From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Tue Aug 14 2001 - 17:45:21 MDT
Peter C. McCluskey writes
>> Yes, there are a certain, though limited number of examples where
>> fitness is improved by false belief.
>
> I believe there is a wide variety of questions for which the benefits
> of thinking in ways that your acquaintances are comfortable with
> exceed[s] the benefits of searching for the truth.
That's true, but I observe that you have changed "fitness" to benefit.
It is of great benefit to me to know the truth, for its own sake.
*Benefit* is often defined according to one's own value system.
>> [The idea of moving closer to those you disagree with] would only work
>> if you had some confidence or faith in those who liked the other candidate.
>> As an example, suppose that you do not believe in God, but wish to be as
>> truth-seeking as possible. It does not follow that you should "move your
>> beliefs in the direction f beliefs favored" by those who are religious.
>
> I believe it normally does follow that you should do so (i.e. increase
> your estimate of the probability that God exists).
There are some issues about which I would agree with you: if more people
came to believe that JFK was the victim of a conspiracy, or if more began
to believe that it was hazardous to use airplanes, or if more people came
to doubt the Many-Worlds interpretation, then I might be swayed.
But on other issues, I wouldn't be swayed (and on many issues, neither
would you). For me, it wouldn't matter whether ten people believe in
UFOs or ten million do: my total "web of belief" about the supposed
reality of UFOs together with my beliefs about how gullible people are
concerning these issues that the skeptics routinely discuss, preclude
me from being influenced.
>> You may have concluded that they are simply out to lunch
>> for some reason (explanation).
>
> Concluded that you can be certain they are "out to lunch"?
> Or merely that they probably are?
That they certainly are (with the usual proviso that we can be absolutely
certain of nothing). I think that people who believe that the moon walk
of the NASA astronauts was a hoax are certainly wrong.
> If you mean probably, then Robin's analysis appears to imply that you
> should believe there is some chance that they know something you don't,
> and adjust your beliefs to acount for this chance.
No. There is no chance (to me) that the people who believe the landing
on the moon was a hoax, know anything that I don't. Quite the opposite.
> If you are truly certain, then I would be very interested how you acquired
> this certainty. Not just that many of them are "out to lunch", but that the
> best are.
It's very difficult to explain. One's understanding of the world arises
from a vast, vast number of impressions. According to pan-critical rationalism,
which I also believe, most of one's beliefs have in essense "stood the test
of time". For example, my disbelief in flying saucers has been sustained
through a number of arguments with believers, and through many accounts of
such arguments (e.g., in the Skeptical Inquirer). Sorry, but it's impossible
for me to account at present for exactly why I am more certain that the
moon landing was real, than I am, for example, that Harvey Oswald was the
lone assassin in the JFK case, both of which I believe to be true.
Lee
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