From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Sun Jun 16 2002 - 10:57:31 MDT
Eugen writes
> On Wed, 12 Jun 2002, Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> > > I'm one of the [two] runs.
> >
> > I think that this is wrong. You are both of the runs. Duplicates
> > are selves. I would say that you have no physical basis for saying
> > that you are one of the runs and not the other.
>
> This only applies if you're looking at this from the inside. An external
> observer whose window of observation is not horizonted by the pressing of
> the button event sees that one trajectory goes on, and the other
> trajectory suddenly ends. There's clearly a difference between those two
> outcomes...
Quite correct in all details (if you ask me).
> if you decide to terminate, and nothing happens, you know you're the first
> run (because the first run runs always through regardless of what you
> choose). You can never observe your nonexistence after the execution of
> the decision. You cannot tell which branch of the run you are after
> you decide to not terminate.
I think that this kind of language gets one into trouble
eventually. I say it is wrong to ever suppose that you
are one branch but not the other. You are both branches.
Even when you gesture wildly and say *this* with exclamation
marks and capital letters, there are two physical referents
for your pointing: one, the earlier run, and two, the later
run. They are distinguished only (as you have just written)
by an external observer or system clock.
> > > The entity may or may not listen.
> >
> > By hypothesis, the entity does not listen.
>
> Life is uncertain. I can't know it in advance, and I refuse accepting
> absolutes resulting on consequence of such magnitude on what I think I
> know.
It's not my fault if you don't know what the word "if" means.
Hypotheses are to be assumed, just as *if* they were true,
for the entire duration of their scope.
> > about runs (program executions) that from the Operating
> > System's point of view are entirely deterministic. Your
> > calculation (i.e. your experience) determines only one
> > bit of output that the OS uses: namely whether or not
> > to terminate the second execution mid-way through.
>
> Because both runs are deterministic, only one outcome (to press or not to
> press) is possible. That information is available at the first run. If
> you're the second run, and you vote to terminate, you're doomed already,
> regardless of what you do.
C'mon, don't try to bring up free will here. Perhaps I'm
just grouchy today, but everyone on this list should understand
that free will and determinism can easily be seen to be non-
contradictory. What the machine decides (calculates, determines)
is the output of its exercise of its free will. In this thought
experiment the person decides (calculates) whether to press A.
Of course its deterministic.
> There's no way to tell, which of the runs is me. The probability is 50%,
> right? The odds here seem to be lots worse than Russian roulette, albeit
> minus the blown out brains splattering the bitscape.
I'm totally convinced that you should NOT look at it as
fifty-percent. **There is *no* physical difference between
the two runs, except spacetime coordinates.** It is absurd
IMO to say, "there is a 50% possibility that I am the later
run", because there is 100% probability that you are *both*
runs.
> No, I think won't terminate.
We agree. Terminating would be unwise. Terminating
is always unwise when life is at all worth living!
Choosing death is always unwise!! BEING ALIVE is BETTER
THAN BEING DE .../rant terminated, self-control regained/.
> > Also, as you say, (A) you could be surrounded by mere portrayals
> > of people that the OS puts on for your benefit, but who are not
> > real and do not have experiences, or (B) there could be other
> > people present (though it's much more complicated and takes
> > some work to make sure inconsistencies don't arise).
>
> Actually, because the runs are deterministic those others must be
> deterministic, too.
Of course.
> It makes me wonder about the degree of fidelity of a
> zombie I know intimately, yet that is not a person.
> I don't think a zombie would pass a Turing test without
> being a real person. If they are not zombies, the
> implications of your decisions have been just amplified
> n-fold (for the number of beings boxed in the sim with you).
All this talk of zombies is a huge confusing diversion.
There are all sorts of issues with zombies, even when
people agree what is meant. Except for lookup tables,
for example, I don't think that they can possibly exist.
What's the matter with my simple language above where
I contrast portrayals and emulations? Isn't that clear?
Lee (in an awful mood this morning grrrr)
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