From: G.P. (gdotpdot@newsguy.com)
Date: Sun Dec 02 2001 - 02:26:37 MST
On Fri, 30 Nov 2001 11:41:51 -0500, "Dickey, Michael F"
<michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com> wrote:
>My thoughts on Identity
>
>I am relatively new to this particular list so I had not seen this
>discussion come up before. I have thought some about this and think it is
>a very important issue to resolve.
This discussion has come up before, and some do not think it belongs
to this forum. I agree that it is an important issue (even if we
cannot perhaps "resolve" it yet). It is indeed crucial to the proposed
preservation of consciousness and identity through uploading.
>... the sentient being that awoke would have
>all my thoughts and experiences and would have a continuity of
>consciousness. However, this sentient being is, by definition, a copy. Is
>an exact copy me? I dont think so, I think its just an exact copy *of* me.
>This means that the original me does not ever perceive a waking up
>sensation.
I believe that if the copy has all your thoughts and experiences, and
a continuity of consciousness, then he (not it) feels like " the
original you" has perceived a waking up sensation. I would say that
this statement is identical to "the original me perceives a waking up
sensation".
>In reality, unless the copy of me is
>identical at the quantum level, theoretically a test could be made to show
>that this is not indeed the original me and is a copy.
IMO this depends on how you define "the original me". Of course the
statement above is true if you include your physical properties in the
definition. But it is also true if I wake up in the hospital after an
amputation. Here the common sense view is that I am still me after the
amputation. I believe this common sense view still holds if part or
all of the physical brain is removed, provided the "identity" encoded
in the brain is preserved. And after a lot of thinking and reading on
this issue, I am more and more convinced that the simplest working
definition of "identity" is consciousness and memory. In other words a
conscious being with all my memories is me. Or at least it contains me
(thinking of more complex cases where more than one set of memories
are uploaded to the same conscious processor).
>There is no doubt in
>my mind that this copy is a sentient being, but there is a doubt in my mind
>that it is *me* Sure, my thoughts hopes dreams and fears and any
>contribution I may bring to the world may live on in this copy, but I do not
>wake up and live on.
I think that if the copy feels continuity between the original you and
himself, then you wake up and live on. Unfortunately there appears to
be no way to establish an operative difference between this position
and yours. Perhaps we have to wait until the copy/restore process is
technically feasible, and then just ask the question to a copy. But to
continue the argument, how can you be sure that you don't die every
night when you go to sleep and that the conscious being who awakes the
next morning is not a copy with the same memories?
>In conclusion, I do not find any solace in a copy of me living on, even if
>it is objectively identical to me, subjectively it is not. So, I think,
>until the above scenario is achieved, I would opt for dearly protecting the
>physiological mechanism currently housing my consciousness.
Well of course I also wish to continue living in my body, at least as
long as it provides me with a reasonable quality of life. But when
this option is not on the table anymore, and of course copy/upload
technology has been developen in the meantime, I believe I would be
willing to try.
--- G.P. gdotpdot@newsguy.com
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