From: Mark Walker (tap@cgocable.net)
Date: Fri Aug 24 2001 - 21:13:01 MDT
----- Original Message -----
From: Russell Blackford <RussellBlackford@bigpond.com>
> Ideally, people like me, who are attracted to Mackie's position should try
> to revise our language so that we no longer seem to make objective moral
> claims, but only give hypothetical recommendations, etc. However, this is
> damn hard.
>
> Actually, I do find that I can get by from day to day making very few
> *moral* judgments, as opposed to having personal responses, tastes, etc.
I wonder what you might say about, e.g.,
1. The 20-60 million Soviet citizens that Stalin had eliminated in the
Gulag. I know you want to resist saying that what he did was morally wrong,
so what do you say? What Stalin did was, what? Gauche?
2. Do you see any _significant_ difference between treating people as means
and ends? Obviously there is no moral difference as far as your concerned.
Is this a distinction without a difference for you?
3. Why do you think that you and your ilk should revise our language to
attempt to expunge moral claims? I would have thought that you would prefer
to use moral language to attempt to manipulate others--to get them to
acquiesce to your preferences--given that so many others believe in the
"myth" of moral claims. Wouldn't it be more _effective_ for you to pretend
that it is immoral for others to interfere with your liberty to pursue your
own version of the good, even though you are privy to the truth that moral
discourse is a sham? Why not keep the moral language and use it as a mask to
hide your will to power?
Moi? I am a skeptic--at least I think I am. Error theorists like Mackie,
seem to me, presuppose way too much knowledge of Being. I am inclined to
think that there may be more things in heaven and earth than our dreamed of
in our human, all too human, philosophy. If one is a skeptic like me then it
is appropriate to reason as follows: If there are moral facts or properties,
and we reason and act if there are such, then we will be better off. If
there are no moral facts or properties, and we reason and act if there are
such, then we will be better off. Why? Because to think there might be moral
truths is comforting, and it will tend to make everyone behave better. (As
the old saw goes: if morals do not exist, then everything is permitted).
(Note: my argument is NOT that we would be better off to believe in morals
even if we _know_ there are not). Cheers, Mark.
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