From: Hal Finney (hal@finney.org)
Date: Sun Apr 28 2002 - 20:47:36 MDT
Joseph 1 writes:
[From the article]
> > > With sign language, some chimps seem to be able to communicate
> > > at about the level of a three- or four-year-old child.
> > >
> > > "If a human four-year-old has what it takes for legal personhood, then a
> > > chimpanzee should be able to be a legal person in terms of legal
> rights,"
> > > Mr. Wise says.
>
> I am continuously amazed to see such fallacies trotted out as sensible
> arguments. Just because a chimp can communicate at the level of a
> three-year-old, does not make that chimp the moral equivalent of a
> three-year-old.
Could you expand on what you see as the foundation of rights and what
allows you to distinguish morally between the chimp and the child?
Later you write:
> Rights bear with themslves commensurate responsibilies; animals such as
> chimpanzees are incapable of fulfilling those responsibilities. Does a chimp
> comprehend the idea of personal property? Does it understand the rule of
> law? Until and unless you can prove otherwise, I see no reason to grant
> rights with no responsibilities.
But this would apply as well to the child. So this must not be the
foundation on which you would grant rights.
We are also faced with other cases, such as a mentally disabled human
being who is stuck at the mental level of a small child, or a human
being who is in a vegetative coma from which he will not recover.
Should either of these classes of people have rights, in your view?
And if they should, can we easily explain why they deserve this privilege
while equally capable animals do not?
Another point which I keep in mind when discussing rights is this: The
first question to ask is, to which beings will I extend the courtesy of
treating them as if they have rights? If I interacted with a chimp,
would I treat it respectfully, or as you say, merely as a resource to
be used for my benefit in any way I saw fit? Only after being able to
answer this first question to my satisfaction am I ready to tackle the
much harder issue of whether I would seek to compel others to follow the
same decisions I have made. Am I so sure I am right in extending rights
to chimpanzees that I want to force everyone else to extend those same
rights as well?
This analysis helps me to keep in mind that when faced with a difficult
moral question, such as the proper treatment of higher animals, the
uncertainty I feel about right and wrong should make me doubly hesitant
to try to tell other people what to do. If I am not even sure about
what is right for me, I should not be claiming to know what is right for
others. Such a claim requires a much higher level of moral certainty.
Hal
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