*
In closing, I want to note that Rand greatly confused
her discussion of music by an unannounced ~definition switch~
between ~Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology~ and "Art
and Cognition." In the earlier work, she employed the Jamesian
concept of "sensation" (sense 5 above), while in the later work,
she employed the Helmholtzian view (sense 1 above). While
there is ~some~ rationale (perhaps) for using the Jamesian
concept in regard to very early infant awareness, there is ~none
whatsoever~ for applying James' concept to our awareness of
tones. Our awareness of tones is discriminated and integrated.
(A tone is the resultant, integrated by our nervous system, of a
number of "simple tones" that are a complex of vibration patterns
of the object producing the sound.) Thus, it is not a "sensation"
in James' sense (#5).
And, as Efron's analysis makes clear, the proper term to use to
refer to forms or modalities of perception (such as tone) is not
"sensation" as Rand and Helmholtz did (#1), but instead
"perception." Our awareness of light and sound is always
integrated and differentiated, to ~some~ extent, so it is always
~perception~, not a "sensation".
At the very least, Rand appears to have become confused
between the two senses of "sensation." She apparently
wanted to treat tones as equivalent (and not merely similar)
to the unintegrated, undifferentiated sensations of very
early infancy, and Helmholtz' faulty terminology allowed
her to do so. But Helmholtz' use of "sensation" to apply to
tones was to what Efron identifies as a form or mode of
perception, and Helmholtz made it clear that tones are
integrated and differentiated, and he formulated the theory
and performed the experiments that prove it. His 1862
book bears ~careful~ reading, not just the cursory glance
that Rand apparently gave it.
Best 2 all,
Roger Bissell
__________
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