From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rms2g@virginia.edu)
Date: Thu Sep 26 2002 - 09:17:09 MDT
Daniel Ust wrote:
I won't disagree with what you say. I would not argue against there
being a need to have certain systems in place to process data. After
all, we don't see chairs or rocks using concepts. (Note the empirical
basis here.:) I said as much, in agreement with Kelley, in my review of
his book. Awareness works by specific means in specific ways and not
others. I would still say conceptual knowledge is ultimately justified
empirically. Even our knowledge of such propensities is empirical.
There still has to be something to be aware of for the processing to get
under way.
Yes, the mind interacts with the world. It's not a clear window. I
don't see where we disagree here -- except maybe over defining where
perception ends and conception begins.
### Yes, I think we are actually pretty close in our conceptual grasp of
this issue, we differ mainly in the way we lump and split some ideas. All
conceptual knowledge is indeed ultimately empirical, although some of the
empirical data is provided not by the organism but by the evolutionary
process that collects data in the form of differential survival of genes
specifying the neural architecture underlying the concepts. As a matter of
esthetic preference and neatness I prefer not to call this process
perception, but this is a minor quibble.
Rafal
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