From: Smigrodzki, Rafal (SmigrodzkiR@MSX.UPMC.EDU)
Date: Sat Dec 01 2001 - 23:53:58 MST
####I have this strange feeling of deja vu, as if somebody wrote it
before....
From: "Reason" <reason@exratio.com> asked the following question:
Case 1:
1) All info on you that is necessary to make an absolutely perfect copy is
stored; same internal state in your finite state machine self. This process
happens at point A.
2) Said info is shipped to point B.
3) A duplicate of you at that point in time is created at point B.
4) Steps 1-3 happen in a smaller amount of time than it takes your internal
state to change.
5) There are now two of you. What does the identity theory say about this?
### The answer is crucially dependent on the attitude the individual
involved in the experiment (A-individual) has towards copying.
If you feel that the copy is as much a focus of your self-preservation
instinct as the directly (first person) perceived consciousness, then there
are indeed two of you, at least as long as the attitude persists in both
individuals. (This would be my attitude)
If the A-individual believes that copies are not self (= the value of their
survival is *not* the same as the value of the first-person consciousness),
the A-individual will deny selfhood to the B-individual, and the
B-individual might feel devastated by the realization of his copyhood.
Attitudes of other people will also impinge on the situation.
Case 2:
1) All info on you that is necessary to make an absolutely perfect copy is
stored; same internal state in your finite state machine self. This process
happens at point A.
2) Said info is shipped to point B.
3) A duplicate of you at that point in time is created at point B.
4) Steps 1-3 happen in a smaller amount of time than it takes your internal
state to change.
5) The original you is now destroyed.
5) There is now one of you after a short interval of there having been two
of you. Is it still you?
### See answer to #1 - either the copy is happy for surviving, or he is mad
about being dead (i.e. has to deal with doubts about his value as a person).
I would imagine that most likely the copy will insist on being a
continuation, at least regarding access to bank accounts, etc..
Case 3:
1) All info on you that is necessary to make an absolutely perfect copy is
stored; same internal state in your finite state machine self. This process
happens at point A.
2) You are destroyed.
3) Said info is shipped to point B.
4) Arbitary time delay occurs.
5) A duplicate of you at that earlier point in time is created at point B.
6) There is now one of you after some interval of there having been none of
you. Is it still you?
### Same as #2
As almost everybody who ever joins this recurrent thread, I think that the
answer is subjective. Yet, in agreement with Hal Finney, I believe that
there is one intersubjective criterion for selfhood - the ability of a
self-concept to survive (meaning, to objectively persist in the environment,
not necessarily with a subjective feeling of continuity with the past or
future). By intersubjective I mean able to span interpersonal differences,
without insisting on absolute validity. Those self-concepts which don't
survive are no less "valid" on their own, but of little intrinsic interest
to humans, who tend to be very fixated on survival.
Some concepts will result in a quick physical destruction of their carriers,
and their own disappearance. Some will persist, be it by defending the
carrier from damage, or by copying their carriers. Some might transfer the
self-concept to larger entities, group minds, or spawns (groups of
semi-independent minds who frequently exchange data by direct neural link,
and remain one distributed person). I am convinced that a whole menagerie of
strange twists on "individuals" will develop as soon as the technology
becomes available.
I do hope that my own self-concept of non-continuist, spawn-based life will
result in a large number of its carriers being produced, making it a good
survival strategy.
Rafal
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